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Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations Between Canada and the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Kal J. Holsti  and
Thomas Allen Levy
Kal J. Holsti
Affiliation:
Professor of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.
Thomas Allen Levy
Affiliation:
Thomas Allen Levy is a research fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax. Mr. Holsti prepared the first three sections of this essay on bilateral national institutions and the fifth section on future institutional development. Some of the material is based on interviews Mr. Holsti conducted with thirteen Canadian officials from four agencies, held on 5 and 6 March and 24 April 1973, and with five Americans in Washington on 12 and 13 March 1973. In addition, Mr. Holsti held talks with Mr. Sperry Lea of the Canadian-American Committee and one retired high-level official of the United States Department of State with extensive knowledge of Canadian-American relations. Mr. Levy prepared the fourth section of this essay on provincial-state relations. The material in this fourth section is based partly on interviews Mr. Levy conducted in seven provinces in 1970.
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Extract

Preceding essays have documented the dramatic growth of transnational relations between Canadians and Americans and have emphasized the development of new issue areas—private, local, regional, and national—between the two countries. As these relations expand in scope, complexity, and occasionally conflict, we would expect to see a corresponding growth in Canadian-American institutions to provide mechanisms for policy coordination, bargaining, and conflict resolution. The increase in formal governmental institutions between Ottawa and Washington has indeed been notable, but we must not conclude that these institutions constitute the core of the intergovernmental relationship. The informal and formal communications between federal government bureaucracies and between officials of the states and provinces are no less important; hence, the essay will focus not only on the bilateral institutions but also on the phenomenon that Nye and Keohane have called transgovernmental relations, that is, the non institutionalized relationships between subunits of governments and the activities they undertake that remain reasonably immune from central control (see their preceding essay in this volume).

Type
Part IV. Integration, Institutions, and Bargaining
Information
International Organization , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1974 , pp. 875 - 901
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1974

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References

1 Coplin defines problem solving as a situation where two or more governments agree that a common problem confronts them, even though they may offer different solutions and have competing or conflicting interests. In a bargaining situation, the actors “see each other's behavior as the basic problem.” Coplin, William, Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview (Chicago: Markham, 1971), p. 232.Google Scholar

2 The effective power of the IJC in some problem areas is revealed in the comment of one Canadian official who suggested that more bodies of the IJC type would not be welcome today because they are difficult to control by the central governments.

3 The case of fisheries is more difficult to classify. The institutions are strong, but interests both converge (preventing depletion of stock) and diverge (allocation of catches to fishermen of each country). See also Scott's article in this volume.

4 Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

5 Some of the rules were already well established in international law; others represented radical departures from accepted practice.

6 Many of the formulas for allocating NORAD costs were agreed upon prior to the signing of the agreement.

7 The Merchant-Heeney report lists 49 American and Canadian agencies that deal directly with each other. United States Department of State, “Principles of Partnership,” Department of State Bulletin 53 (2 August 1965): 193–208.

8 See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1969–1970, vol. 1, p. 64. The total given in the document is actually 12,900 visits, but this number includes 8,313 visits by staff from the Department of National Defence. Of the 8,313 visits by the military, a large proportion are Candian armed forces personnel sent to the United States for special training. I would not include these visits as an indicator of formal and informal contacts between government officials.

9 Fifteen thousand persons are directly employed in and another 100,000 are dependent upon defence industries. To get the proper magnitude, American readers should multiply these figures by ten. The figures are cited in Kirton, John J., “The Consequences of Integration: The Case of the Defence Production Sharing Agreements,” paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on International Relations, Ottawa, 8 April 1972, p. 15.Google Scholar

10 Interview with US Department of Defense official, 13 March 1973.

11 Interviews with former Department of State official and Department of Defense official, 12 and 13 March 1973.

12 See Holsti, Kal J., “Canada and the United States,” in Spiegel, Steven and Waltz, Kenneth, eds., Conflict in World Politics (Boston: Winthrop, 1971), pp. 375–96.Google Scholar

13 Officials in Washington and Ottawa both emphasize that problems between the two countries are dealt with separately and that no strategy involving trade-offs between areas had been, or would be, contemplated. Without being very specific, Canadian officials definitely felt that issue linking is a dangerous strategy for the smaller party in a relationship. See also Greenwood's article in this volume.

