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Iran's Policy toward the Persian Gulf

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Sepehr Zabih
Sepehr Zabih
Affiliation:
St. Mary's College, Moraga, CaliforniaUniversity of California, Berkeley
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Extract

Only recently has the Persian Gulf assumed primacy in Iran's foreign policy. Basic reasons for this ascendency lie in: (a) stabilized relations with the superpowers since the early 1960s, (b) progressive enhancement of the Gulf's role in Iran's economic and strategic interests, and (c) competitive and conflicting interests and aspirations of nonlittoral states of this region.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , July 1976 , pp. 345 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

1 See my ‘Iran's International Posture: Defaçto Nonalignment within a Pro-Western Alliance,’ Middle East Journal, 24, 3 (Summer, 1970), 302–358.Google Scholar

2 On Arab-Iranian relations as a whole consult my Iran's Foreign Relations: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict, co-authored with Shahram Chubin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974).Google Scholar On the more specific Arab-Iranian relations in the Gulf see Ramazani's, R.KThe Persian Gulf: Iran's Role (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973).Google Scholar

3 Amine, Abbas, ed., The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics (Tehran: Institute of International Political and Economic Studies, 1976), pp. 133–161, 259–286.Google Scholar

4 By all accounts Iran was involved in the outbreak of Kurdish insurgency unleashed in March 1974. Press reports suggest Iran's desire to prevent the total victory of the Baghdad regime by supplying the Kurds with limited defensive weapons. This objective of retaining ‘controlled tension’ on Iran-Iraq borders is compatible with the main thrust of Iran's policy toward the Baghdad regime. See inter alia Christian Science Monitor, February 12, 1975.Google Scholar

5 In March Iran offered preferential oil credit terms to India and in October the Shah paid a state visit to India in pursuance of an even-handed policy toward the Indo-Pakistani conflict. See Iran Tribune, April 1974, pp. 4–6; Keyhan International, October 21, 1974.Google Scholar

6 For the United Nations documents related to the settlement see Middle East Journal, XXIV, 3 (Summer 1970), 373–380.Google Scholar

7 Amine, The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics, pp. 227–259. For the U.N. Security Council debate on the issue, see UN Security Council, Provisional Records, Dec. 9, 1971.Google Scholar

8 A constant theme in Iran's reaction toward bipolar rivalry has been the need to strengthen Iran's military capabilities as the best measure to attenuate that rivalry. See, for example, the text of a joint statement made at the end of Premier Hoveyda's visit to Washington in December 1968 in United States, Department of State Bulletin, LIX, 1539 (Dec. 23, 1968), 661–662.Google Scholar

9 Iran's opposition to the threat of U.S. military intervention in the oil-producing Persian Gulf states is partly attributable to this factor. Nevertheless, it is probable that in a critical situation where the industrialized West might face actual “strangulation,” Iran might acquiesce to U.S. military intervention provided it was limited to the Arab states of the Gulf and it was undertaken under some guise of collective security arrangement giving Iran the appearance, if not the reality, of playing a major part in such a venture. For the Shah's reaction to Dr. Kissinger's reference to military intervention, see inter alia Joint Communique with President Sadat in Keyhan International, January 18, 1975.Google Scholar

10 For a discussion of the concern of the oil-importing countries about the security of the Gulf, see “Security in the Producing Countries,” The Security of the Cape Oil Route (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Special Report, March 1974), pp. 14–30.Google Scholar

11 Typical of Arab radical reaction would be Radio Baghdad propaganda as well as the media of the extreme leftist wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Iran's foreign minister denied this allegation as early as summer 1972. Personal interview with Foreign Minister Abbas Khalatbari, Tehran, May 1972.Google Scholar

12 For a recent analysis of the arms buildup in the region see Dale Tahtinen, R, Arms in the Persian, Gulf (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974).Google ScholarA more up-to-date survey my be found in The Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1974). A detailed breakdown of the Iranian Military Inventory appears in a hypothetical scenario of an Iranian military intervention in the Gulf byGoogle ScholarErdman, Paul, “The Coming Oil War: How the Shah Will Win the World,” New York, 12. 2, 1974, pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

