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The Practice of Interdependence in the Research and Development Sector: Fast Reactor Cooperation in Western Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Henry R. Nau
Henry R. Nau
Affiliation:
Henry R. Nau is an assistant professor of political science, Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts.
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Extract

Scholars of international politics have recently offered the concepts of transnationalism and interdependence as alternatives to the state-centric paradigm for studying the impact of advancing technology on modern world politics.1 While these concepts in themselves are not new and may, to some extent, share the normative biases of earlier theoretical challenges to the state-centric model (e.g., regional integration theory),2 they should be examined separately because of the undeniable increase of transnational economic and social activities in the present system.

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International Organization , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , Summer 1972 , pp. 499 - 526
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 1972

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References

1 See, in particular, the recent volume of this journal entitled “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” International Organization, XXV (Summer 1971).Google Scholar The concepts of transnationalism and interdependence are not to be confused. Transnationalism refers to contacts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that do not involve governmental actors exclusively. Nongovernmental actors must also play a significant role. Interdependence, on the other hand, is a characteristic of the relationship between actors whether the latter are exclusively governmental bodies or include transnational participants; it refers to “the ability of statesmen to achieve those goals which have been set for them when goal attainment is contingent upon activities pursued elsewhere.” Or, alternatively, interdependent behavior is “the outcome of specified actions of two or more parties (individuals, governments, corporations, etc.) when such actions are mutually contingent.” See Morse, Edward L., “Transnational Economic Processes,“ International Organization, 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 380–81 and p. 379.Google Scholar For other definitions and studies of interdependence, see, inter alia, Young, Oran R., “Inter-dependencies in World Politics,” International Journal, 24 (Autumn 1969), pp. 726–50;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence (McGraw-Hill, 1968).Google Scholar

2 A separate essay would be required to examine this point in detail. However, one similarity and one dissimilarity between these approaches may be mentioned. While regional integration theorists sought to replace the interstate war model with a community-building paradigm at the regional level, transnational theorists offer their “world politics” paradigm in the hope of affecting community-building at the global level. Unlike integration theorists, however, transnational theorists do not seek to supercede interstate politics but to influence the latter toward cooperative ends.

3 Of the five potential effects of transnationalism discussed in Nye, Joseph S. Jr, and Keohane, Robert O., “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” International Organization, 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 336–42,Google Scholar the first two effects — increased sensitivity of societies to one another and the promotion of pluralism — have already been the focus, as the authors note, of cybernetic and neo-functional approaches. By contrast, the third and fourth effects — increasing dependence and the creation of new instruments of governmental influence (i.e., increasing independence) — seem to be the unique focus of the transnational approach. The fifth effect — the presence of autonomous or quasi-autonomous transnational actors in world politics — is significant primarily as it relates to the increasing dependence or independence of national actors.

4 For expositions of the independence thesis, see, inter alia, Deutsch, Karl W. et al. , France, Germany and the Western Alliance (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967);Google ScholarDeutsch, Karl W., “The Impact of Communications Upon International Relations Theory” in Said, Abdul A. (ed.), Theory of International Relations (Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 74–92;Google Scholar and Waltz, Kenneth N., “The Myth of National Interdependence” in Kindleberger, Charles P. (ed.), The International Corporation (M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 205–23.Google Scholar

5 For example, Nye, and Keohane, in “Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion”, International Organization, 25 (Summer 1971), p. 748,Google Scholar express the hope that their “world politics” paradigm “will stimulate new policy perspectives on the part of statesmen in governments and international organizations.”

6 See Morse, Edward L., “The Politics of Interdependence,“ International Organization, 23 (Spring 1969), p. 314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also Morse, “Transnational Economic Processes,” p. 374.

7 Thus, transnational theorists admit that “states have been and remain the most important actors in world affairs …” yet conclude that the state-centric paradigm “was more useful in the past than in the present and … is … more useful now than it is likely to be in the future.” Their conclusion obviously projects a future increase in the significance of transnational relations. See Nye, and Keohane, , “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” pp. 344–45.Google Scholar

8 Morse, , “The Politics of Interdependence,“ p. 313.Google Scholar

9 Analysts of transnationalism are careful to observe that the response to declining state efficacy may be conflict as well as cooperation. But their bias is to conclude that the advantages of cooperation are obvious and that “more frequently …, cooperative action is likely to create new international institutions to cope with increasing interdependencies.” Nye, and Keohane, , “Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion,” pp. 744–45.Google Scholar

10 Deutsch, et al. , France, Germany and the Western Alliance, p. 1.Google Scholar

11 The distinctions elaborated in this and following paragraphs are all relative, of course. But, as one theorist notes, “It makes a great deal of difference … whether emphasis is placed primarily on aspects of conflict or of cooperation.” Morse, , “The Politics of Interdependence,” p. 312.Google Scholar

12 Morse, Edward L., “The Transformation of Foreign Policies”, World Politics, 22 (04 1970), p. 378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Idem.

