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Israel's Road to the 1956 War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

David Tal
David Tal
Affiliation:
lecturer in the Department of History, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat AvivTel-Aviv 69978Israel.
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Extract

On 29 October 1956 Israeli paratroopers landed deep inside the Sinai Desert, launching the second Arab-Israeli war and adding another level to the bloody edifice of Israel's relations with its neighbors. The Israeli leadership justified its decision to go to war by pointing to “the mini-war which the Arab rulers have waged against us for eight years.” Many scholars have accepted that version of the events, which seeks to connect the multitude of border incidents from 1949 to 1956 with the war in the latter year. Indeed, a central approach in the study of the period viewed the Sinai campaign as the inevitable consequence of the succession of violent events which occurred between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt in particular, beginning shortly after the 1948 war. Benny Morris, in fact, describes Israel's participation in the 1956 war as the direct continuation of the border clashes with Egypt, finding no regional connection in Israel's involvement. Similarly, Nadav Safran, Mordechai Bar-On, and Michael Oren have argued that the border clashes, the infiltrations, and the Israeli reprisals followed one another in a relentless sequence until the final explosion in October 1956. This approach draws a connection between two “types of security” which are a permanent component of the Israeli defense doctrine: “basic security” and “day-to-day security.” The latter incorporates operational activity, unrelated to preparations for war, which the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) constantly engages in during peacetime; whereas the former refers to a situation of total war for which the IDF has prepared itself. Conventionally, events falling within the domain of day-to-day security are considered the cause of the aggravation in relations between Israel and Egypt during the early 1950s; the Sinai campaign thus becomes the inevitable end of a process of deterioration engendered by the border clashes and incidents of the preceding eight years.

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Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , February 1996 , pp. 59 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

NOTES

1 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel, in the Knesset, 23 01 1957Google Scholar: Ben-Gurion, David, Maarekhet Sinai (The Sinai Campaign) (Tel Aviv, 1959), 243Google Scholar.

2 Morris, Benny, Israel's Border War (Oxford, 1993), 428Google Scholar.

3 See Bar-On, Mordechai, Shaarey Aza (The Gates of Gaza) (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1992), 376–77Google Scholar; Love, Kennett, Suez: The Twice Fought War (London: Longman, 1969), 1–2Google Scholar; Oren, Michael B., The Origins of the Second Arab-Israel War (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 7–8Google Scholar.

4 Discussion of these terms is in Shimon Peres, Hashalav Haba (The Next Phase) (Tel Aviv: Am Ha'sefer, 1965), 9–15Google Scholar.

5 Thomson, David, Europe since Napoleon (New York: Penguin Books, 1957), 23Google Scholar.

6 The foreign minister to the government members, 10 09 1948, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel (hereafter ISA), 2348/21Google Scholar; foreign minister's lecture before the Knesset Foreign-Affairs Committee, 2 05 1949Google Scholar, ibid., 2451/18; foreign minister's meeting with the members of the Palestine Conciliation Committee, 17 August 1949, ibid., 2451/1; protocol of a meeting in the Foreign Ministry, 31 January 1950, ibid., 4373/14.

7 The first to put forward the idea that Israel should forgo part of the territories it had acquired in the war was UN. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. In August 1948 he suggested that Israel should give up the Negev, which had been designated part of the Jewish state in the UN. partition plan, while retaining Western Galilee, which was supposed to be part of the Palestinian state but had been captured by the IDF: Bernadotte, Folke, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), 240Google Scholar.

8 Foreign minister's speech in the Israeli Knesset, 9 01 1950, ISA, 2380Google Scholar.

9 Opening-fire orders against infiltrators, see Central Command/Operation Branch, “Instructions of Conduct of Border Violations,” 30 11 1950, ISA, 2256/2/b; instant of shooting at infiltratorsGoogle Scholar, see Prolov, Col. Y. to the commander of the Northern Command, 20 07 1950, Israel Defense Forces Archives, Giv'ataim, Israel (hereafter IDFA), 108/52/12Google Scholar; for instances of ambush laying and firing at infiltrators, see “Annual Summary of Operations, 1952,” ibid.; Tawil, S. to Teqoa, Y., 05 1955, ISA, 2428/10Google Scholar; on the conduct of patrols and search-and-destroy comb operations against infiltrators, see deputy of the IDF chief of staff to the commander of the Southern Command, 3 07 1950, ISA, 2436/5Google Scholar. In February 1950 three companies combed the area from Dueima to Ajur in the eastern sector, killing at least three infiltrators and capturing three. A few days later a light plane of the Air Force bombed shepherds who had penetrated Israeli territory with their flocks: Southern Command Operations, 1 and 21 03 1950, IDFA, 1166/51/8Google Scholar. For more on tracing and destroying infiltrators by Israeli Air Force planes, see daily reports of Operation Branch/Intelligence, ISA, 2428/11, and Report of IDF's Operation Branch'Intelligence, 18 06 1952, ISA, 2428/7Google Scholar.

10 “Infiltrations” (document from the end of 1950), IDFA, 108/52/34; Ben-Elkana, S., head of minorities branch, Israel Police, “Survey on the Infiltration Problem,” 8 03 1951, ISA, 2246/51/bGoogle Scholar. See also Diary, David Ben-Gurion (hereafter BGD), entries for 3 02 1950 and 5 July 1951Google Scholar; Archive, David Ben-Gurion, Boker, Sde, Israel (hereafter BGA)Google Scholar.

11 “Infiltrations”; BGD, entry for 30 09 1949Google Scholar. Glubb, Baggot J., A Soldier with the Arabs (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), 245–46Google Scholar; Ya'ari, Ehud, Mitsraim Ve'hafedayun, 1953–1956 (Egypt and the Fidayun, 1953–1956) (Givat Haviva: Center of Arabic and Afro-Asian Studies, 1975), 9Google Scholar.

12 Bruk, S. to Investigation Branch, Police Headquarters, 4 05 1950, ISA, 2181/51/la; Ya'ari, Fedayun, 9–10Google Scholar; Al-Peleg, Zvi, The Grand Mufti (Tel Aviv, 1989), 126–27Google Scholar.

13 “Infiltration Casualties,” Teqoa, Y. to Harkabi, Col. Y., head of Intelligence Branch, 22 03 1956, ISA, 2404/14Google Scholar.

14 The Israeli military and political confrontation with infiltration from Jordan is described in David Tal, “Heskem Mefakdim Mekomiim (Israel–Yarden)—kishlono shel aruts hidavrut yashir” (Local Commanders' Agreement [Israel–Jordan]—The Failure of Direct Channel of Communication), Qatedra 71 (March 1994) (hereafter LCA).

15 This was the case in the wake of the Qibya raid and again after the attack on the Arab Legion camp at Nahalin (28 03 1954)Google Scholar. On 13 October 1953 an alert was declared under the code name “Stand By,” which lasted until 2 11: commander of Border Guard, Jerusalem, to the head of Border Guard force, “Report on Co-operation with the Army during ‘Stand-By Operation,'” 11 11 1953, ISA, 2303/3/50Google Scholar; Sharett, Moshe, Yoman Ishi (Personal Diary) 8 vols. (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), 2:58Google Scholar (entry for 20 October 1953) and 2:67–68 (entry for 22 October 1953); BGD, entry for 22 October 1953; counselor of the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to the secretary of state, 23 10 1953Google Scholar; U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA), Record Group (RG) 59, 684A.85/10–2353. The deputy head of the IDF intelligence branch is quoted in the counselor's telegram as reporting that the Jordanians were intending to assault Israel. Warning against the possibility of a military showdown between Israel and Jordan, following the Nahalin operation: Memorandum of the assistant secretary of state for Middle East, South Asian, and African Affairs to the secretary of state, 7 04 1954, NA, RG 59, 684A.86/4–754Google Scholar.

16 Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966), 77Google Scholar. For a general discussion of the term “coercion,” see 69–91Google Scholar.

17 Dayan justified the IDFs reprisal activity, citing this reason in his article “Peulot tsvaiyot bizman shalom” (Military Operations in Peacetime), Ma'arkhot (1959), 34–35Google Scholar. Peres explains that “Israel's military operations” were intended “to force the [Jordanian] Legion to cooperate with Israel in preventing infiltrations.… In the Gaza Strip the goal is to furnish Egypt with a concrete interest to prevent the rampaging and acts of sabotage”: Peres, Hashalav Haba, 22–23Google Scholar. Former Foreign Ministry Director-General Walter Eytan adduces this argument mutedly in a tone that suggests reservations: “Those who supported the Qibya raid argued that it had been on-target by forcing the Jordanian authorities to take more stringent measures against the ‘infiltrators,’” Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (New York, 1958), 100Google Scholar.

