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REGIME LOYALTY AND BĀZĀRĪ REPRESENTATION UNDER THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: DILEMMAS OF THE SOCIETY OF ISLAMIC COALITION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2009

Arang Keshavarzian
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The prevailing perception within the academy, policy circles, and the media inside and outside Iran has been that the members of bazaars are a unified social class engaged in a symbiotic relationship with the political elite of the Islamic republic and the conservative faction in particular. This approach is largely built on the perspective that there is a historic predilection for bāzārīs and clerics to cooperate (“mosque–bazaar alliance”), and thus ideological compatibility and familial ties between the clergy and bāzārīs have continued and developed into an alliance under the current regime headed by segments of the clergy. For instance, one of the leading experts on 20th-century Iran, Nikki Keddie, comments that, despite Mohammad Khatami's reformist agenda, “the ruling elite, who represent an alliance between the commercial bazaar bourgeoisie and conservative clerics, resist giving up their economic privileges as they do their political ones.”

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International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , May 2009 , pp. 225 - 246
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

NOTES

Author's note: I am grateful to Lindsay Benstead, Houchang Chehabi, Mona El-Ghobashy, Ali Gheissari, Ellen Lust-Okar, Ali Rezaei, and the Yale Working Group on Middle East Social Science for their generous and constructive comments on earlier versions of this article. I thank Katayon Haghighi for her exceptional assistance with the research for this article. Sylvia Whitman and Mohammad Eskandari provided valuable editorial help.

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2 Ashraf, Ahmad, “Bazaar–Mosque Alliance: The Social Basis of Revolts and Revolutions,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 1 (1988): 538–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Keddie, Nikki R., Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 273Google Scholar. For other political economy accounts, see Lautenschlager, Wolfgang, “The Effects of an Overvalued Exchange Rate on the Iranian Economy, 1979–84,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 18 (1986): 31–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tehrani, Bahram, Pazhoheshi dar Eqtesad-i Iran (1354–1364), 2 vols. (Paris: Entesharat-i Khavarn 1986), 2:384–90Google Scholar; Ansari, Ali M., Iran, Islam, and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000)Google Scholar.

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7 Note that prior to the Islamic Revolution, SIC was known as the Islamic Coalition of Religious Mourning Groups (Hayʾatha-yi Muʾtalifih-i Islami). In 2003, SIC changed its name to the Party of Islamic Coalition (Hizb-i Muʾtalifih-i Islami). For consistency, throughout this article I refer to this group as SIC.

8 As this article was being published, I became aware of this recent essay: Rahnema, Ali, “Jamʿiyat-e Moʾtalefa-ye Eslami,” Encyclopaedia Iranica 14 (2008): 483–500Google Scholar. This is by far the most comprehensive and detailed study of SIC of which I am aware, and I encourage readers to consult it. Although a number of my arguments are elaborated and supported in Rahnema's study, I have been able to integrate his encyclopedia entry only minimally into my article. I thank Ahamd Ashraf for bringing this article to my attention.

9 Buchta, Wilfried, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), 15Google Scholar.

10 Moslem, Mehdi, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 58–59Google Scholar.

11 In addition to the cited primary and secondary sources, this article is based on field research, including interviews and participant observation in the Tehran bazaar, most of which was conducted in May-August 1999, August 2000–July 2001, and several shorter visits between 2001 and 2006.

12 Many bāzārīs and individuals from bāzārī backgrounds have profited economically from the prevailing economic conditions (e.g., high inflation rates) and some of the policies of the Islamic republic. This article, however, is concerned with the political power of bāzārīs as a collectivity and as exhibited in institutionalized politics, in particular, electoral politics.

13 See, inter alia, Posusney, Marsha Pripstein and Angrist, Michelle Penner, eds., Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005)Google Scholar.

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15 Lust-Okar, Ellen and Jamal, Amaney A., “Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (2002): 337–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Lindsay J. Benstead, “Legislatures as Links: Why Members Shape Popular Support for Democracy in Morocco and Algeria” (paper, Middle East Studies Association annual meeting, Montreal, Canada, 23 November 2008).

17 Brownlee, Jason, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Michelle Penner Angrist, “Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East: Explaining Turkish Exceptionalism,” in Posusney and Angrist, Authoritarianism in the Middle East, 119–41.

