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Who “Invented” Egyptian Arab Nationalism? Part 2

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Ralph M. Coury
Ralph M. Coury
Affiliation:
Hartford, Connecticut
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Extract

Part 1, (IJMES, 14 [1982], 249–281) presented arguments in favor of the first of two major contentions in respect to the development of Egyptian Arab nationalism between the two world wars; namely, that a rigid dichotomization between an assumed Arab-Islamic orientation of the Palace and a secular-liberal, Egyptian orientation of the Wafd and other parties is false. In the preceding segment I tried to show that in the interwar period both the Wafd and the Palace began to develop Arab nationalist orientations, albeit cautiously, and in a manner that continued to subordinate Arab concerns to the national question more narrowly conceived. I was particularly interested in demonstrating that no new, activist pan-Arab policy could be attributed to the Palace in the late thirties. Part 2 elaborates upon these and other themes as it discusses my second major contention:

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International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 1982 , pp. 459 - 479
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1982

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References

NOTES

Editor's note: Part I of this article appeared in IJMES, 14 (1982), 249–281.

2 Berque, , Imperialism and Revolution, pp. 456–457;Google ScholarDeeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and Its Rivals. 1919–1939 (London, 1979), pp. 315–324.Google Scholar

3 Quoted in Ramadan, , Tatawwur, 11, 346.Google Scholar

4 For Egyptians in Iraq see Sayigh, , al-Fikra al-A rabiyya, p. 184; al-Ahram, 10. 20, 1936 and 07 2. 1937;Google Scholar and Jalal, al-Sayyid, “Mustafa Wakil: Misri Fi Baghdad: 1941,” Afaq Arabiyya, 5 (01., 1976), 132–139. Wakil, a member of Misr al-Fatat, and an important contact between this party and youthful Iraqi nationalists, was a teacher of sports in the school for secondary teachers in Baghdad.Google Scholar

5 See al-A hram, 09 26, 1935;Google Scholar and Shawkat, Sami, Ahdafuna (Baghdad, 1939), p. 90.Google Scholar

6 Harb's activities within the Arab world are discussed in Abdel-Malek, , Egypt: Military Society, pp. 251–252;Google ScholarHafiz, Mahmud Kamil al-Falaki, and Mahmud, Fathi Umar, Talat Harb (Cairo, 1936), pp. 113–123;Google Scholar and Radwan, Fathi, Talat Harb Bahth fi Uzma (Cairo, 1970), pp. 82–87.Google Scholar

7 Harb, Talat, Majmuat Khutab (Cairo, 1927), p. 127.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., p. 131.

9 Ibid., p. 140.

10 The newspaper industry is a good example. In the twenties a number of Egyptian papers had an “Eastern” (really dealing only with the Arabs) page, often written by a Syrian or Lebanese who lived in Egypt, al-Ahram had Asad Daghir, al-Muqattam, Amin Said; al-Jihad, Sami Sarraj; al-Balagh, Tawfiq Diyab; al-Hilal, Habib Jamati; and Kawkab al-Sharq, Ahmad Hafiz Awad. Initially, these pages seem to have been directed more to non-Egyptians than Egyptians but they were nevertheless to play their role in the Arabization of Egyptian opinion. The Journalist Hafiz Mahmud, for example, says that he never looked at such papers until he heard the Syrian Dr. Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar speak in Cairo and say that Egypt would be the capital of the future united Arab East. After that he began to follow Shahbandar about to hear his speeches and to follow, with his friends, the Arab pages that he had not looked at before. See Mahmud, Hafiz, al-Maarik fi al-Sahafa wa al-Siyasa wa al-Fikr. 1919–1932 (Cairo, 1967), pp. 56–57.Google Scholar For the earliest cultural contacts between Egypt and the Arab East see Muhammad, Yusif Najam, “al-Silat al-Thaqafiyya bain Misr wa Lubnan fi al-Nahda al-Haditha,” al-Adab, 6 (06, 1962), 1–3, and 66–69.Google Scholar

11 The term “sons of the Arabs” was, as we saw, used by Makram in addressing the Iraqi visitors in 1936. See note 22.

12 In a speech in Damascus given July 7, 1925. See Harb, , Majmuat Khutab, pp. 136, 139.Google Scholar

13 In a speech in Baghdad, quoted in Mahmud, , al-Maarik, p. 115.Google Scholar

14 Harb, “al-Taawun al-Iqtisadi bain al-Umam al-Arabiyya,” in a special edition of al-Hilal, “at- Arab wa al-Islam,” March, 1939, p. 34.

