Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2009
The Islamic shariʿa is central to Islam in the minds of most Muslims and non-Muslim scholars. In many ways, the centrality of the Islamic shariʿa has increased in recent decades. Yet despite—or perhaps because of—this centrality, the precise, even the general, role of the shariʿa in Islamic societies is the subject of contentious debate among Muslims. Outside of and underlying such debates are more subtle and rarely articulated differences about the meaning of the Islamic shariʿa. In this essay, I will put forward a general intellectual map for those varying meanings. More critically, I will suggest that important shifts in the meaning of the Islamic shariʿa have taken place in the Muslim world, and that these shifts are closely connected to the nature and viability of legal and educational institutions associated with the Islamic shariʿa in the past. As the Islamic shariʿa has become disconnected from these institutions, its meaning has changed in some fundamental ways. Most important, the shariʿa is approached less for its process than for its content. And because the shift in institutions and understanding has received much less attention from Muslims, widespread attempts to re-create older relationships (particularly involving the relationship between the Islamic shariʿa and the state) in fact involve a deepening rather than a counteracting of the transformation in the Islamic shariʿa.
Author';s note: The first draft of this paper was prepared for the workshop ‘History and Memory in the Muslim World,’ held at Tel Aviv University in January 1996. I owe thanks to the organizers of the workshop and my fellow participants. I also benefitted from the comments of Judith Kohn Brown, Keith Lewinstein, Armando Salvatore, Ron Shaham, and Emad al-Din Shahin.
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23 I have dealt with this theme in more detail in a forthcoming book, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts, Politics, and Society in Egypt and the Arab States of the Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)Google Scholar.
24 The Kuwaiti exception is best explained by the historical weakness of the sharīʿa courts there. They had never established an existence independent of the rulers'; courts.
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38 The Muslim Brotherhood and the personnel of the shariʿa courts opposed amalgamation, which involved folding the shariʿa courts into the civil-court system. Because the shariʿa judges were replaced on retirement by secularly trained judges, amalgamation actually amounted to gradual abolition. For an analysis of the steps taken to minimize protest, see Rule of Law, chap. 3.
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