14 When Lyndon Johnson vetoed a bill that would have been highly detrimental to Canadian lumber exporters, he was reported to have remarked privately to a Canadian official that it was now Canada's turn to make a goodwill gesture to the United States. The famous “shopping list” of grievances held by Washington against Ottawa during the trade crisis of 1971–72 linked a broad set of issues, but they were all basically in the areas of trade and communications. Efforts to resolve the outstanding differences in these two issue areas through a package deal came to nought. Among other reasons, the negotiators found it impossible to weigh or compare gains and losses in problems so different as automobile trade and customs exemptions for Canadian tourists. On the NORAD decision, see Gray, Colin S., “Still on the Team: NORAD in 1973,” Queen's Quarterly 80 (Autumn 1973): 398–404.Google Scholar

15 See Nye, p. 41; Lindberg, Leon, “The European Community as a Political System,” Journal of Common Market Studies 5 (1967): 359;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stuart, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970);Google Scholar and for further discussion of developing integration measures, see Lindberg, Leon, “Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement,” International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970): 649–731.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 For a fuller statement of the constitutional issues, see Leach, Richard H., Walker, Donald E., and Levy, Thomas Allen, “Province-State Transborder Relations: A Preliminary Assessment,” Canadian Public Administration 16 (Fall 1973): 470–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar While the foreign relations of the states are confined mostly to Canada and Mexico, provincial external activity is more broadly international, including intergovernmental contact with Britain, France, and Japan. See Levy, Thomas Allen, “The Involvement of the Provinces in Foreign Affairs II,” in The Changing Role of the Diplomatic Function in the Making of Foreign Policy, Occasional Paper of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (Halifax: Dalhousie University, June 1973), pp. 57–72.Google Scholar

17 Leach, et al., p. 481.

18 Province-state agricultural cooperation involves the exchange of experience and hence constitutes an administrative relationship. The existence of transborder electricity grids connotes mutual assistance, an administrative link as defined here, while the long-term export of provincially controlled energy resources would constitute an economic linkage. Inasmuch as provincial and state trade offices serve to influence investment flows, they are of economic significance.

19 A Great Lakes Environmental Conference, for which Ontario was host and which was attended by eight states in September 1970, was undoubtedly significant in hastening the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement signed by the two national governments in April 1972. A more detailed analysis of province-state administrative relations may be found in Leach, et al.

20 Text of House Resolution No. 81 in Québec, Ministère des Affaires Culturelles, Service du Canada Francais d'outre Frontières, Québec-Am´rique, January 1969, p. 30 (author's translation). For the historical background see ibid., October 1967, pp. 13–16.

21 The text of the act establishing CODOFIL may be found in ibid., January 1969, pp. 35–36. The chairman of the organization is appointed by the governor.

22 Gouvernement du Québec, Conseil Exécutif, Office de I'Information et Publicité, “Joint Communiqué,” n.d.

23 Gouvernement du Québec, Conseil Exécutif, Office de I' Information et Publicité, “Quebec-Louisiana Liaison Committee,” n.d., pp. 1–3. According to former Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Marcel Masse, the Quebec component included senior officials of the Departments of Cultural Affairs and Education and of the Civil Service Commission. See his speech at the 13 December 1969 meeting of CODOFIL at Nachitoches, Louisiana.