15 The activities of such organizations are referred to frequently in many of the works I have cited. See, in particular, Daghir, , Mudhakkirati, pp. 93–98, and 152–174;Google Scholar and Sayigh, , al-Fikra al-A rabiyya, pp. 175–180.Google Scholar

16 al-Sayyid, Rashid Rida, in a letter of 01 30, 1923,Google Scholar found in Amir, Shakib Arslan, Akha Arbain Sana (Damascus, 1938), p. 323.Google Scholar

17 Quoted in Tahir, , Nazarat, p. 132.Google Scholar

18 Such a comparison draws its inspiration from Amin, , The Arab Nation, pp. 33–49;Google Scholar and AbdelMalek, , Egypt: Military Society, pp. 246–287.Google Scholar

19 Abd, at Qadir al-Mazini, “al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya,” al-Risala, ed. 112, 08. 26, 1935, p. 1363.Google Scholar

20 Ubaid, Makram, “al-Misriyyun Arab,” in a special edition of al-Hilal, “al-Arab wa al-Islam,” 04 1939, p. 32.Google Scholar

21 Abd, al Rahman Azzam, al-Kashshaf, 01. 21, 1928.Google Scholar

22 Cited in Berque, , Imperialism and Revolution, p. 153.Google Scholar

23 F.O. 406/75 4694 no. 63 E 4668/22/31. Kelly, , Alexandria, , to Halifax, , F.O., 08 9, 1937.Google Scholar

24 F.O. 406/75 4694 E 4320/22/31 no. 427. Lampson, , Cairo, , to Eden, , F.O., 07 25, 1937.Google Scholar

25 F.O. 406/74 no. 108, E. 5831/381/63. Kelly, , Ramleh, , to the F. 0., 09 4, 1936.Google Scholar

26 F.O. 406/76 E 5015/10/31, no. 74. Bateman, , Cairo, , to Halifax, , F.O., on a conversation between al-Maraghi and Smart, the Oriental Secretary, on 08 20, 1938.Google Scholar Al-Maraghi's fears were shared by a good friend, Muhammad Mahmud, leader of the Liberal Constitutionalists and Prime Minister, who told the British that the Parliamentary Conference for the Defense of Palestine was a great nuisance to himself and that it would get no official recognition, but who was, in his own right, nevertheless very concerned about the question of Palestine. See F.O. 406/76/ E 4658/10/31, Halifax, F.O., to Bateman, , Cairo, , 08 4, 1938.Google Scholar

27 Minutes of Session 62, Chamber of Deputies, May 12, 1927, pp. 953–954.

28 From a manuscript of Haikal's unpublished memoirs, which Dr. Charles Smith of San Diego State University has allowed me to quote. Haikal's fears were to be expressed in his paper al-Siyasa, and particularly at the time of the Palestinian crisis of 1929. On Sept. 21, 1929 one of the paper's leading writers, Muhammad Abd Allah Anan, urged the Palestinians to show restraint, arguing that it was within the power of the Arabs to win by a peaceful, continuous struggle and that they should proceed without shedding blood.

29 Muhammad, Ali Alluba, Mabadi fi Usul al-Siyasa al-Misriyya (Cairo, 1942), p. 284. Haikal expressed the same views in an article of al-Siyasa (July 17, 1937) about the effect of the establishment of a Zionist state on Egypt's economic position and political leadership.Google Scholar

30 F.O. 371/23304/ J 377/1/16. Lampson, , Cairo, , to the F.O., 01 16, 1939.Google Scholar

31 I say “tendency” to diverge because I feel that the “revolutionary” nature of some of these groupings must be kept in perspective. I believe that Mahmud Hussein is correct when he says that the Brotherhood (and this would be true of Misr al-Fatat) wished to rely on its mass base and underground apparatus to exert decisive pressures on the regime and that its leadership was hostile to spontaneous, uncontrolled mass actionand a popular upsurge. Thus, the Brotherhood's policy at the top, Hussein says, was to maneuver between the various currents of the ruling class and even, at one time, to flirt with the occupying power. See Hussein, , Class Conflict, pp. 72–87.Google Scholar

32 The interest of the Muslim Brotherhood and Misr al-Fatat in Palestine and the Arabs is well known. What has been given less attention is the growing interest of the radical and Marxist left. See Fair al-Jadid, May 16, June 16, and throughout July, 1945; and Rifat, al-Said, al-Sahafa al- Yasariyya fi Misr, 1925–1945 (Beirut, 1974), pp. 137–143, 171–173;Google Scholar also, passim, , al-Yasar al-Misri wa a!Qadiyya al-Filistiniyya (Beirut, 1974).Google Scholar

33 For a discussion of political life between the wars and the role of the “pressure of the masses,” see Riad, Hassan, L'Egypte Nasserienne (Paris, 1964), pp. 203–219.Google Scholar

34 F.O. 371/13123/1744/ J 3130/4/16. R. H. Hoare, acting High Commissioner to Lord Cashendun F.O, Nov. 5, 1928.

35 Tawfiq, al-Suwaidi, Mudhakkirati (Beirut, 1969), pp. 292–293.Google Scholar

36 El-Gritly, A. A. J., The Structure of Modern Industry in Egypt (Cairo, 1948), p. 566.Google Scholar

37 For Ismail Sidqi's refusal to believe that a Jewish state might be a threat to Egypt, see Tahir, , Mutaqal Hakstib, p. 493. Even Azzam, who understood Arab realities much better than Sidqi, seems to have awakened to the seriousness of the Zionist project rather slowly. For example, in his speech on the Italians in Libya given at the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem, he said that the Jews were “weak” and “dependent upon funds which they received” but that the Italian colonist in Libya–whose aims were the same–dealt with Muslims through bayonets. “If there is danger which all Moslems should unite to combat,” he said, “it is the Italian danger.” Such remarks can be attributed, in part, to Azzam's generally pro-British moderation, and contrast with his later estimate of the potential danger of Zionism.Google Scholar

38 F.O. 406/74 no. 108, E 5831/381/65. Kelly, , Ramleh, , to the F.O., 09 4, 1936.Google Scholar

39 F.O. 406/74 4694 no. 94, E 5207/94/31. LampsonM, , Cairo, , to Eden, F.O., 08 18, 1936.Google Scholar

40 F.O. 371/20801/1783 E 987. Lampson, , Cairo, , to the F.O., 02 1, 1937.Google Scholar

41 Quoted by Abdel-Malek, , Egypt: Military Society, p. 251,Google Scholar from a passage which originally appeared in Sati, al-Husri, al-Uruba, Awwalan (Beirut, 1961), pp. 121–122.Google Scholar The statement was made in 1950 but the sentiments existed long before. For example, in an article of al-Hilal of Feb., 1934, Azzam argued: “We are in the age of the cartel and trust. Do the Iraqis or the Syrians or the Egyptians believe that they can reach an honorable life without unity? Let the leaders of opinion and the perceptive recall that there can be no existence for the state before rebirth and no endurance for it without security and safety and there is no security without strength.” Quoted in Anwar, al-Jundi, al-Adab al-Arabi al-Hadith fi al-Muqawama wa al-Tajammu (Cairo, 1959), p. 515.Google Scholar

42 Vatikiotis, P. J., Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies (London, 1972), pp. 8–9, proceedings of a seminar.Google Scholar

43 Safran, , Egypt in Search, pp. 7–25.Google Scholar

44 Ibid., pp. 257–258.

45 Mitchell, , Muslim Brothers, p. 327.Google Scholar I say that Mitchell writes in this manner “uneasily” because of note 93 which he affixes to the passage I have cited: “We have qualified with the word ‘potential’ because of uncertainty about the apparently purely religious implication [for Mahdism] as used by Gibb, , Modern Trends, pp. 121 and 113 ff.” Mitchell adds that “even in Smith [Wilfred Cantwell] the tendency to tie activism and violence (which gives rise to the labels) too specifically to the religious phenomenon, Islam, does some violence to the very mundane drives which inspire much of the ferment in the modern Muslim world. Much more rapidly than we believed possible when this study was begun, it will become increasingly difficult to isolate the religious aspect for purposes of analyzing modern Muslims.”Google Scholar

46 Haim, Sylvia, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, 1964), p. 52.Google Scholar

47 James, Heyworth-Dunne, “Egypt Discovers Arabism: the Role of the Azzams,” Jewish Observer and Orient Review, 14, (03 26, 1965), 20.Google Scholar

48 See, for example, Review of Middle East Studies, 1(1975), 2(1976), and 3 (1978);Google ScholarSaid, Edward, Orientalism, (New York, 1978);Google Scholar and Bryan, S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism (London, 1978).Google Scholar

49 See, for example, Dawn, Ernest, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Urbana, 111., 1973), pp. 122–147.Google Scholar

50 See, for example, Abd, al-Rahman Azzam, “al-Arab Umma al-Mustaqbal,” al-Fath, 28 Jamada al-Ula, 1351 (09 19, 1932), p. 9;Google Scholarpassim, , “Wahda al-Thaqafa al-Islamiyya,” al-Fath, 29 Shaban, 1352 (12 17, 1933), p. 4; “Muqarana bain al-Sharq wa al-Gharb bi Munasaba Muahada al-Taif,” al-Fath,Google Scholar 9 Rabi, al-Awwal, 1353 (06 22, 1934), p. 15; “Darura al-Wahda al-Arabiyya lil Salam al-Alami,” al-Rabita al-Arabiyya, 03 24, 1937; “al-Wahda al-Arabiyya wa al-Wahda alAlamiyya,” address given in Ewart Hall, American University of Cairo, Cairo, 01 4, 1946;Google Scholar “al -Malik Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud Kama Araftahu,” in al-Malik Abd al-A ziz ibn Saud wa al Mamlaka al-A rabiyya al-Saudiyya, Abd, Allah Husain, ed. (Cairo, 1948), pp. 104–107;Google Scholarpassim, , al-Risala alKhalida, 2d edition (Cairo, 1954), pp. 215–250,Google Scholar an exact reprint of the 1946 edition which was based on radio broadcasts given in the 1940s. Thereis an expanded English translation of this work entitled The Eternal Message of Muhammad, Cesar Farah, trans. (New York, 1964).Google Scholar

51 For a discussion of the development and stability of this bourgeoisie see Davis, Eric, “Political Development or Political Economy?: Political Theory and the Study of Social Change in Egypt and the Third World,” Review of Middle East Studies, 1(1975), 41–61. According to Davis, approaching Egyptian society in terms of an undifferentiated social structure does not allow for an understanding of social change in Egypt during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. “A political economy approach … would significantly modify the ‘decay thesis.’ While Egypt certainly did experience decay as a result of its contact with the West, the causes of this decay were materialist rather than idealist forces. We would argue that this decay most adversely affected the peasantry, rather than the bourgeoisie, as reflected in the rise of rents, the difficulty of small land holders in obtaining credit, an inflation in food prices, the fragmentation of land holdings and the dispossession of a large number of small holders of their land. For the landowning bourgeoisie which grew out of the rural notable stratum … the nineteenth century was an ever-increasing accumulation of capital and the displacement of the Turco-Circassian ruling class as a major indigenous economic and political force. With the weakening of European colonialism … the Egyptian bourgeoisie found itself a junior partner in the extraction of surplus for the world market. Thus Egyptian politics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed a consolidation of the native bourgeoisie's hold over Egyptian society” (here p. 58).Google Scholar

52 This apparently contradictory quality has been identified and brilliantly analyzed in Berque's fine work on modern Egypt. Berque recognizes the class dimensions of an ideology which seems to excite and restrain but he seeks to relate it, as well, to millennial traditions within the Arab world, to “a process which seems to arise from the remote depths of Middle Eastern history.” See his comments upon a manifesto issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1947. In Berque, , Imperialism and Revolution. p. 601.Google Scholar

53 Ibid., pp. 386–387, where he speaks of the Wafd's efforts to canalize the anger of the masses.

54 Cited in Anis, , Thawra, pp. 119–120.Google Scholar

55 For this prudent policy, see Rodinson, Maxime, The Arabs, (Chicago, 1981), pp. 110–115.Google Scholar For Mahir's economic orientation with which Azzam was in sympathy see Berque, , Imperialism and Revolution, pp. 464–465.Google Scholar According to Berque, Mahir was one of the first to be concerned with the control of social development: “He recommended an ‘orientation,’ taujih, which was to be revived in a revolutionary form after 1952, but which this tactician of the monarchy was already planning in 1936. He declared: 'Our evolution must be given a direction, one adapted to the specific character of the Egyptian people, to its customs and capacities, just as we must match our social institutions to the results of this evolution of material progress and of innovation, in all fields of work, of the economy and of the circumstances of modern life.” Berque realizes that Mahir's aim was to “strangle the revolutionary impulse.” In this respect it is relevant to point out that as early as January, 1927, in a debate in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies, Azzam advocated government interference to mitigate the effects of capitalist development on the poor peasantry. He cited with approval a law of Mussolini's which sought to “determine the relation between landlords and peasants” through the setting up of a process of arbitration in which courts made up of representatives of each would liquidate outstanding disputes and discuss conflicts between owners and peasants on the land. Azzam said that he chose Mussolini as an example because “he was able to get rid of communism in his country and because he is the best example for those who have defended individual ownership.” See minutes of session 8, Chamber of Deputies, January 10, 1927, pp. 240–241. For a view of Nasserism which emphasizes the socio-economic continuities that link the pre- and post-1952 periods, see Davis, , “Political Development r Political Economy? Political Theory and the Study of Social Change in Egypt and the Third World,” pp. 56–57. Davis writes: “Rather than destroying the Egyptian bourgeoisie, the 1952 Revolution strengthened it. This statement should not be interpreted in individual but in class terms. In other words, while many individual landowners and businessmen may have been expropriated, this does not imply a radical transformation in the mode of production (semi-capitalist in agriculture and state capitalism in industry) or the indigenous class structure. What can be effectively argued, I think, is that the change entailed by the 1952 Revolution consisted of the replacement of the upper levels of the Egyptian bourgeoisie by its lower level elements. The situation of peasants and workers remained appreciably the same since relations of production experienced no drastic change” (p. 56).Google Scholar

56 al-Mazini, , “al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya,” p. 1363.Google Scholar

