So writers the British administrator Harold Ingrams about the chewing of leaves from the qāt tree in Yemen. Qāt is the Arabic term for Catha edulis, a species of the Celastracae cultivated in the highlands of southwestern Arabia for at least the last six centuries. The leaves of this tree are chewed as a stimulant, producing a feeling of euphoria followed by depression.

Israel is a nation replete with contradictions; its economics, politics, and sociology often defy understanding. This Jewish state, located on the periphery of the Moslem world, has few natural resources of its own, while its neighbors to the south and east enjoy the benefits of oil wealth. It is geographically Middle Eastern, yet politically finds itself considered European. Its population is predominantly Asian and African, yet its political institutions and leadership, civilization, and national cultural figures are rooted in the West. Another contradiction, less obvious but no less puzzling, provides the subject of this article. In typical periods of inflation, real wages are eroded and the laboring class suffers from a reduction in its purchasing power. Yet in the inflationary economy characteristic of most of Israel's existence, the wage-earner has managed to escape the harm threatened by the ever-diminishing value of the currency. The ostensible explanation—indexed wage contracts— appear to be inadequate, for such agreements never provided full de jure coverage against inflationary erosion.

The literature on the genesis of Arab nationalism in Syria often mentions a group of religious reformers who influenced the first generation of Arab nationalists. The relationship between reformers and nationalists, however, has not been explored, perhaps because sources mention the influence of liberal sheikhs without suggesting where the sheikhs came from or what they signified. This study traces the social origins and ideological import of the religious reform movement in Damascus, a hitherto neglected phenomenon. The relationship between reformers and Arabists is also discussed so as to shed new light on the beginnings of Arab nationalism and its significance in late Ottoman Syria.

Egypt was firmly ensconced by the early 1980s in the ranks of the Third World's more dependent, financially troubled economies. The country's total foreign debt, under $3 billion in 1973, had grown to 16 billion by 1979. In 1982–83, the external debt was estimated at $20 billion, with the servicing of medium and long-term obligations absorbing more than one-third of export earnings. The terms of trade were also moving against Egypt as its major exports lost value. A trade deficit, registered largely with EEC countries and the United States, stood at the equivalent of $4.7 billion in 1982–83.

Since the late 1940s, and especially since the mid-1960s, a wealth of pamphlets, articles, and books have appeared that constitute the corpus of what is now known as “Islamic economics.” This literature, whose exponents call themselves “Islamic economists,” purports to provide the blueprint of an economic system consonant with the original sources of Islam. The central feature of the proposed system is that individuals are guided in their economic decisions by a set of behavior norms, ostensibly derived from the Qur'an and the Sunna. Two other features stand out: zakāt, a tax considered the basis of Islamic fiscal policy, and the prohibition of interest, viewed as the centerpiece of Islamic monetary policy. Virtually all Islamic economists consider this trio—the norms, zakāt, and zero interest—the pillars of the Islamic system.’

On Friday, July 18, 1924, Robert W. Imbrie, United States Consul in Tehran— and personal friend and special agent of Allen W. Dulles, Chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Division—was brutally killed. Imbrie was beaten to death by a mob led by members of the Muslim clergy and including many members of the Iranian Army. In the weeks preceding July 18, there had been several outbreaks of anti-Bahai violence. Imbrie and Melvin Seymour had gone that morning to investigate a miraculous watering place in central Tehran that figured in the anti-Bahai excitement. According to contemporary accounts, a Bahai had been struck blind after drinking from the source when he refused to make an offering in the name of the Shi'i saints; his sight miraculously had been restored after he had repented and made the donation.

Islam is a faith as well as a cultural commitment. Whether Islam also provides a framework of political ideology is still questionable. Some sociologists employ the notion “the politicization of the sacred” to depict this claim. Ideology is a very modern notion that Muslim thinkers have adopted from Western culture. The suggestion of the Moroccan philosopher Lahbabi, at a conference of C.E.R.E.S., that the arabized term “fikrologia” be employed as a substitute for “ideology,” (in Arbaic: al-ideologiyya) nevertheless does not change this situation.