14 Thus, Deutsch and associates focus on the attitudes of national elites toward foreign policy issues and devote only one of the four sections of their survey questionnaire to domestic issues. France, Germany and the Western Alliance, Chapter 1.

15 Young, , “Interdependencies in World Politics,” p. 732;Google ScholarMorse, , “The Politics of Interdependence,” pp. 319–21;Google Scholar and Morse, , “Transnational Economic Processes,” p. 397.Google Scholar

16 Young, , “Interdependencies in World Politics,” p. 732.Google Scholar

17 The larger study is a doctoral dissertation entitled “Technological Politics: Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation in Western Europe” and examines research cooperation in the four major sectors of civilian nuclear reactor development in Western Europe — proven, heavy water, high temperature gas and fast reactors.

18 The point is not to be taken lightly. Had this investigator been interested in documenting cooperation, he might have concluded that national research communities in Western Europe are closer to one another today than they have ever been before. Data on numbers of scientific meetings, exchanges of technical reports and personnel, etc. would strongly substantiate this conclusion. This approach, however, would have done little to illuminate the obstacles effectively nullifying or at least seriously reducing the significance of these expanded contacts.

19 Fast neutron or fast breeder reactors represent the most advanced fission reactor currently being developed. (The control of nuclear fusion in power reactors is an even more advanced concept but of a different kind.) The principal economic appeal of fast reactors lies in their inexpensive fuel cycle based on plutonium (rather than costly enriched uranium) and their capacity to produce more fissile material during the nuclear reaction than they consume, permitting almost complete nuclear burn-up of the fuel elements.

20 For a more extensive elucidation of the difference between an economic and political perspective and the practical consequences of this difference for policy analysis, see the author's article, “A Political Interpretation of the Technology Gap Dispute,” Orbis, XV (Summer 1971), pp. 507–27.Google Scholar

21 For a reference to this early proposal, see Euratom, , Fifth General Report, p. 34.Google Scholar

22 Commissariat á I'Énergie Atomique, Rapport Annuel — 1957, p. 11.Google Scholar

23 The critical assembly is a smaller, zero-power reactor useful in studying the core characteristics of larger reactors such as RAPSODIE.

24 Scheinman, Lawrence, “Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe,” International Conciliation, No. 563 (05 1967), pp. 40–41.Google Scholar France's opposition was based on the fact that four of the five reactors receiving assistance under this program were American-type reactors (light water-moderated reactors). France wanted its partners to take a greater interest in the French gas graphite reactors, although French officials resisted sharing this technology on terms acceptable to the Euratom partners.

25 This was the purpose of the French-initiated proposals in late 1962 for a cooperative Franco-German project to construct a gas graphite reactor at Fessen-heim on the upper Rhine border. The project did not materialize because German utilities, with funds from the German government, chose the American-designed light water reactors for three demonstration plants decided upon in 1962–64. While American nuclear industries were not consciously implementing government strategic policies by persuading German partners to choose American over French reactor-designs, these transnational industrial alignments in the nuclear field did have important consequences for national security options. On this point, see Scheinman, Lawrence, “Security and a Transnational System: The Case of Nuclear Energy,“ International Organization, 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 634–35 and 640–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Haefele, W., “Das Projekt Schneller Brueter,” Atomwirtschaft, 8 (04 1963), pp. 206–09.Google Scholar The decision to seek American rather than French assistance had political, industrial and ideological roots. Having renounced military uses of nuclear energy, Germany was wary of imitating or becoming too dependent on the French program (or, for that matter, the British program) which stressed military applications. By contrast, the United States, as Germany's major Westernally and principal advocate of the industrial development of nuclear energy through the Atoms for Peace plan, was the safest partner for minimizing foreign suspicion. In addition, the United States and Germany shared similar industrial outlooks concerning the role of private industry in research and development. Finally, older scientists in France and Germany continued to harbor ideological differences stemming from the opposing socialist and fascist experiences of the two communities during the interwar period.