19 Abukhalil, Asʿad, “Change and Democratization in the Arab World: The Role of Political Parties,” Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 149–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; El-Ghobashy, Mona, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37 (2005): 373–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lust-Okar, Ellen, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Ellen M. Lust-Okar defines two separate components of party systems: “the existence and strength of parties of various ideologies and the ability of the political-party system to provide a conduit between masses and the government.” Idem, “The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myths or Realities?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 545. Lust-Okar's general point is an important one, but in this article I do not draw out such a sharp distinction between these two dimensions because the article focuses only on a single party and segment of the masses.

21 See Moslem, Factional Politics, and works cited in n. 1.

22 Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State, 77–100.

23 Ibid., 100–13.

24 For similar findings regarding China, see Tsai, Kelee S., “Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity among Private Entrepreneurs in China,” Comparative Political Science 38 (2005): 1130–158CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Badamchian, Asadallah and Banaʾi, ʿAli, Hayʾatha-yi Muʾtalifi-i Islami (Tehran: Owj, 1983), 120–27Google Scholar.

26 See Changiz Pahlavan, “Nigahi bih Jamʿiyyat-i Hayʾatha-yi Muʾtalifi-i Islami,” Andishah-yi Jamiʿih (n.d.): 8–13.

27 Chehabi, H. E., Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), Chapter 2Google Scholar.

28 Kuhistaninizhad, Masʿud, “Muʿarrifi-yi Jamʿiyyat-i Muʾtalifi-i Islami,” Guzarish 93 (1999): 13–21Google Scholar, and an interview of Asadallah Badamchian by Farid Mudarrisi, 20 August 2007, “Yik Daheh Pardahnashini-yi Muʾtalifi dar Guftugu ba Asadallah Badamchian,” http://www.faridmod.blogfa.com/post-232.aspx (accessed 15 September 2007). In this interview, Badamchian recalls that within SIC there was a debate over the decision to join the larger catch-all party rather than to remain in an exclusive group of “pure people, who were specifically following the line of the Imam [Khomeini], guardianship [vilāyat], jurisprudence [fiqāhat], and religious leadership [imāmat].”

29 In the early 1980s, SIC and the Hujjatiyyih group membership seems to have overlapped. The Hujjatiyyih group had a complicated relationship with the Islamic republic and was disbanded after some ideological and theological confrontations with Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party. Vali, Abbas and Zubaida, Sami, “Factionalism and Political Discourse in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Case of the Hujjatiyeh Society,” Economy and Society 14 (1985): 139–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Hamshahri, 14 October 2002.

31 Asnaf 40 (1996): 29.

32 Jumhuri-yi Islami, 28 February 1983.

33 Personal interviews with bāzārīs, August 2000–July 2001. During the war, the general secretary of the society argued that these “popular efforts” should be seen as an indication of the potential benefits of allowing the private sector to be more active in the economy. Risalat, 4 March 1987.

34 Abol Ghassem Lebaschi, interview by Habib Ladjevardi, tape recording no. 3, Paris, France, 28 February 1983, Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, 2.

35 Ibid. Personal interviews with bāzārīs, December 2003.

36 Badamchian and Banaʾi, Hayʾatha-yi Muʾtalifi-i Islami; Qasimpur, Davud, ed., Khatirat-i Muhsin Rafiqdust (Tehran: Markaz-i Asnad-i Inqilab-i Islami, 2004)Google Scholar; Mirdar, Mortida, ed., Khatirat-i Hujjat al-Islam va al-Muslimin, Natiq-Nuri (Tehran: Markaz-i Asnad-i Enqilab Islami, 2003)Google Scholar.

37 Bakhash's The Reign of the Ayatollahs is particularly good on the early conflicts among the elite and how their conflicts played out among bāzārīs.

38 Nader Nazemi, War and State Making in Revolutionary Iran (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1993).

39 Bianchi, Robert, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar, and Collier, Ruth Bairns and Collier, David, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

40 Khumayni, Ruhallah, Matalib, Mawduʿat, va Rahnamudha-yi Iqtisadi dar Bayanat-i Hadrat-i Imam Khumayni, 4 vols. (Tehran: Muʾassisih-yi Mutaliʿat va Pazhuhishha-yi Bazargani, 1992), 4:17Google Scholar.

41 Ibid. The same basic argument was used by Habiballah ʿAsgarawladi (a leading member of SIC) in his unsuccessful 1988 campaign for parliament. Ittilaʿat, 31 March 1988.

42 See, inter alia, Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 8, and Schirazi, Asghar, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, trans. O'Kane, John (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 67Google Scholar.

43 Khumayni, Matalib, Mawduʿat, 4:19.

44 For other examples of differentiations between bāzārīs, see ibid., 2:43–44, 56.

45 These relationships have led some to speak of SIC as constituting a “secret government.” See Mohammadi, Ali, “The Sixth Majles Election and the Prospects for Democracy in Iran,” in Iran Encountering Globalization, ed. Mohammadi, Ali (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003)Google Scholar.

46 In many ways the maydan is socially and economically distinct from the bazaar. See Adelkhah, Fariba, Being Modern in Iran, trans. Derrick, Jonathan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), Chapter 2Google Scholar.

47 Qasimpur, Khatirat-i Muhsin Rafiqdust, 32–34.

48 Ravabit-i ʿUmmumi-yi Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Nigahi bih Avvalin Dawrih-yi Majles-i Shawra-yi Islami (1364); Muʿarrifi-yi Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Dawrih-yi Duvvum; Muʿarrifi-yi Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Dawrih-yi Sivvum; Muʿarrifi-yi Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Dawrih-yi Chiharum; Muʿarrifi-yi Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Dawrih-yi Panjom; Muʿarrifi-yi Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Dawrih-yi Shishum.

49 I thank Vahid Nowshirvani for directing me to this information and sharing his insights on this topic.

50 Nomani, Farhad and Behdad, Sohrab, Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

51 Ibid. and Muʿarrifi-yi Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami, Dawrih-yi Haftom.

52 Ravabet-i ʿUmumi-yi Majles-i Shawra-yi Islami, Nigahi bih Avvalin Dawrih-yi Majlis-i Shawra-yi Islami.

53 See, inter alia, Nader Habibi, “Impact of Bureaucratic Inefficiency and Corruption on the Performance of Trade Liberalization Policies in Iran,” Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran, and Turkey, Working Paper 9633, and Amid, Javad and Hadjikhani, Amjad, Trade, Industrialization and the Firm in Iran: The Impact of Government Policy on Business (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005)Google Scholar.

54 Nomani and Behdad, Class and Labor in Iran, 204.

55 Ghassem Ladjevardi, in an interview by Habib Ladjevardi, 29 January 1983, Los Angeles, Tape No. 1, Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, 9–10.

56 Qasimpur, Khatirat-i Muhsin Rafiqdust, 59–65; Badamchian and Banaʾi, Hayʾatha-yi Muʾtalifi-i Islami.

57 Badamchian and Banaʿi, Hayʾatha-yi Muʾtalifi-i Islami, 133.

58 Mainwaring, Scott, “Party Objectives in Authoritarian Regimes with Elections or Fragile Democracies: A Dual Game,” in Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflict, ed. Mainwaring, Scott and Scully, Timothy R. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

59 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World, 70.

60 Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State, 102–103.

61 Ibid., 115. This is a common finding in the social-movement literature. See, inter alia, Hafez, Mohammed “From Marginalization to Massacres: Explaining GIA Violence in Algeria,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Wiktorowicz, Qunitan (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

62 Iran News, 31 July 2000.

63 Agence France Presse, 14 February 2000.

64 Robert Tait, “Voter Fury Threatens Iranian Election: With Polling a Month Away, Those in Tehran's Conservative Bazaar Now Reject the Whole System,” The Guardian, 17 May 2005.

65 Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, 124–35.

66 Angrist, “Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East,” 136–38.

67 Useful discussions of the emergence of this new coalition can be found at Sharq: Salnamah 1383, 7, continued on 24, and Farid Mudarrisi, “Muʾtalifi dar Dam-i Rast-i Jadid,” Imruz, 14 March 2007, http://Emruz.info/ShowItem.aspx?ID=5981&p=1 (accessed 7 April 2007).