Sunni Islam recognizes four sources from and through which the laws governing its conduct are derived. These are the Qur'an, the Sunna of the Prophet, the consensus (ljmā') of the community and its scholars, and qiyās, the juridicological method of inference. The first two sources provide the jurist with the material from which he is to extract through qiyas and ijtihād (the disciplined exercise of mental faculty) the law which he believes to the best of his knowledge to be that decreed by God. Except for a relatively limited number of cases where the Qu'an and the Sunna offer already-formulated legal judgments, the great majority of furū' cases, which constitute the body of positive and substantive law, are derived by qiyas. Thus, qiyas may be used to “discover” the judgment of a new case provided that this case has not already been solved in the two primary sources. The process of legal reasoning which qiyas involves is charged with innumerable difficulties not the least of which is finding the circle of common similarity, the 'illa, between the original case in the texts and the new case which requires a legal judgment. Since finding the 'illa entails a certain amount of guesswork (zann) on the part of the jurist and since it is highly probable that the 'illa is extracted from a text which is not entirely reliable or a text capable of more than one interpretation, Sunni jurists deemed the results of qiyas to be probable (zannī). It is only at this point that consensus may enter into play in the legal process. Should Muslims, represented by their jurists, reach an agreement on the validity of a zanni legal judgment, such judgment is automatically transferred from the domain of juristic speculation to that of certainty (qat', yaqīn). Consensus then renders this judgment irrevocable, not to be challenged or reinterpreted by later generations. Furthermore, this judgment, being so irrevocable, acquires a validity tantamount to that of the Qur'an and the highly reliable traditions embodied in the Sunna of the Prophet. Thus, such a case with its established judgment becomes a precedent according to which another new legal question may be solved. It is only in this sense that consensus functions as a source of law, a source which is infallible.

The council of ministers constitutes the single most important decision-making center in parliamentary systems. Commonly called the cabinet, this body, under the leadership of the prime minister, defines a general framework for governmental policy as well as the substance of policy on matters which affect large groups of citizens in society. Members of cabinets not only hold extensive decision-making powers but also enjoy access to substantial public resources which they can distribute.

Muhammad Kurd 'Alī referred to his teacher and close friend, Sheikh Tāhir al-Jazā'irī, as the Muhammad 'Abduh of Syria. Kurd 'Alī, however, was not alone in remarking upon the impact that al-Jazā'irī had in Syria during the lete nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Albert Hourani also mentioned him in comparison to 'Abduh:

Ideas such as those of 'Abduh were “in the air” in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. We find similar groups of reformers in all the more advanced Muslim countries, and perhaps it is too simple to explain them in terms of the influence of al-Afghānī and 'Abduh. It could be said… that al-'Urwa al-wuthqa could only have had its influence because there were already little groups of Muslims thinking on the lines which made it popular… In Syria similar men can be found in all the great centers of Muslim learning… Among those whom were roughly contemporary with 'Abduh and had some contact with him, was Tāhir al-Jazāir'ī,… a writer on literary and linguistic subjects, he had a wider importance through his work for the establishment of modern schools and the preservations of ancient books.

The Iranian economy under the Islamic Republic has been strongly influenced by factors which lie for the most part outside the Iranian government's control, in particular lower oil sales due to the Iraqi attack and to the world-wide oil glut. One should not underestimate, however, the impact of the policies which have traditionally most concerned economists, namely, the government budget and monetary matters. The major thesis of this article is that the Islamic Republic's economy has been heavily influenced by an overvalued exchange rate which has: (a) forced reductions in government development spending; (b) fueled inflation as the government printed money to finance its deficit; (c) worsened the imbalance in foreign trade by encouraging imports and discouraging non-oil exports; (d) subsidized the consumption of imported goods, primarily benefiting the urban population, especially the rich; (e) distorted the allocation of resources in favor of commerce at the expense of production; and (f) benefited well-to-do merchants at the expense of poorer farmers and artisans.

On the night of May 26, 1762, several residents of the Syrian city of Aleppo entered a house in their neighborhood uninvited. The owners were not in, but several unveiled women sitting in male company were there to greet them. If the scene proved less compromising than the intruders expected, it did confirm their suspicion that the house was a meeting place for illicit relations. The following day they turned in the owners, a man and his mother, to the court and secured the qadi's consent to have them expelled from the neighborhood.