27 The report of the Yvon group has never been released for public use, but the author was able to read the text and question Community and national officials about its content. For some general reporting on the discussions of this group, see Agence Europe, 01 20, 1962, and 01 26, 1962.Google Scholar

28 At this point German federal and state authorities granted research funds on a year-by-year basis; whereas, Euratom funds covered a five-year period and provided the financial basis for long-term planning of major technological projects.

29 The Germans followed a general rule in this period which required that whatever was done internationally must be done at home on at least twice the scale. Later the ratio became more like 1:4 in favor of national programs. See comments of Pretsch, J., top-level official in the German Research Ministry, in “Europaeische Zusammenarbeit in der Kernforschung,” Atomwirtschaft, Vol. 11 (08/09 1966), p. 420.Google Scholar

30 The political nature of the disagreement was admitted in retrospect by all officials (Community and national) with whom the author spoke. An indication of the perceptions prevailing at the time emerges from a newsletter comment by the German research society warning that close integration with the more advanced French program risked turning German scientists into “mere handymen of their French colleagues.” Deutscher Forschungsdienst, Sonderbericht Kernenergie, 02 7, 1962.Google Scholar

31 The fast reactor association contracts concluded between the Commission and the French, German and Italian programs included all fast reactor studies leading up to, but not including, the construction of a prototype. Though the Commission preferred to include prototypes, the contracts provided that each party would not undertake any new activities (prototypes being included) without first presenting proposals to the association for collective action. If one party was unable to participate in these activities for lack of funds, the other party could undertake the activities on its own.

Organizationally, each association contract established a Comité de Gestion composed of equal numbers of Commission and national representatives to exercise overall responsibility for the performance of the common research program. The Comite took decisions on a majority basis provided this majority included at least one representative of each party — in effect a veto system if the national or Commission representatives were to vote as a block. Daily supervision of research was entrusted to the Project Head who turned out, in each case, to be the head of the corresponding national program. Contract conditions permitted the assignment of Commission personnel to the research work teams and the exchange of national staff members among the associations.

The Groupe de Liaison set up to coordinate the separate associations consisted of representatives from the Commission and each of the association partners. This group had no powers of decision or regular meeting schedule. Its function was exclusively that of review and information exchange.

For copies of the French, German and Italian association agreements, see Euratom Commission Document Nos. EUR/C/1124/6/62f, EUR/C/2015/5/63f and EUR/C/489/3/63f respectively. Much of the information discussed in the rest of this article was culled from the minutes of the Comite de Gestion of the individual associations and confirmed in conversations with participating officials. The documents themselves are not available for public citation.

32 Exact percentages of contract funds from each association going to non-national firms are not available, but conversations with participating officials disclosed that in no case did any association disperse more than 10 percent of total program expenditures outside the national economy. France, by placing the design contract for its critical assembly with Belgonucleaire and minor sub-contracts for RAPSODIE with Neratoom (Holland), awarded the highest percentage to outside firms, while Germany awarded scarcely 1 percent of total funds to non-German industries. Italy distributed all of its funds to local industries.

33 The Commission stated this interest explicitly in a letter drafted at the time of the signing of the German association. See Euratom Commission Document No. EUR/C/2549/l/63d.

34 Before receiving the contracts, ALKEM did reduce its bid to that of the Belgian firm. In this limited sense, the purpose of competitive bidding was served. But subsequent cost overruns led to a 75 percent increase in the ALKEM contract, and the entire proceedings did nothing to encourage transnational industrial contracts, a principal objective of the common program.

35 Agence Europe, 12 13, 1963.Google Scholar

36 The French favored a dry reprocessing technique involving the construction of a separate plant, while the Germans preferred an aqueous technique which would permit expansion of existing facilities used in reprocessing natural and slightly enriched uranium. The French later switched to the aqueous concept.

37 The attack against CNEN stemmed from alleged misconduct on the part of Felice Ippolito, the Secretary-General of CNEN, and led to Ippolito's imprisonment as well as a full-scale Parliamentary review of Italy's nuclear programs, See Atomo e Industria, September 1, 1963, and March 1, 1964.

38 While Commission personnel were freely assigned to the separate associations, few national members were exchanged between the associations. Only one CEA man was seconded by the Commission to Karlsruhe, and no Germans were officially assigned to Cadarache. The Italians had no national representatives assigned to either program.

