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Dag Hammarskjöld's Conception of His Office

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Joseph P. Lash
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Extract

In one of his first declarations as Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld said that no part of his task was “more challenging than the one which consists in trying to develop all the potentialities of that unique diplomatic instrument which the Charter has created in the institution called the Secretary-General of the U.N.”

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , Summer 1962 , pp. 542 - 566
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1962

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References

2 American Association for the United Nations (A.A.U.N.) speech, September 14, 1953. UN Press Release SG/336.

3 A. M. Rosenthal's account of a talk with the Secretary-General in 1953 published in The New York Times, September 19, 1961.

3 Ibid.

4 Press Conference at Idlewild, April 9, 1953.

5 Rosenthal, loc. cit.

6 A.A.U.N. speech.

7 Ibid.

8 Speech to the National Press Club, April 14, 1954, UN Press Release SG/378.

9 Ibid.

10 General Assembly Official Records (10th session), Supplement IA, p. xii.

* Some of the following material has already appeared in Part II, “The Office of the Secretary-General as viewed by Dag Hammarskjöld”, in the Fourteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The U.N. Secretary-General: His Role in World Politics, New York, 01 1962Google Scholar, for which I was responsible. Since much of it involves paraphrasing of Mr. Hammarskjold's statements, I have let the original phraseology stand with only minor changes.

11 UN Press Release, SG/812, May 1, 1959, p. 9.

12 General Assembly Official Records (16th session), Supplement IA.

13 Hammarskjöld made remarks to this effect to both Andrew Cordier and the late Heinrich Wieschoff.

14 In his 1953 A.A.U.N. address, Hammarskjöld had developed the same theme when he had described the UN as “a secular ‘church’ of ideals and principles in international affairs” with the Secretariat and Secretary-General as its priesthood.

15 For Hammarskjöld's reading of Articles 7, 97, 98, and 99 with respect to the functions of his office, see p. 6–10 of his speech at Oxford University, May 30, 1961, “The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact,” UN Press Release 1035.

16 Press Conference, April 25, 1957. UN Press Services Note No. 1590.

17 Hammarskjöld's five-point plan for Middle East stabilization presented at the opening of the Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on Lebanon and Jordan, August 8, 1958, A/PV.732) foreshadowed the final resolution. His statement to the Security Council (S/PV.873, July 13–14, 1960) was incorporated almost word for word in the Council's initial resolution on aid to the Congo (Document S/4387, July 14, 1960).

18 Professor Walter R. Sharp has suggested to me that Hammarskjöld's repeated offers to resign whenever he no longer had the confidence of the General Assembly suggests a parliamentary conception of responsibility in contrast to the independent position of the President of the United States.

18 In accordance with the principles generally applied by the Organization, the Congo Force “is necessarily under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council.” Document S/4389, July 18, 1960 (Hammarskjöld's first report on implementation of the July 14 resolution).

20 In his speech to the Chicago University Law School (May 1, 1960), Hammarskjöld noted that the UN founders, like the authors of the American Constitution, made him “the only elected member” of the executive branch. See United Nations Review, 06 1960 (Vol. 6, No. 12), p. 26–30Google Scholar for the full text.

21 Author's discussion with the Secretary-General, April 20, 1960.

22 Ibid.

23 Document S/PV.722, April 4, 1956, paragraph 51.

24 The author's discussion, April 20, 1960.

25 Document 8/4305, April 19, 1960.

26 Author's discussion, April 20, 1960.

27 Sir Pierson Dixon, United Kingdom Permanent Representative, considered that Article 99 could be read to mean that the Secretary-General's political initiatives could be through the Security Council, “but he [Hammarskjöld] says his real responsibility derives from the Charter as a whole. I don't think that the Russians like it. We have accepted it. … It was under the ‘Charter as a whole’ doctrine that he sent a man to Laos. He never stated what Article he was acting under.” Conversation with the author, 04 19, 1960Google Scholar.

28 Document A/PV.690, September 26, 1957.

29 Dictated version of extemporaneous remarks by the Secretary-General, at an official luncheon in Mexico City, April 8, 1959, privately circulated to some delegations.

30 Professor Leland M. Goodrich and others have queried whether this should not read “provisional agenda” since under the Security Council's Rules of Procedure the first order of business is always the adoption of the agenda. But this would not convey fully Hammarskjöld's meaning. In stating he had an “unconditional right” to inscribe an item on the agenda, he was implying that the Council was obligated to inscribe an item brought by the Secretary-General under Article 99. By contrast the Laotian crisis was brought to the Council's attention in the form of a report from the Secretary-General, but he did not ask that an item be inscribed or invoke Article 99. (Document S/PV.847, September 7, 1959).