18 Operation Branch/Intelligence, daily reports for 02–04 1954, ISA, 2428/12Google Scholar; memorandum of the assistant secretary of state for Middle East, South Asian, and African Affairs to the secretary of state, 7 04 1954, NA, RG 59, 684A.86/4–754Google Scholar; Teqoa, Y. memorandum, “Incidents Along the Gaza Strip Border before the Kidnapping of the Israeli Soldier,” 5 05 1954. ISA, 2951/11Google Scholar.

19 On Israel's abortive attempts to initiate a high-level meeting with an Egyptian senior representative, see Dulles to the U.S. embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo, 9 04 1954, NA, RG 59, 684A.85/4–954Google Scholar; U.S. ambassador in Cairo to the secretary of State, 12 04 1954, NA, RG 84, CE-GR box 255Google Scholar; U.S. ambassador in Cairo to the secretary of state, 25 04 1954, NA, RG 59, 647.84A/4–2554Google Scholar; the chargé in Israel to the secretary of state, 4 05 1954, NA, 674.84A/5–454Google Scholar; Teqoa, Y. memorandum, “Incidents Along the Gaza Strip Border before the Kidnapping of the Israeli Soldier,” 5 05 1954, ISA, 2951/11Google Scholar.

20 Lt.-Col. Shalev, A., “Report of a Meeting with General V. Bennike in 12.4.54,” 15 04 1954Google Scholar; ISA, 2951/4 (Cairo Embassy General Records, Box 255); U.S. ambassador to the secretary of state, 10 and 12 04 1954, US, NA, RG 84Google Scholar.

21 Captain Hareven, A., Intelligence Branch, to the Foreign Ministry, 23 12 1954, ISA, 2436/7aGoogle Scholar; see also, UNTSO inspector report to the head of the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Committee, 4 December 1954, ibid. The letter includes a confession of an Egyptian intelligence man captured in Israel.

22 Sharett, M. to Eylat, E. (and others), 26 10 1954, quoted in Sharett, Yoman Ishi, 2:591Google Scholar.

23 On Sharett's attempts to pacify the situation along the border through American mediation, see the charge in Israel to the secretary of state, 10 09 1954, NA, RG 59, 674.84A/9–1054Google Scholar; the chargé in Israel to the secretary of state, 1 10 1954, NA, 674.84A/10–154Google Scholar.

24 Dishon, Daniel, “Mediniut hahuts shel mishtar hamahepeha be'mitsraim” (The Foreign Policy of the Revolutionary Regime in Egypt), Ha'Mizrah Ha'Hadash (The New East) 7, 3 (1956): 180–81Google Scholar.

25 Jibly, Col. B. to the minister of defense, “Implications of the Resume of the Negotiations for the Evacuation of the Canal Area,” 16 06 1954, ISA, 2419/12Google Scholar.

26 For Sharett, and Ben-Gurion, speeches on the subject, see protocol of the Mapai political committee meeting, 28 03 1953, Labor Party Archive, Bet Berl, Israel (hereafter LPA)Google Scholar. See also consultations at the prime minister's home, 27 03 1953, ISA, 2449/1Google Scholar; Reuven Shiloah memorandum, 1 08 1954, ISA, 4373/17Google Scholar.

27 Nasser, Abdel to the secretary of state, 12 05 1953, FRUS 1952–54, IX, 21Google Scholar. Nasser reiterated his negative stance regarding Western intervention in the defense of the Middle East in an article published in January 1955, when he was in the midst of the struggle against the Baghdad Pact. Nasser, Gamal Abdel, “The Egyptian Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (01 1955): 210Google Scholar.

28 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:715 (entry for 10 02 1955)Google Scholar. Ehud Yaari quotes the minutes of a meeting held on 29 January 1955 with the participation of the senior command in the Gaza Strip at which a series of measures was decided on to prevent infiltration from Gaza into Israel. The measures included a ban on crossing the Gaza-Rafah road eastward, violators to be shot; detention facilities that would be erected to incarcerate suspected infiltrators whose guilt had not been proved; a special unit to be formed to combat infiltration and operate along the border; a procedure for the quick trial of infiltrators, with the judgments to be made public: Ya'ari, Egypt and the Fedayun, 16.

29 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:742 (entry for 20 02 1955)Google Scholar.

30 Teqoa, Y. to Israeli delegations, 28 02 and 2 March 1955, ISA, 2952/2Google Scholar.

31 “[F]or Nasser it changed everything”: Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 64Google Scholar. Love, Kennett quotes in similar wording Nasser's response to him: Love, Suez, 83Google Scholar. Sayed-Ahmed, Mohammed Abd el-Wahab, Nasser and American Foreign Policy, 1952-/1956 (London, 1989), 107Google Scholar.

32 Dayan, Moshe, serving as the commander of the Southern Command, explains the rationale that brought the IDF to attack civil targets: protocol of Mapai's political committee and member of the Knesset meeting, 18 06 1950, LPA, 11–1–3Google Scholar.

33 Dayan, Moshe, Avney Derekh (Milestones) (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1976), 115Google Scholar.

34 Heikal, Mohammed, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972), 5Google Scholar; Sayed-Ahmed, , Nasser and America, 218Google Scholar; Vatikiotis, P. J., Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 139–45Google Scholar.

35 Golani, M., “The Gaza Operation: A Change or Continuity in Israel's Security Policy?” (a lecture given at the Herzel Institute conference, “35 Years to the Gaza Operation,” 5 03 1990)Google Scholar; Morris, , Israel's Border War, 1949–1956, 332Google Scholar; Shlaim, Avi, “Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs: Ben Gurion and Sharett, 1953–1956,” Middle East Journal 37, 2 (Spring 1983): 189Google Scholar.

36 Shlaim, , “Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs,” 189Google Scholar.

37 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:800 (entry for 27 02 1955)Google Scholar.

38 Ben-Gurion, to Teddy Kollek, 15 09 1954, ISA, 4374/19; Teddy Kollek to Reuven Shiloah, 19 September 1954Google Scholar, ibid.

39 Protocol of the Mapai political committee meeting, 16 09 1954, BGAGoogle Scholar.

40 Bar-Zohar, Michael, Ben Gurion, 3 vols. (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977), 3:1126Google Scholar. Repeatedly in 1955, Ben-Gurion had recourse to the theme of “cowardice” in reference to Sharett's policy.

41 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:874–75, entry for 29 03 1955Google Scholar; ibid., 3:894, entry for April 1955. BGD, entry for 6 April 1955; Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 143.Google Scholar Nasser told the U.S. ambassador in Cairo, H. Byroade, that Egypt was not involved with the murder in Patish. He assumed that the attack was perpetrated by the Mufti's men: U.S. ambassador in Cairo to the secretary of state, 5 04 1955, NA, RG 59, 674.84A/4–555Google Scholar.

42 Shlaim, , “Ben Gurion and Sharett,” 189;Google ScholarMorris, , Israel's Border War, 332.Google Scholar

43 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:874–75, 894 (entries for 29 03 1955 and 4 April 1955, respectively)Google Scholar; BGD, entry for 6 04 1955; Dayan, , Avney Derekh, 143Google Scholar.

44 Ben-Gurion, to Gliner, I., 14 08 1955, General Correspondence, BGAGoogle Scholar. See also Bar-Zohar, , Ben Gurion, 3:1141.Google Scholar

45 National Security Council (NSC) 207th meeting 22.7.54, Statement of Policy by the NSC, NA, RG 273.

46 On the Eisenhower administration's intervention in Iran against Mossadegh's government, see Rubin, Barry, Paved with Good Intentions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), chap. 3;Google Scholar on Eisenhower involvement in June 1954 with the removal of the pro-Communist government in Guatemala, see Caridi, Ronald J., 20th Century American Foreign Policy (New Jersey, 1974), 315–19;Google ScholarBrown, Seom, The Faces of Power (New York, 1968), 140–41.Google Scholar

47 Ben-Gurion, D. to Sharett, M., 26 03 1954, in Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 2:418Google Scholar; Ben-Gurion, repeated this theme in his letter to Sharett on 16 04 1955, in op. cit., 4:937–38Google Scholar.