13 When the Bahrain government, bowing to the Arab pressures at the end of the October War, contemplated the closure of American naval facilities at Jufair, Iran used its “influence” to persuade Bahrain to give the United States a year to dismantle these facilities. In October 1974 a similar presentation led to Bahrain's quiet shelving of this issue.Google Scholar

14 For Soviet-Chinese views concerning the Gulf's security see “Soviet and Chinese Policies” in The Security of the Cope Oil Route, pp. 6–11. For an original analysis by Chinese authorities of United States–Soviet aims toward the Indian Ocean seeGoogle ScholarSu-Cheng, T, “The Struggle for the Domination of the Indian Ocean between the US and the USSR,” Wen-Ti Yu Yen Chin, 13, 4 (1974) 53–75.Google Scholar

15 For background analysis of the Kurdish problem consult Kinnane, Derk, The Kirds and Kurdistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).Google Scholar For coverage of the renewed insurgency, Johns, Richard, “No Peace for Kurdistan, But Will There Be War ?” New Middle East, 52 –53 (01–02, 1973), 48–50.Google Scholar

16 Repeated mediation efforts by various Arab leaders preceded the successful Algerian mediation initiative to resolve Iran-Iraq disputes. Bilateral talks, such as those held at the foreign minister level in Istanbul in January 1975, were also periodically attempted. See Keyhan International, February 4, 1975.Google Scholar

17 Texts in Keyhan International, March 7–21, 1975.Google Scholar

18 For background consult Ramazani, The Persian, Gulf: Iran's Role.Google Scholar

19 More recent speculation regarding these islands suggests some form of agreement permitting their long lease to Iraq if in return Iraq concedes on other issues like the demarcation of the continental shelf. “Survey: Oil the Gulf and the West,” The Economist (London), May, 1975.Google Scholar

20 Kurdish sources in Paris have accused Iran of planning to resettle these refugees in Iran's Baluchestan. General Mostafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader who also sought refuge in Iran had reportedly consented to Iran's plan for gradual assimilation of the Kurds into the country. See Kraft's, Joseph report in the San Francisco Chronicle, April 29, 1975. It should be noted that the policy of resettlement of dissident tribes has many historical precedents in Iran, the best Imown of which is the case of the Qashqai tribe which was resettled in Fars province from the remote Azerbaijan over 150 years ago.Google Scholar

21 One may draw quite a contrary conclusion by noting that this accommodation will enable the bulk of the Iraqi army to return to the Arab-Israeli conflict zone. For an expression of such Israeli concern see Middle East Intelligence Survey (Tel Aviv), Vol. 3, No. 2, April 15, 1975.Google Scholar

22 A communiqué issued at the end of Iraqi Vice-President Saddani Hussein's visit to Moscow in mid-April praised the accord (Keyhan International, April 17, 1975).Google Scholar

23 See Millar, T.B, “Iran's Quest for Greatness,” in Christian Science Monitor, 04 28, 1975, for a discussion of the Shah's new search for consensus on the Gulf's security.Google Scholar

24 On October 10, 1974, in a move to prevent the Arab summit conference at Rabat from distraction by non-Israeli issues, the Oman foreign ministry declared that Iranian military contingents were on the verge of departing from Oman. Soon after reports indicated continuous military operations by these forces which, apart from serving Iran's security needs, are designed to provide the Iranian army with practical experience in guerrilla warfare. For recent accounts of these operations see “Case of War for Persian Troops,” International Herald Tribune (Paris), December 20, 1974.Google Scholar On the nature of insurgency see Tremayne, Penelope, “Guevara through the Looking Glass: A View of the Dhofar War,” Journal of the Royal United Institute for Defense Studies, Vol. 119, No. 3, 09. 1974, pp. 39–42. For a recent scholarly analysis see John Duke Anthony, “Insurrection and Intervention: The War in Dhofar,” in Amine, The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics, pp. 287–304.Google Scholar

25 In mid-January Sultan Qabus visited Washington and received the pledge of United States arms sales. Coincidentally the Pentagon set in motion the process for American lease of the British base in Masirah off the Oman coast on the Arabian Sea. See Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 1975.Google Scholar