Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2018
How has the Law and Justice Party in Poland (PiS) been able to get significant labor support to introduce far-right policies that undermine pluralist democracy? We look at PiS in the context of the “left fascist” traditions of the past, when redistributionist policies won wide support among workers who were accepted as part of the favored “nation.” Labor support breaks down along three lines, with industrial labor most closely aligned with PiS, white-collar labor (in education and health) mostly opposed, and the marginalized small-city precariat being mobilized by PiS, but also finding a place in explicitly fascist parties further to the Right. Left alternatives, weakened due to the collapse of class discourse, are slowly reemerging, but the Right will likely command most labor support for the near future.
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14. These examples taken from an unpublished 2017 conference paper by researchers at the University of Wrocław, Justyna Kajta and Adam Mrozowicki, titled “Labour and nationalism in Poland: exploring the (missing) links.”