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Alliances, balance, and stability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Glenn H. Snyder
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Type
Review essay
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International Organization , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , Winter 1991 , pp. 121 - 142
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1991

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References

1. Liska, George, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 3Google Scholar. For a comprehensive inventory and discussion of theoretical propositions in a more “behavioral” vein, see Ole, R. Hoisti, Hopmann, P. Terrence, and John, D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: Wiley. 1973).Google Scholar

2. The seminal article is Mancur, Olson and Richard, Zeckhauser's “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (08 1966), pp. 266–79Google Scholar. For typical examples of the elaborations and critiques that followed, see Murdock, James and Sandler, Todd, “A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (06 1982), pp. 237–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bruce, M. Russett and Starr, Harvey, “Alliances and the Price of Primacy,” in Bruce, M. Russett, ed., What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 91–127Google Scholar. For applications of the theory to pre-1939 systems, see Thies, Wallace, “Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (06 1987), pp. 298–332CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Posen, Barry, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

3. See Zinnes, Dina, “Coalition Theories and the Balance of Power,” in S., Groennings, Kelley, E. W., and Leiserson, M., eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), pp. 351–69Google Scholar; and James, C. Hsiung, “Sino–U.S.–Soviet Relations in a Triadic-Game Perspective,” in James, C. Hsiung, ed., Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 107–32.Google Scholar

4. For the original theory, see Heider, Fritz, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Howard, F. Taylor, Balance in Small Groups (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970)Google Scholar. For applications to international relations, see Jervis, Robert, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Paul, Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 212–45Google Scholar; Healey, Brian and Stein, Arthur, “The Balance of Power International History: Theory and Reality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (03 1973), pp. 33–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McDonald, H. Brooke and Rosecrance, Richard, “Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System: A Reinterpretation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (03 1985), pp. 57–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. The seminal work applying n–person game theory to political science is William, H. Riker'sThe Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar, but its emphasis is on legislative rather than international coalitions. The pioneer in international applications is Wagner, R. Harrison, whose works include “The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 77 (06 1983), pp. 330–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics 38 (July 1986), pp. 546–76.Google Scholar

6. For recent works in this genre, see Michael, F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” Western Political Quarterly 37 (12 1984), pp. 523–44Google Scholar; James, D. Morrow, “On the Theoretical Bases of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (12 1987), pp. 423–38Google Scholar; and Michael, D. McGinnis, “A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (03 1990), pp. 111–37.Google Scholar

7. Wolfers, Arnold, “Alliances,” in David, L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), P. 268.Google Scholar

8. The best typology currently available is Russett's. See Russett, Bruce, “An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 15 (05 1971). pp. 262–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. See Kenneth, N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 165.Google Scholar

10. Liska, , Nations in Alliance, p. 12.Google Scholar

11. Walt, , The Origins of Alliances, p. 5.Google Scholar

12. The books checked were as follows: Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1973)Google Scholar; Inis, L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962)Google Scholar; Edward, V. Gulick, Europe'ss Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton. 1967)Google Scholar; and Paul, Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler. 1965)Google Scholar. Authors who assert that a balance does form or should form merely against power sometimes warn that a powerful state may develop aggressive intentions.

13. Walt, , The Origins of Alliances, pp. 22 and 25.Google Scholar

14. Walt approaches this formulation when he says that “an imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition is significantly more dangerous than the second most threatening coalition” (Ibid., p. 265). This implies that threats are balanced when both sides are equally “dangerous.” But it seems odd to refer to a defender as “dangerous,” and this choice of terms fails to distinguish the resolve component from the capabilities component of each side's threat.

15. Walt has clarified this in a subsequent article. The issue, he says, is the “relative propensity for states to balance or bandwagon.” If bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, alliance leaders must “work very hard” to prevent defections. If balancing is preferred, less effort is required. See Stephen, M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization 42 (Spring 1988). p. 283.Google Scholar

16. Foradiscussion of these trade-offs, see Morrow, , “On the Theoretical Bases of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes.”Google Scholar

17. Walt has subsequently relaxed the dichotomy. Balancing and bandwagoning are ideal types which actual behavior only approximates: “balancing against a potential threat does not require unremitting hostility to it.” States should “maximize security by aligning with one side while maintaining cordial relations with the other.” See Walt, , “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation,” p. 315.Google Scholar

18. The concept was briefly discussed by Kenneth, Waltz, Walt's teacher, in Theory of International Politics, p. 126Google Scholar. Waltz credits Stephen Van Evera for the label.

19. Walt, , “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation,” p. 315.Google Scholar

20. Obviously, these states were not balancing either. Walt cites the Nazi–Soviet Pact and the alignments of several East European states with Germany in the 1930s as examples of bandwagoning. The diplomatic history of the 1930s does not support Walt's thesis that balancing predominates over bandwagoning, although it was hardly a typical decade. See Robert, G. Kaufman, “Balancing and Bandwagoning Reconsidered: Alignment Decisions and Non-Decisions Against Nazi Germany Between the Two World Wars.” unpublished manuscript, nd., Colgate University, Hamilton. N.Y.Google Scholar

21. Walt does recognize that the Middle East is a “multipolar, regional subsystem embedded within a bipolar global system” and that this structural condition gives certain distinctive characteristics to alliance formation in the area—notably a preference for superpower support over alignment with regional actors. See Walt, , The Origins of Alliances, p. 266.Google Scholar

22. Compare Deborah, Welch Larson, “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?”Google Scholar and Robert, Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” both in Robert, Jervis and Jack, Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

23. Ibid.

24. Niou, , Ordeshook, , and Rose, , The Balance of Power, p. 25.Google Scholar

25. The word “resources” is tacitly defined as “military power potential.”

26. It is not clear why peaceful transfers are preferred over war gains, since wars are assumed to be costless. Zero war costs are assumed in order to simplify the model; the assumption does not affect the theoretical results. See Niou, , Ordeshook, , and Rose, , The Balance of Power, p. 52.Google Scholar

27. One is tempted to suggest a parallel between the two types of viable counter and Walt's choice between balancing and bandwagoning. The second type of counter, the countercoalition, is crudely analogous to balancing. The ceding of resources has the flavor of the defensive form of bandwagoning or simply of appeasement. However, there seem to be no examples in history of an aggressor being appeased to the extent of giving it half of the power in the system. And the motive for appeasement, in its conventional sense, is to moderate an aggressor's intentions, not to increase its capabilities.

28. For example, France's capitulation in 1940 did not give Germany near-preponderance, nor would have the capitulation of all of Western Europe; concessions by the United States, the Soviet Union, or both would have been required to preserve remnants of territory and sovereignty for the Western European countries.

29. Niou, , Ordeshook, , and Rose, , The Balance of Power, p. 223.Google Scholar

30. Ibid., p. 262.

31. Ibid., p. 234.

32. On the whole, the authors' mathematics are accessible to the novice.

33. I attempt such an exercise in “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44 (Spring–Summer 1990), pp. 103–25Google Scholar. I have drawn on this article for several other ideas in the present review essay: see pp. 103–5 and 108–9. The progressive relaxation of assumptions is also part of the method of Niou and his colleagues. For instance, they relax their initial assumption of equal rates of growth to develop their model of preventive war.

34. For a discussion of these risks, see Glenn, H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (07 1984), pp. 461–96Google Scholar. Apparently, the concepts of entrapment and abandonment were initially proposed by Mandelbaum, Michael in The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 151–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar