Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T10:42:02.806Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Hierarchy versus inertial cooperation

Review products

KeohaneRobert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Charles P. Kindleberger
Affiliation:
Ford International Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, and Visiting Sachar Professor of Economics at Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts.
Get access

Abstract

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Review Essays
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Frohlich, Norman and Oppenheimer, Joe A., “I Get Along with a Little Help from My Friends,” World Politics 23 (10 1970), pp. 104, 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), chap. 14Google Scholar.

3. Ibid., p. 293.

4. Ibid., rev. and enlarged edition, forthcoming.

5. Krasner, Stephen D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1Google Scholar.

6. Strange, Susan, “Cave, hie dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 337–54Google Scholar.

7. Gowa, Joanne, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Brelton Woods (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Lipson, Charles, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Young, Oran R., Compliance and Public Authority (Baltimore: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Kxasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and United States Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

8. Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984)Google Scholar.

9. Scitovsky, Tibor, “A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs,” in American Economic Association, Readings in the Theory of International Trade (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1949)Google Scholar.

10. Jones, Joseph M. Jr, Tariff Retaliation: Repercussions of the Hawley-Smoot Bill (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, W. H., “Theory of the Firm, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), pp. 305–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. Rosen, Sherwin, “Implicit Contracts,” Journal of Economic Literature 23 (09 1985), pp. 1144–75Google Scholar.

13. Cooper, Richard N., “International Economic Cooperation: Is It Desirable? Is It Likely?Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 39 (11 1985)Google Scholar.

14. Hahn, Hans-Werner, “Hegemonie and Integration: Voraussetzungen und Folgen der preussischen Fuhningsrolle in Deutsche Zollverein,” in Berding, Helmut, ed., Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europe in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenboeck & Ruprecht, 1984), pp. 4570Google Scholar.

15. Diebold, William Jr, “The United States in the World Economy: A Fifty-Year Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 61 (Fall 1983), pp. 81104CrossRefGoogle Scholar.