57 Musa, Salama, “al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya Wa Sair al-Rawabit,” in Mukhtarai Salama Musa, (Beirut, 1963), pp. 127–130.Google Scholar That Musa should have expressed such sentiments may come as a surprise to those who associate him with a vigorous Egyptianism that adamantly opposed Arab identity and nationalism. Musa's thoughts and formulations in respect to the Arabs seem to have fluctuated from period to period and according to various contexts. I nevertheless believe that a perusal of his work as a whole would support the view that he was not opposed in principle to the idea of Arab identity or even Arab nationalism as long as these were not associated with values and practices that were incompatible with the egalitarianism, democracy and scientific modernity that he championed. Those who see him as an irrevocable enemy of Arabism have pointed to passages such as that found in al- Yawm wa al-Ghad (1927) in which he declares that Egyptians owe no fidelity to the Arabs. Yet a careful reading of the context in which this and similar statements occur would show that when Musa spoke of the “Arabs” in this way he was referring to the Arabs of ancient and medieval times whose cultural, social and political values were, in his view, alien and unsuitable for contemporary Egyptians. He did not reject the concept of a common modern and scientific Arab culture as such. Thus in al-Hayat wa al-Adab (1930),Google Scholar in an article entitled “Misr, Markaz, al-Thaqafa al-Arabiyya,” he wrote, “All of us desire that the Arab world be united through the Arabic language. However, we do not wish to sacrifice our personality through this unity, nor do we want unity between us and the rest of the Arab countries to be only linguistic. Rather, we wish to be linked to these countries in a modern culture, based upon science and industry. It will be a culture that unites all of us through ties of sedentary civilization (al-hadara) and not of bedouinism (al-badawa). The path of our coming to know each other better and of our achieving mutual accord must be built upon modern views of government, marriage, and social reform, upon scientific discoveries and inventions. In other words, we must be united by the ties of modern civilization and modern culture so that our social sentiments and goals of reform will [also] unite.” See al-Hayat wa al-Adab (Cairo, nd., [1930]), pp. 101–102.Google Scholar

58 Muhammad, Ali Alluba, Filistin wa Damir al-Insani (Cairo, 1964), pp. 171–173.Google Scholar

59 See, for example, his arguments against Taha Husain, quoted in Shuqairi, Ahmad, Hiwar wa Asrar Mac, al-Muluk wa al-Ruasa (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 48–50.Google Scholar

60 Haim, , Anthology, p. 52.Google Scholar

61 Amin, Ahmad, Qamus al-Adas wa Taqalid wa Taabir al-Misriyya (Cairo, 1953), pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

62 Gabriel Baer has written of this struggle on the basis of his study of Kirab al-Dhakhair wa al- Tuhaffi Bir al-Sanai wa al-Hiraf, an Egyptian manuscript written at the end of the sixteenth or in the seventeenth century and kept in the Landes-bibliothek of Gotha. According to Baer, “This struggle is reflected throughout the Gotha manuscript, and to judge by this source it assumed the character of antagonism between Arabs (Egyptians) and Ottomans. The Ottomans are not only accused of having caused the decline of the guilds but of having practiced discrimination against awlad al-arab, whose tekyes they destroyed while keeping intact those of the Ottomans. This seems to have generated fervent hatred of the Turks; they are described as beasts and accused of being sodomites (luwat). It is not only the nakib of the guilds that is superior to the governor, but Arabs in general are superior to Turks–and therefore Arab sheikhs of guilds to Turkish ones.” He then quotes a passage of the manuscript which says that the shaikhs of guilds should be from the sons of the Arabs (abna al-arab) because “they are superior” and “only the Arabs possess learning and eloquence.” See Baer, Gabriel, The Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times (Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

63 Amin, , The Arab Nation, p. 21;Google ScholarPolk, William, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 28–29;Google Scholar and Khaldun, S. al-Husry, Three Reformers (Beirut, 1966), pp. 94–95, where he criticizes Haim for writing that al-Kawakabi must have derived his ideas about the nobility of the bedouin from Blunt.Google Scholar

64 A conversation with Madame Nihad Sirhan, a native of Faiyum and an anthropologist from Indiana University, Cairo, April 21, 1971.

65 A conversation with Dr. Ahmad Shams al-Din al-Hijazi, lecturer at the Institute for Drama, Cairo, and a native of Luxor, Cairo, , 04 4, 1971.Google Scholar

66 Ammar, Hamed, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village (New York, 1966), pp. 58–60.Google Scholar

67 The necessity of differentiating the particular histories, cultures and structures of each of the Western (and Third World) bourgeoisies is, of course, one of the lessons to be drawn from Gramsci. See Lynne Lawner's introduction to Gramsci, Antonio, Letters from Prison (New York, 1973), p. 52.Google Scholar