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Majority Rule vs. Great Power Agreement in the United Nations1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Aleksander W. Rudzinski
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Extract

I. The Rationale of the Veto

At the time of San Francisco, and intermittently since, five separate but interrelated arguments have been advanced to support the veto privilege: I) that the terms of Article 27 (3) of the Charter, by requiring big power negotiations before a vote is taken, in fact guarantee preservation of international peace; 2) that, since big powers cannot and will not submit to being voted into a war by small and medium states, the chain of events theory is valid and a big power should be permitted to exercise a veto on a subject which might eventually lead to enforcement action by the United Nations; 3) that the veto acts as a kind of safety valve preserving the status quo and preventing controversial changes which might cause conflict among the Big Five; 4) that the veto enables states in a minority position to protect their vital interests against infringement by the majority; and finally, 5) that the veto has, in fact, been used as a bargaining weapon by small states or by a minority.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , August 1955 , pp. 366 - 375
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1955

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References

2 The lone French veto exercised on August 25, 1947, in the Indonesian conflict (194th meeting) which killed the dispatch of a Security Council commission to supervise on the spot the fulfillment of cease fire was undoubtedly motivated by French preoccupation against creating a precedent which could possibly be used in the Indochinese civil war. Nevertheless, as it was cast in a conflict which did not effect directly French vital interests, it must be considered as an abuse of the veto privilege.

3 They are: Syria and Lebanon case, Security Council Official Records (1st year), 23d meeting; Spain, ibid., 47th meeting and 49th meeting (three times); and possibly Indonesia, ibid. (4th year), 456th meeting twice).

4 In the absence of established procedures which could lead, without the necessity of an ad boc consent of the offending state, to an authoritative judgment that the particular instance of exercising a right constitutes its abuse and, therefore, a breach of the Charter, the exercise still remains technically valid. Abuse must be proved, cannot be presumed. (Permanent Court ot International Justice, A.7, p. 30; A.24, p. 12; A/B.46, p. 167.) An interesting proposal was made by Mr. Spaak during negotiation on the defunct European Defense Community concerning the veto power of the states over the decisions of the Commissariat. He suggested that the Court of the European Defense Community decide whether the vetoing state was acting in defense of a vital interest (New York Times, August 28, 1954).

5 SeeVan Wagenen, Richard W., Research in the International Organizations Field, Some Notes on a Possible Focus, Princeton, 1952Google Scholar, and “Expanding the United Nations Community: The Future of the United Nations, Issues of Charter Revision.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11 1954, p. 93– 97.

6 At the present time the figure seems not to exceed 84 even when divided China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam are counted twice. Byelorussia and Ukraine are not included and the miniature states like Monaco and San Marino omitted.

7 See Sohn, Louis B., Cases and other materials of world law, Brooklyn, p. 316–345, 1234–35Google Scholar; andClark, Grenville and Sohn, Louis B., Peace through disarmament and Charter revision, 1953, p. 17–24Google Scholar; see also Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community, Ad Hoc Assembly instructed to work out a draft treaty setting up a European Political Community, Published by the Secretariat of the Constitutional Committee, Paris, p. 66–67;Mclntyre, Elizabeth, “Weighted Voting in International Organizations,” International Organization, VIII, p. 484–497Google Scholar.

8 An interesting suggestion is contained inDulles, John Foster book War or Peace (Macmillan Co., New York, 1950, p. 192–193)Google Scholar, to require in the General Assembly two kinds of voting on each important issue: the present “one state, one vote” method and in addition a “weighted” voting giving several votes to greater powers. A tentative but elaborate project of a weighted voting system in the General Assembly is to be found in U. S. Congress (83d, 2d sess.), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on theUnited Nations Charter, Representation and Voting in the United Nations General Assembly; Staff Study No. 4, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954Google Scholar.

9 Bluntschli, C., Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechts von den ersten ewigen Bunden bis auf die Gegenwart, Bd. I, Zweit Auflage, Stuttgart, 1875, p. 402–406Google Scholar; Motley, John Lothrop, The Rise of the Dutch Republic, vol. IV, The Co-operative Publication Society, New York and London, 1898, p. 161Google Scholar.

10 See Ball, M. Margaret, “Bloc Voting in the General Assembly,” International Organization, V. p. 3–31Google Scholar; and Furey, John B., Voting Alignment in the General Assembly, Doct. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1954Google Scholar.

11 The Mexican delegate had this situation in mind when he quipped at San Francisco on June 12, 1945 that “he was inclined to feel that the delegates were engaged in establishing a world order in which the mice could be stamped out but in which the lions would not be restrained” (UNCIO, vol. 11, p. 474). He did not foresee that the stamping out of a mouse enjoying the protection of a lion may not be an easy task either.

12 On May 25, 1945, the Committee II/1 of the San Francisco Conference approved by 30 votes to none a decision that the General Assembly “shall elect the Secretary General of the Organization upon the recommendation of the Security Council made by an affirmative vote of 7 members” (UNCIO, vol. 8, p. 399Google Scholar; ibid., p. 456). As agreed to by the US delegate on May 19, 1945, in the Drafting Subcommittee “it was the intent of the Committee that the unanimous vote of the permanent members of the Security Council was not needed to nominate the Secretary General” (UNCIO, vol. 8, p. 532)Google Scholar and “it was pointed out… that the phraseology employed was that of the Yalta formula as given in Chapter VI, Section C, paragraph 2” (procedural vote) (ibid., p. 399). The Report of the Rapporteur repeats: “It is the intent of the Committee that the majority stipulated shall be a majority of any seven members and need not include the concurrent votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council” (ibid., p. 452).

However on June 14, 1945, Committee III/I unanimously agreed that: “1. Since Committee II /I (dealing with the General Assembly) had no authority to incorporate the words: ‘made by an affirmative vote of 7 members’ … that action was null and void … 3. The voting procedure in the Security Council for other than procedural matters, approved by Committee III/I … is applicable to the nomination of the Secretary General” (UNCIO, vol. 11, p. 571). And so it remained.