24 State of Massachusetts, Acts, 1968, ch. 681, approved 19 July 1968.

25 SeeDagneau, Georges-Henri, “Les Lignes de Conduite du Service du Canada Francais d'Outre-Frontiéres,” ACSUS Newsletter 2 (Spring 1972): 81–82.Google Scholar Other writings on Quebec's cultural presence in the United States include Bonenfant, Jean-Charles, “Les Relations Extérieures du Québec,” Etudes Internationales 1 (February 1970): 83, and 1 (June 1970): 85–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cultural activity supported by the French government in Louisiana now surpasses considerably that of Quebec. Moreover, there are unconfirmed reports that the Canadian federal government is paying the salaries of one or two employees of CODOFIL. Whatever the extent of recent French and Canadian cultural involvement in the United States, Quebec's catalytic role in the cultural renaissance among American francophones is undeniable.

26 For examples, see Canada, Constitutional Conference, Second Meeting, February 1969, Proceedings (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), pp. 128 (Alberta) and 303 (New Brunswick); and British Columbia, Opening Statement to the Federal-Provincial Conference, Ottawa, November 15, 16, and 17, 1971, pp. 4–5.

27 See Willoughby, William R., The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study in Politics and Diplomacy (Madison, Wise: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 181–220Google Scholar and passim.

28 I am grateful to Professor Willoughby of the University of New Brunswick and to Professor Neil A. Swainson of the University of Victoria for making their respective unpublished researches available to me.

29 Interview conducted at the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, 16 June 1971.

30 See Leach, et al., p. 480, table 3.

31 The best-known analysis of the special character of Canadian-American relations is the report by Merchant, Livingston and Heeney, A. D. P., “Principles for Partnership,” in Department of State Bulletin 53 (2 August 1965), pp. 193–208,Google Scholar and printed by the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1965. See also Dickey's, John Sloan analysis of the decline of the partnership rhetoric: “The Relationship of Rhetoric and Reality: Merchant-Heeney Revisited,” International Journal 27 (1972): 172–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32 Some of the agreements made with the United States in past years were accepted at the time of negotiations as being reasonable bargains in terms of distribution of costs and benefits. Today, some Canadians question those agreements. They believe that the Columbia River Treaty in particular may have brought disproportionate benefits to the United States.

33 Swanson, Roger, “The U.S.-Canadian Constellation, I: Washington, D.C.,” International Journal 27 (1972): 188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34 One reporter has claimed that the Canadian ambassador to Washington has not received an audience with President Nixon in three years. See Stewart, Walter, “Our Washington Game Plan,” Maclean's, August 1973, p. 50.Google Scholar Stewart also notes the more nationalist attitude of younger Canadian diplomats in the Washington embassy.

35 Officials of both governments admit that they do not engage in advanced consultations when it is not in their interest to do so. They would prefer not to listen to foreign objections when formulating domestic policies. The Michelin tire case and the DISC proposal are two recent cases. The unwillingness to consult on some key issues is a notable departure from the recommendations of the Merchant-Heeney report. Occasionally, of course, transnational coalitions may form to oppose or promote a proposed domestic program. The conferences of state and provincial authorities were an important factor in promoting at the federal levels interest in Great Lakes pollution control.

36 Barbara Haskel has suggested that in bargaining between states of disparatesize, the weaker seeks to ensure adequate payoffs, assuming that the final agreement is in the nature of a fixed sum. It treats the negotiations as an “issue,” or “an area of common concern in which the objectives of the two parties are assumed to be in conflict.”. The stronger party treats the negotiations as a “problem,” where a possible solution can benefit both parties. It concentrates on increasing the joint gain. Lacking a required number of case studies, it is difficult to estimate to what extent this hypothesis holds for Canada and the United States. It would seem, however, that in the 1950s and 1960s most negotiations were seen by Washington and Ottawa as problems. Today Ottawa defines many of its relations with Washington as an issue; the American government treats sectors such as resources and defence as problems but trade and airline routes as an issue. See Haskel, Barbara, “Disparities, Strategies and Opportunity Costs: The Example of Scandinavian Economic Market Negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s,” International Studies Quarterly 18 (March 1974): 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 The assistant secretary of commerce in question resigned from the government shortly after presenting the proposal.

38 See Hughes, Barry B. and Schwarz, John E., “Dimensions of Political Integration and the Experience of the European Community,” International Studies Quarterly 16 (September 1972): 263–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar