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Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2016

Cameron Ballard-Rosa
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Abstract

What drives autocrats to default on their sovereign debt? This article develops the first theory of sovereign debt default in autocracies that explicitly investigates survival incentives of political actors in nondemocracies. Self-interested elites, fearful of threats to their tenure because of urban unrest, may be willing to endure the long-term borrowing costs that defaulting creates rather than risk the short-term survival costs of removing cheap food policies for urban consumers. I test my main claims that both urbanization and food imports should be associated with greater likelihood of autocratic default using panel data covering forty-three countries over fifty years, finding that autocracies that are more reliant on imported food and that are more urbanized are significantly more likely to be in default on their external sovereign debt. I emphasize the regime-contingent nature of these effects by demonstrating that they are reversed when considering democratic sovereign default. I also substantiate the mechanisms put forward in my theory through illustrative historical cases of sovereign debt default in Zambia and Peru, in which I demonstrate that fear of urban unrest in the face of rapidly increasing food prices did indeed drive autocratic elites to default on international debt obligations. In addition to providing the first political theory of debt default in autocracies, the article introduces two robust predictors of autocratic default that have been overlooked in previous work, and highlights the importance of urban-rural dynamics in nondemocratic regimes.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 70 , Issue 2 , Spring 2016 , pp. 313 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2016 

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