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Reviewing the United Nations Charter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Lawrence S. Finkelstein
Lawrence S. Finkelstein
Affiliation:
member of the staff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Opinions expressed in this article are personal to him and do not reflect the views of the Endowment, which takes no point of view.
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Extract

The special provision in Article 109, paragraph 3, on review of the United Nations Charter resulted from the concern of many states that the five great powers, working in harness, would excessively dominate the organization. Most of the conference members at San Francisco resented the implication of permanent inferiority reflected in the great powers' special voting position in the Security Council. Although they feared that the Charter permitted too wide an application of the veto power, they nevertheless accepted it as necessary within limits.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , May 1955 , pp. 213 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1955

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References

1 This interpretation has been questioned. Dr. Jacob Robinson, for example, has raised the question whether the ratification procedure in Article 109, Paragraph 2, applies as clearly to amendments proposed by the special conference provided for in Article 109, Paragraph 3, as it would if the order of the two Paragraphs had been reversed. See Robinson, Jacob, “The General Review Conference,” International Organization, VIII, p. 318–319Google Scholar. Professor Hans Kelsen is reported to have questioned whether the restrictions of the amendment procedure should be understood to apply to amending the amending procedure itself. See Schwareenberger, Georg, Report of the Committee on the Review of the Charter of the United Nations to the Edinburgh Conference of the International Law Association, 1954, p. 12–13Google Scholar. Hereafter referred to as International Law Association Report. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles, in response to a question by Senator Gillette, stated his firm view that the requirements for ratification, set forth in Article 109, Paragraph 2, apply to amendments proposed by the special review conferences as well as to amendments which may be proposed by conferences called under Article 109, Paragraph I. See United States Congress (83d, 2d sess.). Senate. Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Review of the United Nations Charter. Hearing … Part I, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954. p. 25Google Scholar. Hereafter referred to as Hearing.

2 Hearing, p. 9.

3 See, for example, Clark, Grenville and Sohn, Louis B., Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision, Preliminary Print, 07 1953Google Scholar.

4 Robinson. Cited above, p. 324–327.

5 General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), November 3, 1950.

6 Senator Wiley has referred to the difficulties of preventing “crime when criminals are on the police force”. United States. Congress (83d, 2d sess.). Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter. Pacific Settlement of Disputes in the United Nations, Staff Study No. 5, 10 17, 1954, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954. p. iiiGoogle Scholar. Even before Soviet relations with the Western world deteriorated, the difficulties of planning joint action against an unknown potential aggressor had been apparent.

7 SirJebb, Gladwyn, “The Free World and the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs, 04 1953 (Vol. 31), p. 382–391CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and de Lacharriere, René, “L'action des Nations Unies pour la Securité et pour la Paix,” Polhique Elrangère, 09–10 1953 (18e année), p. 307–338Google Scholar.

8 For a contrary view, see Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, “The World is Round,” Foreign Affairs, 01 1953 (Vol. 31), p. 194–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Clark and Sohn, cited above.

10 Hearing, p. 7.

11 Dulles, John Foster, “U.S. Constitution and U.N. Charter: An Appraisal,” The Department of State Bulletin, 09 7, 1953 (Vol. 29), p. 307–310Google Scholar.

12 See, for example, Schmidt, Petrus J., “Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and Armaments,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 01 1953 (Vol. 25), p. 67–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cavers, David F., “International Control of Armaments,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11 1954 (No. 296), p. 117–123Google Scholar, and comment thereon by Benjamin V. Cohen, same issue, p. 125–126.

13 See United States. Congress (83d, 2d sess.). Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter. Pacific Settlement of Disputes in the United Nations, Staff Study No. 5, 10 17, 1954, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954, p. 10Google Scholar. The “chain of events” theory was set forth in the “Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedures in the Security Council” at Francisco, San which appears in Goodrich, Leland M. and Hambro, Edvard, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents (rev. ed.), Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1949. p. 217Google Scholar.

14 de Arechaga, Eduardo Jimenez, Voting and the Handling of Disputes in the Security Council, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950. p. 39–42Google Scholar.

15 The General Assembly's development has been well charted in Haviland, H. Field Jr, The Political Role of the General Assembly, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951, especially p. 88 ffGoogle Scholar.

16 Many of these questions are discussed in Jackson, Elmore, “Developing the Peaceful Settlement Functions of the United Nations,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11 1954 (No. 296), p. 27–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Attention is directed to Article 28, Paragraph 2, of the Charter which has become a dead letter.

18 For a fine analysis of the history of the membership question in the United Nations, see Gross, Leo, “Election of States to United Nations Membership,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 48th meeting, 04 22–24, 1954. p. 37 ffGoogle Scholar.

19 One might go one step further and suggest that the Security Council's role in the admission of new members should be eliminated entirely. In the League of Nations, admission was accomplished by the Assembly alone. See Rudzinski, Aleksander W., “Admission of New Members,” International Conciliation, 04 1952 (No. 480), p. 162Google Scholar. Also, see International Law Association Report, p. 20–21 for suggested revisions to this endGoogle Scholar.

20 United States. Congress (83d, 2d sess.). Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter. The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council, Staff Study No. 1, 02 19, 1954. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954. p. 20Google Scholar.

21 Gross, Ernest A., “United Nations Charter Review,” Social Action, 12 1954, p. 18Google Scholar.

22 Hearing, p. 20.

23 Goodrich and Hambro, cited above, p. 199–202.

24 On weighted voting, see the recent article in this journal, McIntyre, Elizabeth, “Weighted Voting in International Organizations,” International Organization, VIII, p. 484–497Google Scholar.

25 Hearing, p. 10.

26 United Nations Conference on International Organization, Documents. New York, United Nations Information Organization, 1945. Vol. 7, p. 441Google Scholar.

27 Ibid., p. 467.

28 Ibid., p. 440.

29 Ibid., p. 466.

30 Gross, cited above, p. 19.

31 The American Assembly, The US Stake in tie UN: Problems of United Nations Charter Review, New York, 1954. p. 132Google Scholar.

32 Statement by MrBelaunde, Victor A. (Peru) General Assembly, Official Records, 439th Plenary Meeting, 21 09 1953, p. 70Google Scholar.

33 Statement by MrUnden, Osten (Sweden) General Assembly, Official Records, 443d Plenary Meeting, 24 09 1953, p. 118Google Scholar.

34 Key, David McKendree, “United States Planning for Charter Review,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11 1954 (No. 296), p. 152Google Scholar.

35 Hearing, p. 9, 22–23, 42.

36 See “Soviet Policy Toward Revision,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11 1954 (No. 296), p. 147CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Gross, Ernest A., “Revising the Charter: Is It Possible? Is It Wise?” Foregin Affairs, 01 1954 (Vol. 32), p. 206–207Google Scholar.

38 Gross, Ernest A., “United Nations Charter Review,” Social Action, 12 1954, p. 17Google Scholar.

39 It can be urged on the other hand that the knowledge that there is to be a special conference will be a valuable stimulus to governmental appraisal of the United Nations and of national policies toward it.