Hammarskjöld said to me: “I took it to the Security Council without invoking 99. The Soviets said how can you do it without invoking 99. I said if I did so you would be obliged to inscribe it and under Chapter VII. In this way you don't have to inscribe it. The Russians thought that was rather cynical. But they had the right to ask for inscription. I can always ask for less than I am entitled to.”

31 Professor Norman J. Padelford has suggested to me the parallel with the “permissive doctrines” that have been developed under the United States Constitution where both the Executive and the Congress have moved into areas which, while not expressly authorized by the text of the instrument, were on the other hand not forbidden.

32 General Assembly Official Records (14th session), Supplement IA.

33 Author's discussion with Secretary-General, April 20, 1960.

33 Proceedings of General Assembly (fourteenth session), General Debate, October 6, 1959. The previous year speaking in the General Debate, October 7, 1958, Krishna Menon had raised “philosophic” questions about the executive developments of the previous few years.

It is all very well in an emergency to produce some sort of machinery and say “deliver the goods,” but I think we must think hard and see that we do not get a situation where the United Nations as at present composed, becomes a kind of superior authority, a kind of super-state with its representatives directing Governments, which is not provided for in the Charter, and where the Secretary-General will be pushed away from his Charter functions into other matters. … We have to see that we do not exceed the cautious balances that have been introduced into this Charter for the preservation of national sovereignty and for the preservation of small nations. If this rather superior power should be at the disposal of a snap vote of a two-thirds majority, the position of small states and of minorities would be far from enviable.

35 Author's discussion with the Secretary-General, April 20, 1960.

36 Roosevelt, Theodore, Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), p. 357Google Scholar.

37 Conversation with author, April 20, 1960.

38 Hammarskjöld, letter, November 7, 1959, quoted in The Christian Science Monitor, 11 19, 1959Google Scholar.

39 Soviet, comment leaked to press and quoted in The New York Times, 11 9, 1959Google Scholar.

40 Statement by Secretary-General to the General Assembly, April 5, 1961, UN Press Release SG/1020.

41 Document A/C.5/SR.763, October 6, 1960.

42 Document A/C.5/SR.768, October 17, 1960.

43 Document A/C.5/SR.765, October 7, 1960.

44 UN Press Release SG/971.

45 Ibid.

46 UN Press Release SG/1020, April 5, 1961.

47 Ibid. At this meeting of the Council the Soviet Union took the view that Hammarskjöld's interpretation of his mandate was in basic conflict with the Council's directive, and, that short of formal approval by the Council, Hammarskjöld's interpretation could have no legal or binding significance.

“Implementation obviously means interpretation,” Hammarskjöld replied. If his interpretation was' challenged, he referred the matter back to the Council and “I have the right to expect guidance. That guidance can be given in many forms. But it should be obvious if the Security Council says nothing I have no other choice than to follow my conviction.” Document S/PV.888, August 21, 1960.

48 UN Press Release SG/1020, April 5, 1961.

49 This was Palamarchuk's description of what Hammarskjöld had written.

50 Document A/PV.968, March 27, 1961.

51 Document A/PV.977, April 5, 1961.

52 Document A/PV.978, April 6, 1961.

53 Ibid.

54 Soviet delegation statement, No. 30/61, dated June 2, 1961.

55 Press conference of President de Gaulle, April 11, 1961.

56 In the Bizerta dispute, the French Government rebuffed his bid to come to Paris in connection with the Security Council's cease-fire resolution. It suggested he was biased in favor of Tunisia. Hammarskjöld's exposition of the situation, wrote French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville “appears to me to set out the views of the Tunisian Government. …” Exchange of letters, July 25 and 26, 1961 between the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. Document S/4894.

57 Conversation with the author, April 20, 1960.

58 Oxford University speech, see footnote 15 above.

59 Document A/4794, July 3, 1961, paragraph 7.

60 Oxford speech.

61 It is noteworthy that United States constitutional experts casting about for ways to discipline and restrict the United States Presidential Office have suggested a cabinet strengthened vis-à-vis the President by filling it with men not politically dependent upon him, capable of controlling and supporting him, and ensuring that Presidential actions reflected a wide consensus.

62 Document S/PV.885, August 8, 1960, paragraph 115.

63 Document S/PV.887, August 21–22, 1960, paragraph 36.

64 Document S/PV.888, August 21, 1960, paragraph 108.

65 Document S/PV.889, August 22, 1960, paragraph 141.

66 General Assembly Official Records (16th session), Supplement IA.

67 “The Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation,” speech at the University of Chicago Law School, May 1, 1960, reproduced in United Nations Review, 06 1960 (Vol. 6, No. 12), p. 26–30Google Scholar.

68 Copenhagen speech, May 1, 1959. UN Press Release, SG/812.

69 See Hammarskjöld's statement before the General Assembly, April 5, 1961. General Assembly Official Records (15th session), p. 191Google Scholar.