48 Ben-Gurion's suggestion to overtake the Gaza Strip: BGD, entry for 6 04 1955Google Scholar; Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 143.Google Scholar His suggestion to abrogate the General Armistice Agreement with Egypt: Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:895–99Google Scholar, entries for 3 and 4 April 1955. Ben-Gurion's demand to bring the responsibility on the Armistice Affairs back to the Ministry of Defense: Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 3:744,Google Scholar 748, 906–7; 4:919–20, 922, 939–43; 956–57, 968, 982, 990, 1012–14, 1023, 1054–55. Sharp speeches against Sharett: Ha'aretz (Israel), 28 04 1955Google Scholar. Ben-Gurion, in a meeting of the Mapai political committee, 8 08 1955, BGAGoogle Scholar.

49 Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 122, 145.Google ScholarSee also protocol of the IDF general headquarters meeting, 1 08 1955, IDFA, 847/62/30Google Scholar.

50 Protocol of Mapai political committee meeting, 8 08 1955, BGAGoogle Scholar. See also the minister of defence's speech in an IDF High Command conference, 5 07 1955, ISA, 5565/7Google Scholar.

51 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 4:925Google Scholar (entry for 11 April 1955).

52 That was “Operation Alpha.” For documents, see FRUS 1955–1957 XIV, 1–401Google Scholar; Shamir, Shimon, “The Collapse of Project ‘Alpha,’”in Suez 1956, ed. Louis, W. R. and Owen, R. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

53 Protocols and memorandums of the June-August meeting are to be found in ISA, 2454/1. On fedayeen attacks, see protocol of the IDF General HQ, 19 09 1955, IDFA, 847/62'30Google Scholar and “The Activities of the Egyptian Gangs,” ISA, 2951/10.

54 On Saturday night, 31 August, IDF forces raided the Khan Younes police: Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 151–55Google Scholar, DAG 1/2.2.5.2.0:1. Burns to the UN. Secretary-General, 1 09 1955, United Nations Archives, New YorkGoogle Scholar.

55 Bar-Zohar, , Ben Gurion, 3:1131–33;Google ScholarRaanan, Uri, The USSR Arms the Third World (Boston: MIT Press, 1969), 35–48, 57–62;Google ScholarVatikiotis, , Nasser and His Generation, 231–32.Google ScholarIn 01 1956 Nasser, conducted talks with the special ambassador, Robert AndersonGoogle Scholar. He made no reference to the Gaza operation, but reiterated his concern over the implementation of the Baghdad Pact: R. Anderson to the State Department, 19 January 1956, FRUS 1955–1957 XV, 28–36.Google Scholar

56 Ginat, Rami, The Soviet Union and Egypt (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 207–19.Google Scholar Byroade reported that in the wake of the Gaza operation, an Egyptian delegation had gone to Eastern Europe looking for arms. Ginat rejects Byroade's interpretation, arguing that it is not reasonable that this was the delegation's purpose, because Egypt and the Soviet Union had concluded an arms deal before the Israeli operation. According to Ginat, the delegation had the task of completing and concluding technical details concerning the arms deal; ibid., 211–12.

57 The prime minister's speech, 18 08 1952, Divrei Ha'Knesset (Knesset Annals), XII: 2985Google Scholar. On Israel's expectations from the revolutionary regime, see meeting: Israel's Ambassador to the United States, Eban, A., with State Department officials, 31 07 1952, NA, RG 59, 774.00/7–3152Google Scholar.

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59 Ben-Gurion, expressed these fears on several occasions—for example, on 27 10 1949 (Tsava u'Bitahon [Army and Security] [Tel Aviv: Ma'archot, 1955], 138) and on 18 October 1951Google Scholar, ibid., 289–90; see also Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 4:958Google Scholar (entry for 24 04 1955).