39 Agence Europe, March 22, 1965.

40 The Commission initially planned in 1962 to lease plutonium selling in the United States for $12–15/gram. As it turned out, it had to buy this fuel outright at a price of $43/gram.

41 From 1964 on, France sought to limit Euratom activities to those fields — fast reactors, the Community's ORGEL program, nuclear fusion — which France considered most important for Europe's future independence in the reactor field. Revisions of the second five-year plan in 1965 and again in 1967 raised Euratom expenditures for fast reactors from $73 million to $91 million. Only after the second revision did France finally agree to pay the additional amount for plutonium purchases.

42 For a general discussion of the SEFOR project, see Schnurr, W. and Welsh, J. R., “The SEFOR Reactor — Aspects of International Cooperation.” Paper presented at the Third United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 09 1964.Google Scholar

43 See, e.g., the comments of the French Project Head, Vendryes, G., in Nucleonics Week, 08 31, 1967.Google Scholar

44 Agence Europe, March 17, 1965. See also the subsequently published report, Euratom Commission, First Target Programme for the European Atomic Energy Community (Brussels, 03, 1966).Google Scholar

45 Bertrand Goldschmidt, “Les principales options techniques du programme francais de production d'énergie nucleaire,” Revue Francaise de l'Énergie, Numéro special (10 1969), p. 92.Google Scholar

46 For a description of the context in which these talks occurred, see Agence Europe, March 28, 1966. The details of the talks were gained in interviews with participating officials.

47 Bulletin des Presse — und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 12 1, 1965, p. 1524.Google Scholar

48 While these reactors were not technically fast reactors, they were built for subsequent conversion to fast cores. Their development was intended to fill a need in the Gennan program, which RAPSODIE served in the French program.

49 Forschungsdienst, Deutscher, Sonderbericht Kernenergie, 01 12, 1967.Google ScholarInteratom together with Siemens (which from 1964 on discussed merger plans with Interatom) opened discussions with Belgonucleaire and Neratoom; while AEG and two other Gennan firms, Gutteh off nungshuette (GHH) and Maschinen-fabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg (MAN), opened exploratory talks in Italy with the mdustrial group, Instituto per la Reconstruzione Industriale (IRI) and the national electricity company, Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica (ENEL).

50 Agence Europe, October 10, 1967. The AEG/GHH/MAN talks with IRI and ENEL (Note 49) never reached the serious negotiating stage. They ended for good in 1968 when German officials, under pressure of mounting costs, dropped the steam-cooled program altogether.

51 The shares in this enterprise were divided 70 per cent Germany, 15 per cent Belgium and 15 per cent Holland. Luxembourg joined in 1969 at a small percentage.

52 German and French differences on industrial issues were expressed in separate memoranda submitted to the Council in 1968. See Note déleacute;gation française, Cooperation européenne dans le domaine des réacteurs rapides, April 1968, 817f/68 (ATO 40) nl; and Memorandum der deutschen, der belgischen und der nieder-laendischen Regierung, Moeglichkeiten fuer die Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der schnellen Reaktoren im Rahmen von Euratom, May 1968, 919d/68 (ATO 47) mp.

53 Se discussion of the Commission's proposals to the Council in March 1968 in Agence Europe, May 21, 1968, and the Commission's recommendations in October 1968 and again in March 1969 for a third multiple-year plan: Commission of the European Communities, Entwurf des Mehrjahres-programms fuer For-schung und Ausbildung, KOM(68)801, 10 9, 1968, pp. 15–21;Google Scholar and Kuenftige Aufgaben fuer Euratom, KOM (69) 350, 04 23, 1969, pp. 50–66.Google Scholar

54 Atomo e Industria, November 1, 1969.

55 See copy of this communique in Research and Technology, bulletin published by the Press and Information Services of the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, December 8, 1969, Annex 1.

56 See Survey of the Nuclear Policy of the European Communities, Supplement to the Bulletin of the European Communities, September/October 1968.

57 Siemens' license agreement with Westinghouse expired in June 1970 and was not renewed. See The Times (London), 06 15, 1970.Google Scholar Once AEG severs its license ties with GE, the KWU merger will cover all nuclear activities of Siemens and AEG.

58 On the circumstances and content of the Siemens offer, see Allgemeine Zeitung (Mainz), 11 28, 1969Google Scholar and Agence Europe, December 16, 1969.