68 In a series of articles, ʿAbbas Kakavand, a former journalist of the Risalat newspaper, outlined the decline of SIC among the forces of the right. See ʿAbbas Kakavand, “Uful-i Shitabnak-i Muʾtalifih,” Guya, 12 July 2004, http://khabarnameh.gooya.com/politics/archives/013553.php (accessed 7 April 2007); “Chira az Jinah-i Rast Birun Amadam? Rivayat-i Yik Inhitat,” Guya, 4 March 2004, http://khabarnamh.gooya.com/politics/archives/007252.php (accessed 7 April 2007).

69 Bellin, Eva, Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 150Google Scholar.

70 Mudarrisi, “Muʾtalifi dar Dam-i Rast-i Jadid.”

71 The decision to do so was likely conditioned by polls, such as the one conducted prior to the 2005 presidential election, which showed that SIC received support from 1.3 percent of those polled and the Developers' Coalition of Islamic Iran received 12.5 percent. Sharq, 25 May 2005.

72 Tairani, Bihruz, Namah 30 (May–July 2004), 8Google Scholar.

73 Shuma, 20 August 2005.

74 Sharq, 28 May 2005; Sharq, 12 May 2005; Iranian Labour News Agency, 17 May 2005, http://www.ilna.ir/shownews.asp?code=197285&code1=1 (accessed 20 May 2005).

75 Risalat, 22 June 2005.

76 Sharq, 25 May 2005.

77 Risalat, 23 June 2005.

78 Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Mines, 18 May 2005, http://www.iccim.org/persian/info/Newsdetails.aspx?NewsID=2959&dt=1 (accessed 28 May 2005); Hatef.com, 21 June 2005, www.hatefnews.com/print_version.aspex?ID=3047 (accessed 27 June 2005).

79 Naghmeh Sohrabi, “Conservatives, Neoconservatives, and Reformists: Iran after the Election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad,” Middle East Brief 4 (April 2006).

80 “Dabir-i Kull-i Hizb-i Muʾtalifi-i Islami: ba Kuntrul-i Ifratiha Mitavan Yik Riqabat-i Akhlaqi ra Masam Dad,” http://www.motalefeh.org/dabirekol/archive/4-12.htm (accessed 17 August 2005).

81 Sharq, 27 June 2005; Shuma, 20 August 2005. Shuma, the weekly journal of SIC, has regularly included these criticisms since Ahmadinejad took office. The lead article on 26 November 2005 explains that Ahmadinejad's cabinet nominations failed to win approval from the parliament because the new president was unwilling to work with a broader set of conservatives.

82 Sharq, 18 July 2005.

83 Shuma, 27 August 2005.

84 Shuma, 20 August 2005.

85 Mudarrisi, “Muʾtalifi dar Dam-i Rast-i Jadid.” A similar argument is laid out by another member of SIC in Shuma, 26 November 2005.

86 BBCPersian.com, 13 June 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/story/2007/06/070613_ka-chamber-commerce-elections.shtml (accessed 15 June 2007).

87 Sharq, 10 April 2006. The timing of these negotiations is emblematic of the unwillingness of Iranian political elites to engage in debate and discussions with “opponents” at moments of strength; they tend to do so only when in a position of weakness, hence undermining the meaningfulness of these discussions.

88 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Reports, Iran, 10 (2 January 2007).

89 Moslem, Factional Politics.

90 Fairbanks, Stephen, “Theocracy versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties,” in Iran Encountering Globalization, ed. Mohammadi, Ali (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 212Google Scholar.

91 Ehsani, Kaveh, “Iran: The Populist Threat to Democracy,” Middle East Report 241 (2006): 4–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 The Independent, 12 February 2007. This article was written and accepted for publication prior to the October 2008 strikes that swept through the major bazaars in Iran. A response to a new value-added tax imposed by Ahmadinejad's government, these closures were initiated by jewelry and gold sellers in the Isfahan bazaar who were joined in protests by shopkeepers and merchants in other sectors and cities. In response to these protests and criticisms by other business leaders, the government suspended the value-added tax. Only then did the closure of the bazaars end.

93 This is true both in the area of party politics and the organized corporatist bodies, such as the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Mines. However, having well-developed business organizations with policy-shaping power does not necessarily mean that this will result in close ties to political parties and movements. See Moore, Pete W., Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 189CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94 Nomani and Behdad, Class and Labor in Iran, 204.

95 Shuma, 30 December 2005.

96 Magaloni, Beatriz, Voting for Autocracy: The Politics of Party Hegemony and its Demise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.