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62 In a speech he gave a few days after the raid to Egyptian army cadets, Nasser announced that the Egyptian Army would repel aggression, but he did not make direct threats against Israel: Byroade, Henry, Cairo Embassy, to the State Department, 4 03 1955, NA, RG 84 (Cairo Embassy, General Records, Box 263)Google Scholar. The heads of the Egyptian government even expressed fears of an Israeli attack on Egypt: Henry Byroade, Cairo Embassy, to the Department of State, 23 06 1955, NA, 674.00/6–2355Google Scholar; from Cairo Embassy to secretary of state, 14 06 1955Google Scholar, ibid., 674.84A'6–1455. See Nasser's speech after the announcement on the Egypt-Czech arms deal: From Cairo Embassy to secretary of state, 3 10 1955, NA, RG 84 (Cairo Embassy, General Records, Box 263)Google Scholar. See also his talks with Byroade: From Cairo to the secretary of state, 27 11 1955, NA, 674.84A'11–2755Google Scholar.

63 Gordon, Joel, Nasser's Blessed Movement (Oxford, 1992), 177–79, esp. 186;Google ScholarSayed-Ahmed, , Nasser and America, 91–92;Google ScholarVatikiotis, , Nasser and His Generation, 144–45.Google Scholar

64 The extent of Nasser's concern with the “Baghdad Pact” is reflected in his talks with Byroade in Cairo: Henry Byroade, Cairo Embassy, to secretary of state, 5 04 1955, NA, RG 84 (Cairo Embassy, General Records, Box 263)Google Scholar; Byroade, Henry, Cairo Embassy, to secretary of state, 23 06 1955, NA, 674.00/6–2355Google Scholar. On Nasser's struggle against Egypt's loss of influence, see Tal, LCA, 145–46; Dann, Uriel, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism (New York, 1989), 26–30;Google ScholarPode, Eli, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 107–18,Google Scholar 126–32, 149–53, 172–95. See also Heikal, Mohammed H., Suez: Cutting the Lion's Tail (London, 1986), chap. 5.Google Scholar

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69 This was the central theme of Ben-Gurion lectures to the IDF General HQ: Dayan, , A vnei Derekh, 175.Google Scholar

70 The numbers of infiltration cases to Israel from Egypt and the Gaza Strip during August-December 1955, for stealing, robberies, cultivation of lands, and so on were August, 22; September, 15; October, 25; November, 41; and December, 37: Police General HQ, monthly survey of infiltration cases, ISA, 2402/13.

71 Ben-Gurion said this to the American ambassador in Israel and to the American Information Service: U.S. ambassador in Israel to the secretary of state, 10 01 1956, NA, RG 59,784A.56/1–1056Google Scholar; American Embassy in Israel to the State Department, 16 12 1955Google Scholar, ibid., 674.84A'12–1655.

72 Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 179.Google Scholar

73 Protocol of the IDF General HQ meeting, 16 01 1956, IDFA, 847/62/31Google Scholar.

74 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 4:921 (entry for 11 04 1955)Google Scholar. Dayan explained his refusal to pull back the patrols from the border in this way: “We want to teach the Egyptians a lesson that we have the power to stop their mining actions!"

75 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 5:1392–93Google Scholar (entry for 13 April 1956). Ambassador Lawson assumed that Israel would retaliate: U.S. ambassador in Israel to the secretary of state, 8 04 1956, NA, RG 59, 674.84A'4–856Google Scholar.

76 Sharett, , Yoman Ishi, 5:1393Google Scholar (entry for 13 April 1956); Bar-On, , Etgar Ve'tigra, 90–91.Google Scholar

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78 It is accepted by scholars of Israel's security doctrine and policy that no single source exists from which they can distill that policy. See Meir, Yehuda Ben, National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 95–101;Google ScholarEvron, Yair, Hadilemma Hagarinit Shel Israel (Israel's Nuclear Dilemma) (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin Press, 1987), 45;Google ScholarYaniv, Avner, Deterrence without the Bomb (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), 56–57.Google Scholar

79 Brodie, Bernard, War and Politics (New York, 1973), 279.Google Scholar

80 Protocol of Mapai's political committee meeting, 28 December 1955, LPA, 26/56; Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 174–75,215–16.Google Scholar

81 Divrei Haknesset, 19 06 1956, XX:2069.Google Scholar

82 Ben-Gurion speeches: ibid., 19 June 1956, 2070; to the Mapai conference, 26 08 1956, Ma'arechet Sinai, 147–52.Google Scholar

83 BGD, entry for 29 07 1956.Google Scholar

84 Dayan, , Avnei Derekh, 218–19.Google Scholar

85 BGD, entry for 3 08 1956.Google Scholar