59 The announced reason for the German postponement was a safety problem involved in locating the plant in a densely populated area; but, as conversations with knowledgeable officials suggested, a safety problem usually reflects more fundamental technical design problems. Meanwhile, the French program was achieving unexpected success with a RAPSODIE fortissimo experiment designed to increase the power of RAPSODIE and permit more accurate experimentation of the PHENIX design.

60 As one Community official told the author, “the Germans were extremely disappointed by the results of this meeting.”

61 Agence Europe, July 14, 1971 and July 19, 1971.

62 For example, even the modest conclusion that “the higher the level of interdependence among component units of a world system, the greater the probability of system transformation” is not completely self-evident, since it rests on the assumption that the component units of the system are “collective entities” and behave “as a single unit with respect to … participation in world politics.” See Young, “Interdependence in World Politics,” pp. 740–43. This assumption ignores possible alterations in the internal capabilities of participating units which might enhance their passive ability to absorb external change and/or their active ability to resist such change.

63 Morse, , “The Transformation of Foreign Policies,” pp. 377–78.Google Scholar

64 This tendency was evident in all of the case studies conducted by the author, particularly the study of heavy water reactors where French and German scientists split neatly along national lines in arguing the technical virtues of pressure vessels versus pressure tubes for heavy water systems. Again the differences were less technical than personal and national in character. The problem is most severe in the context of unstructured, ad hoc relationships among scientists, such as those prevailing in the various working groups of Euratom's CCNR. But the problem also exists in international laboratories, as the following comment of a physicist working at the Euratom Center in Ispra, Italy illustrates:

There is no national physics. The physics I studied in Germany, I continued to study in the U.S.A., and I practice here are all quite the same. The thing that is different is the way different people attack a problem … I mean a solution is a solution … but how you get to the solution, this depends on your background, your cultural and national background.

Interview recorded in Teich, A. H., “International Politics and International Science: A Study of Scientists' Attitudes” (Summary report of unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), p. 9.Google Scholar For more on the impact of differing social and cultural experiences on the practice of scienc in Western countries, see Ben-David, Joseph, The Scientist's Role in Society(Prentice-Hall, 1971).Google Scholar

65 See Scheinman, , “Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe,” pp. 35–51.Google Scholar The tendency to minimize personal and professional rivalries among scientists derives from the general reluctance to question the norm of internationalism in scientific investigation. The reluctance is understandable and justified in the case of basic research. But science today is increasingly pursued and supported in the expectation of eventual application. Thus, an awareness of the human sources of technological nationalism may discourage the temptation, appearing in the literature on the politics of science, to explain away scientific rivalries in terms of administrative conflicts or administrative disagreements in terms of insufficient political influence of non-partisan scientists. See Crane, Diane, “Transnational Networks in Basic Science,” International Organization, 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 585–601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

66 Excerpts from speech reprinted in Industry, Research and Technology, bulletin published by the Press and Information Services of the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 12 14, 1971, Annex 1.Google Scholar

67 Young, , “Interdependencies in World Politics,” pp. 745–46.Google Scholar

68 See, Miller, Linda B., “Europe's Futures — Change and Continuity?” Journal of Common Market Studies, 9 (09 1970), pp. 105–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

69 Young, , “Interdependences in World Politics,” pp. 743–45;Google ScholarMorse, , “The Transformation of Foreign Policies,” pp. 382–83.Google Scholar

70 Concerning the political advantages of international economic and currency arrangements for United States policy, see respectively, Gilpin, Robert, “The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,” International Organization, 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 398–419;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Strange, Susan, “The Politics of International Currencies,” World Politics, 23 (01, 1971), pp. 215–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

71 This conclusion differs from that offered by Edward Morse who argues that internal interdependence and external independence constitute incompatible goals for European policy-makers because the level of interdependence between Europe and other industrialized societies is increasing as fast as the level of interdependence within Europe. Morse is right in suggesting that the two aims may work at cross-purposes; but this results only because the two aims are not informed by an overarching political strategy, not because structural changes wrought by modernization make the consideration of political aims irrelevant. See “The Politics of Interdependence,” p. 324.

72 Young, , “Interdependence in World Politics,” pp. 748–49.Google Scholar

73 Brenner, Michael J., “Strategic Interdependence and the Politics of Inertia,” World Politics, 23 (07 1971), pp. 635–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74 Nye, and Keohane, , “Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion,” p. 747.Google Scholar