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Obstructionism and the Rules of the General Assembly
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
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The United Nations action against aggression in Korea was aided by a series of fortuitous circumstances which included the absence of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council in June 1950, the existence of a United Nations commission in Korea which was able to provide a timely and unimpeachable report of the facts, and the availability to United Nations forces of a base in Japan from which military operations could be, conveniently undertaken. For the purpose of assuring so far as possible that united resistance to further acts of aggression would not have to depend so largely on coincidence, the General Assembly, on November 3, 1950, gave its overwhelming approval to the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.
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References
1 “Uniting for Peace”, Resolution A, Document A/1481, November 4, 1950. In the vote on this resolution, India and Argentina abstained.
2 The only exception occurred in the Second Special Session when China was given the chairmanship of the Political Committee instead of a Vice-Presidency.
3 New York Times, October 3, 1947. Mr. Reston blamed “bloc voting” as well as “interminable speeches” for this phenomenon.
4 Document A/PV.177, December 8, 1948, p. 2.
5 Document A/PV.191, April 13, 1949, p. 6ff.
6 Document A/PV.285, September 26, 1950, p. 32ff.
7 Report of the Special Committee on Methods and Procedures of the General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/937), August 12, 1949, p. 13.
8 Document A/1481, op. cit., Annex, p. 7.
9 SirMay, Thomas E., A Treatise on the Law Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, ed. by SirCampion, Gilbert (London, Butterworth, 1946), p. 433Google Scholar.
10 These observations apply to plenary meetings, but the situation is similar in the Main Committees, which are governed by a closely comparable set of rules. Both sets of rules, as amended in the Fourth Session, appear in book-let form as Document A/520/Rev.l, January 1, 1950.
11 See the verbatim reoords of the 58th, 67th, 135th and 169th Plenary Meetings.
12 On a point of order, General Romulo (Philippines) had moved “the reduction of the time limit of our speeches”. President Evattreplied in part, “I think in the long run you will find that perhaps more time will be saved by allowing discussion”. He thought that the Assembly should be given “reasonable notice” of such a motion. Later General Romulo withdrew the proposal, but properly protested the President's refusal to put it to the vote. See Document A/PV.177, December 8, 1948, p. 31ff.
13 Official Records of the General Assembly, 102d Plenary Meeting, second session, Vol. I, 10 31, 1947, p. 522Google Scholar.
14 Ibid., p. 524.
15 Official Records of the General Assembly, 54th Plenary Meeting, second part of the first session, December 10, 1946, p. 1110–1113.
16 Ibid., 76th Plenary Meeting, first special session, May 7, 1947, p. 116–122.
17 Ibid., 128th Plenary Meeting, second session, Vol. II, November 29, 1947, p. 1417.
18 Document A/PV.303, 303d Plenary Meeting, Fifth Session, November 3, 1950, p. 39–40.
19 President Entezam shattered all precedents by applying this rule in the Fifth Session. The first time the resort to this rule produced an effective decision against plenary discussion, there were actually nine speeches before the resolution came to the vote. These speeches, one a half-hour in length, were made under the convenient aegis of Rule 88, which provides for “explanations of votes”. Generally, the voting preon whether or not to discuss a committee report has shown a high proportion of abstentions — dissuggesting that many Members, while not themselves desiring renewed debate, were unwillingto interfere with those who did.
20 Report of the Special Committee, op. cit., p. 9.
21 Ibid. It should be noted that under both Rule 67 and the Special Committee's draft, onefirst third of the Members present and voting could obtain discussion. The fraction is less arbitrary than it might appear: Resolutions on “important questions” are adopted in the committees by simple majority vote. Since a two-thirds majority is required for such resolutions in plenary — that is, since one-third (plus one) could prevent adoption in plenary — such a minority should be able to require discussion. Such disscussion should and often does permit the formulation of compromises which make possible the adoption of the measure by the Assembly in some amended form.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 13.
24 Document A/PV.161, November 18, 1948, p. 96.
25 See the verbatim records of the 54th, 100th, and 107th Plenary Meetings.
26 Chamberlin, W., Memorandum Concerning the Conduct of the Business of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 09 1949, p. 32Google Scholar. (Unpublished; quoted by permission.)
27 Robert, H. M., Robert's Rules of Order (N.Y., Scott-Foresman, 1943, revised), p. 143–146Google Scholar.
28 Official Records of the General Assembly, 55th Plenary Meeting, second part of the first session, December 11, 1946, p. 1140–1144. No provision comparable to what is now Rule 74 existed at that time. In resorting, as he did several times, to the closed list, Mr. Spaak had set a precedent for the rule which was adopted as such on November 17, 1947.
29 Document A/PV.193, April 14, 1949, p. 2.
30 Document A/PV.195, April 14, 1949, p. 61.
31 Document A/PV.214, May 16, 1949, p. 122.
32 Document A/PV.203, April 30, 1949, p. 7.
33 From Life and Letters of Joseph Story, quoted inLuce, R., Legislative Procedure (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1922), p. 6Google Scholar.
34 Op. cit., p. 174–175.
35 Document A/PV.231, 231st Plenary Meeting, Fourth Session, October 20, 1949, p. 22.
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