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Interests, power, and multilateralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Lisa L. Martin
Lisa L. Martin
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University.
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Abstract

Multilateralism characterizes, to varying degrees, patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct. The utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront. Thus, the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution, as in coordination problems, and those under which it will not, as in collaboration problems. Within these constraints, powerful states choose institutions that will serve their interests, with multilateral arrangements becoming more attractive as the future is valued more highly. Multilateral institutions should be stable in circumstances of changing distributions of power, relative to more hierarchical institutions. The vulnerability of patterns of international cooperation to various exogenous changes depends on the type of strategic interaction underlying state behavior.

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1992 , pp. 765 - 792
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1992

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References

This article was originally prepared for the Ford Foundation West Coast Workshop on Multilateralism, organized by John Gerard Ruggie. The author gratefully acknowledges the Ford Foundation's financial support for this project. My thanks also to Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner, as well as to the participants in this project, for their valuable comments on this research.

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