Before broaching the main topic of this study, there seem to me to be two general issues involving terms in the title which need to be addressed: The one concerns nomenclature, the other the question of genres. A certain vagueness colors most attempts at definition of the term “novella,” something which seems the result of both the way in which the term has developed and the considerable differences of opinion among critics. Thus the Oxford English Dictionary seems to reflect the relatively recent interest in the genre in the English-speaking world by not including the word at all in the main part of the dictionary and by defining it in the Supplement as “a short novel (as in the stories of Boccaccio's Decameron).” As Howard Nemerov points out, however, “the term ‘short novel’ is descriptive only in the way that the term ‘Middle Ages’ is descriptive—that is, not at all, except with regard to the territory on either side.” The index to the English translation of Todorov's Poetics of Prose lists: Novella, see Tale. Such entries as these do at least convey to us the notion that the novella operates somewhere along a fictional spectrum, the two poles of which are the novel and the short story, but that is all.

This article attempts to delineate the set of circumstances under which religion acts as a significant conducive factor in the development of Arab political communities, and those circumstances under which religion presents an important obstacle to the emergence of a political community. The focus is restricted to the Arab world so as to permit a more precise analysis than would be possible were one to attempt to generalize across more diverse cultures, but some of its main threads may apply equally well to other peoples and other religions. For the reasons discussed below, religion seems to be a particularly powerful source of individual political identities, and of feelings of membership in political communities.

Islam's influence on political values and, as a result on the political behavior of the Muslim state, has traditionally been analyzed in terms of two general categories. These categories were the purely religious and the purely temporal, which in turn identified the interests of theological beliefs and transcendentally fixed ethical duties on the one hand and the interests of ruling dynasties, military and financial affairs on the other. The influence pattern, however, is more complex than the one suggested by the traditional approach.

The protracted Turko-Armenian conflict, marked by intermittent massacres, was violently resolved during World War I. By governmental decree the bulk of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was uprooted from its ancestral territories and was committed to a process of deportation that became a process of destruction. The provinces in the interior of Turkey with heavy concentrations of Armenians were thus completely denuded of their indigenous population.

Volumes have been produced regarding the instruments and dimensions of this destruction. The carnage was attested to by multitudes of Armenian survivors; by German, Swiss, and American missionaries; and by European and American consuls in the provinces and their ambassadors in Istanbul, the Ottoman capital. The testimony of Austrian and German officers of all ranks who fought in and directed that war alongside the Turks as political and military allies is even more striking.

Since the publication of Edward Said's Orientalism in 1978, every Western student of the Near East, regardless of his or her position in the ensuing debate, has been forced to examine afresh the assumptions underlying even the most respected historical studies. As far as the first century of Islam is concerned, a significant contradiction emerges from such reexamination. Although the reliance of the Muslim conquerors on indigenous administrative classes, their continuation for some time of pre-Islamic coin tupes, and their acceptance of late antique material culture in general are commonly recognized, the conclusion ususally drawn from these facts is rather a curious one: that the Arabs, entirely lacking in experience of government and distinctive material culture, were forced to adopt the essentially alien practices taht prevalied in the conquered lands.

The premier position of the Lāmiyyat al-'Arab among the poetry of al-shu'arā' al-Ta'alīk (the brigand-poets) of the Jāhiliyya is undeniable. Among scholars and philologists, both Arab and Orientalist, it has remained over the centuries the object of the most minute philological commentaries. Its Arab commentators number more than 20, among them the foremost names in classical Arabic literary scholarship: al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898), the doyen of the Basran school, whose commentary is said actually to have been taken from his Kufan archrival, Tha'lab (d. 291/904); the renowned poetic commentarist al-Tibrīzī (d. 502/1109); and the famed grammarian and Qur'anic commentator, al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1143). Its European popularity—a phenomenon that Blachére attributes to its appeal to the sensibilities of nineteenth-century Romanticism—dates to Sylvestre de Sacy's study and translation of 1826, followed by Rückert's German translation in his Hamāsa of 1846. In philological studies, of note are the more than 20 pages of his Beiträge that Nöldeke devotes to lexical matters and Jacob's extensive two-part Schanfará-Siudien.

The status of women in Turkey may be examined from several perspectives. One perspective might focus on the public sphere and take into account the legal, political, and institutional reforms of hte Republican era and their reflection in the increasing literacy rates, educational attainment, political participation, labor force participation, and professionalization of women in Turkey. A second perspective might focus on the private sphere, mainly the family, and consider family dynamics and interaction patterns as well as the place of the woman in the family. This paper will adopt the second perspective. Before taking it up in detail, however, it may be helpful to consider briefly the general picture of the public sphere. This should provide us with necessary backgorund and help put our findings into context.