Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T09:38:19.036Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2010

Beth A. Simmons
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. E-mail [email protected]
Allison Danner
Affiliation:
United States Attorney, Northern District of California. E-mail: [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

The creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute war crimes poses a real puzzle. Why was it created, and more importantly, why do states agree to join this institution? The ICC represents a serious intrusion into a traditional arena of state sovereignty: the right to administer justice to one's one nationals. Yet more than one hundred states have joined. Social scientists are hardly of one mind about this institution, arguing that it is (alternately) dangerous or irrelevant to achieving its main purposes: justice, peace, and stability. By contrast, we theorize that the ICC is a mechanism to assist states in self-binding, and draw on credible commitments theory to understand who commits to the ICC, and the early consequences of such commitments. This approach explains a counterintuitive finding: the states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to hold leaders accountable do not. Similarly, ratification of the ICC is associated with tentative steps toward violence reduction and peace in those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to foreswear atrocities. These findings support the potential usefulness of the ICC as a mechanism for some governments to commit to ratchet down violence and get on the road to peaceful negotiations.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Abbott, Kenneth W., Keohane, Robert O., Moravcsik, Andrew, Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Snidal, Duncan. 2000. The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 54 (3):401–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Snidal, Duncan. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International Organization 54 (3):421–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Akhavan, Payam. 2001. Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? American Journal of International Law 95 (1):731.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexander, James F. 2008/09. The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact. Villanova Law Review 54:155.Google Scholar
Bacio Terracino, Julio. 2007. National Implementation of ICC Crimes: Impact on National Jurisdictions and the ICC. Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2):421–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernhard, William, Broz, J. Lawrence, and Clark, William Roberts. 2002. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. International Organization 56 (4):693723.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bloxham, Donald. 2006. Beyond ‘Realism’ and Legalism: A Historical Perspective on the Limits of International Humanitarian Law. European Review 14 (4):457–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradley, Curt, and Kelley, Judith. 2008. The Concept of International Delegation. Law and Contemporary Problems 71 (1):136.Google Scholar
Burke-White, William W. 2008. Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of Justice. Harvard International Law Journal 49 (1):53108.Google Scholar
Carr, Caleb. 2003. The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Danner, Allison Marston. 2003. Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court. American Journal of International Law 97 (3):510–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Danner, Allison Marston. 2006. When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War. Vanderbilt Law Review 59 (1):166.Google Scholar
Danner, Allison, and Simmons, Beth A.. 2006. Why States Join the International Criminal Court. Manuscript. Available at ⟨http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/international/Danner.pdf⟩. Accessed 8 January 2010.Google Scholar
Dixon, William J. 1994. Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict. American Political Science Review 88 (1):1432.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Easterly, William, Gatti, Roberta, and Kurlat, Sergio. 2006. Development, Democracy and Mass Killings. Working Paper #93. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elkins, Zachary, Guzman, Andrew T., and Simmons, Beth A.. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. International Organization 60 (4):811–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, Jon. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Farer, Tom J. 2000. Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal Law Help? Human Rights Quarterly 22 (1):90117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1):6890.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehl, Caroline. 2004. Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches. European Journal of International Relations 10 (3):357–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. International Organization 57 (2):337–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime. International Organization 60 (4):935–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glasius, Marlies. 2006. The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldsmith, Jack L. 2003. The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court. Chicago Law Review 70 (1):89104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Posner, Eric A.. 2005. The Limits of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ho, Daniel E. 2002. Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord? Journal of International Economic Law 5 (3):647–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holmes, Stephen. 1988. Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy. In Constitutionalism and Democracy, edited by Elster, Jon and Slagstad, Rune, 195240. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Humphreys, Macartan, and Weinstein, Jeremy M.. 2006. Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War. American Political Science Review 100 (3):429–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katzenstein, Suzanne. 2009. Strategic Delegation and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court. Paper presented at the 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April, Chicago.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O., Moravcsik, Andrew, and Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2000. Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational. International Organization 54 (3):457–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiss, Elizabeth. 2000. Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice. In Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by Rotberg, Robert I. and Thompson, Dennis, 6898. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ku, Julian, and Nzelibe, Jide. 2006. Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities? Washington University Law Quarterly 84 (4):777833.Google Scholar
Lee, Roy S. K. 1999. Introduction: The Rome Conference and Its Contribution to International Law. In The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations, and Results, edited by Lee, Roy S., 139. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maoz, Zeev, and Felsenthal, Dan S.. 1987. Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly 31 (2):177200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 2005. The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices. Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (3):440–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Mégret, Frédéric. 2005. Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A Theoretical Exploration Based on the Legal Nature of Complementarity. In Complementary Views on Complementarity, edited by Kleffner, Jann K. and Kor, Gerben, 152. The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press.Google Scholar
Meierhenrich, Jens, and Ko, Keiko. 2009. How Do States Join the International Criminal Court? The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Japan. Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 (2):233–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Méndez, Juan E. 2001. National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International Criminal Court. Ethics and International Affairs 15 (1):2544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meyer, John W., Boli, John, Thomas, George M., and Ramirez, Francisco O.. 1997. World Society and the Nation-State. American Journal of Sociology 103 (1):144–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2):217–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neumayer, Eric. 2009. A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and the International Criminal Court. Journal of Peace Research 46 (5):659–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pace, William R., and Schense, Jennifer. 2002. The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations. In The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, edited by Cassese, Antonio, Gaeta, Paola, and Jones, John R. W. D., 105–43. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Peskin, Victor A. 2008. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posen, Barry R. 1993. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival 35 (1):2747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2008. The Creation and Expansion of the International Criminal Court: A Legal Explanation. Paper presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April, Chicago.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ratner, Steven R. 2003. Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation. Texas Law Review 81 (7):2055–81.Google Scholar
Scheffer, David J. 2002. Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court. Cornell International Law Journal 35 (1):47100.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Looking for Audience Costs. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (1):3260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A., and Martin, Lisa. 2002. International Organizations and Institutions. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth A., 192211. London: Sage Publications.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Burke-White, William. 2006. The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law). Harvard International Law Journal 47 (2):327–52.Google Scholar
Smith, Heather. 2004. The International Criminal Court and Regional Diffusion. Paper presented at the 5th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, September, The Hague, Netherlands.Google Scholar
Snyder, Jack L., and Vinjamuri, Leslie. 2003/2004. Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice. International Security 28 (3):544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swaine, Edward T. 2003. Unsigning. Stanford Law Review 55 (5):2061–90.Google Scholar
Tochilovsky, Vladimir. 2003. Globalizing Criminal Justice: Challenges for the International Criminal Court. Global Governance 9 (3):291–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul, and Balch-Lindsay, Dylan. 2004. ‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare. International Organization 58 (2):375407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul, and Croco, Sarah. 2006. Covenants Without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War. World Politics 58 (3):339–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3):469–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walter, Barbara F 1999. Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace. International Security 24 (1):127–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar