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Joint Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Hirad Abtahi
Hirad Abtahi*
Affiliation:
Legal and Enforcement Unit of the Presidency of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
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Extract

On November 24, 2013, the Islamic Republic of Iran, together with the E3/EU–comprised of France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)–as well as the People’s Republic of China (China), the Russian Federation (Russia), and the United States of America (US) agreed to the Joint Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program (Joint Plan of Action). The Joint Plan of Action aims at ensuring the Islamic Republic of Iran’s exclusive peaceful nuclear program through mutually-agreed steps between the so-called E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Though much has been said about the Joint Plan of Action since its adoption, not enough attention has been paid to its historical context; such neglect risks the Joint Plan of Action being, at best, viewed in isolation. This note bridges that gap by providing an overview of the events that led the Islamic Republic of Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and Germany (P5+1) to agree on the Joint Plan of Action.

Type
International Legal Materials
Information
International Legal Materials , Volume 53 , Issue 4 , August 2014 , pp. 732 - 738
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2014

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References

* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the European Union External Action website (visited June 18, 2014), http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf.

1 Yukiya Amano, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Statement on Geneva Agreement (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2013/amsp2013n25.html.

2 For the text of the Joint Plan of Action, see IAEA, COMMUNICATION DATED 27 NOVEMBER 2013 RECEIVED FROM THE EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT PLAN OF ACTION (2013), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2013/infcirc855.pdf. See also IAEA, COMMUNICATION DATED 28 NOVEMBER 2013 RECEIVED FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE AGENCY CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT PLAN OF ACTION (2013), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2013/infcirc856.pdf.

3 Agreement for Co-Operation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, U.S.-Iran., art. 4, Mar. 5, 1957, 4898 U.N.T.S. 28.

4 Contract for the Transfer of Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for a Research Reactor in Iran, art.1, Mar. 10, 1967, 8866 U.N.T.S. 108.

5 In accordance with Article IX(3) of the NPT, a nuclearweapon State as a State that “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.” These States are China, France, Russia (succeeding the USSR), the UK, and the US.

6 WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, NUCLEAR POWER IN IRAN (2014), http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Iran/.

7 JAHANPOUR FARHANG, OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP, CHRONOLOGY OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME, 1957–2007, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/oxford_research_group_chronology_ irans_nuclear_programme_1957_2007.

8 See id.

9 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).

10 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, IRAQ’S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM (2005), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html.

11 See, e.g., IAEA, Telex Messages to the Director General from the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/346/Add.2, Nov. 27, 1987.

12 WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 6.

13 GREG BRUNO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (2010), http://www.cfr.org/iran/iransnuclear-program/p16811.

14 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 2–3, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/69 (Sep. 12, 2003), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf.

15 IAEA, Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/637 (Nov. 26, 2004), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.

16 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/ 77 (Sep. 24, 2005), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.

17 IAEA, Press Release, Iran To Resume Suspended Nuclear Research and Development, IAEA Press Release 2006/01 (Jan. 3, 2006), at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2006/prn200601.html.

18 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 3, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.

19 IAEA, Communication dated 2 February 2006 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/666 (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc666.pdf.

20 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,IAEADoc. GOV/2006/27 (Apr. 28, 2006), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf.

21 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1696-2006.pdf.

22 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf.

23 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf.

24 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf.

25 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sep. 27, 2008), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1835-2008.pdf (referencing previous Resolutions).

26 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf.

27 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1696-2006.pdf.

28 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf. See also S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf.

29 See PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40094, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: TEHRAN’S COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40094.pdf.

30 Jim Finkle, Researchers Say Stuxnet Was Deployed Against Iran in 2007, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/us-cyberwar-stuxnet-idUSBRE91P0PP20130226.

31 See e.g., Parisa Hafezi, Iranian Nuclear Scientist Killed in Tehran: Report, Reuters Canada, July 23, 2011, http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE76M1WI20110723?pageNumber=2&;virtualBrandChannel=0.

32 IAEA, Press Release, IAEA Statement on Iranian Enrichment Announcement (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2010/prn201002.html.

33 See nuclearenergy.ir, Facilities, http://nuclearenergy.ir/facilities/. See also Iran’s Key Nuclear Sites, BBC News, Oct. 15, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11927720.

34 NTI, Building a Safer World, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), http://www.nti.org/facilities/184/.

35 Narges Bajoghli, Iran’s Chemical Weapon Survivors Show Twin Horrors of WMD and Sanctions, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 2, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/sep/02/iran-chemical-weapons-wmd-sanctions.

36 The First Step, which was due to expire on July 20, 2014, was extended to November 24, 2014. For the implementation of the Joint Action Plan, see ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Implementation of the Joint Action Plan At A Glance, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/Implementationof-the-Joint-Plan-of-Action-At-A-Glance.

1 Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

2 At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

3 Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.

4 Consistent with its plans, Iran’s centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.

5 “Sanctions on associated services” means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.

6 Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” applies.