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Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds Of Jabal Sinjar

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Nelida Fuccaro
Nelida Fuccaro
Affiliation:
Research Fellow at the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter, Old Library, Prince of Wales Rd., Exeter EX4 4JZ, United Kingdom.
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Extract

In modern Iraq, processes of state formation and national integration have been consistently affected by a number of ethnic issues and concerns. This became particularly evident in the decade after the country became independent from British Mandatory control in 1932. First, in the immediate postcolonial period ethnicity became central to the development of Iraqi national and international politics. Second, ethnic specificity emerged as a major factor in the shaping of postcolonial Iraqi society, despite the continuous attempts at enforcing a new national identity on the part of a still fragile state. This article discusses the important role played by ethnicity during the first stages of Iraqi national development by focusing on the impact of conscription on the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar.

Type
Articles:Creating National Identities
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 29 , Issue 4 , November 1997 , pp. 559 - 580
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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References

NOTES

Author's note: Research for this article was supported by the Italian Ministry of Public Education. I thank Peter Sluglett and Sami Zubaida for suggestions and constructive criticism.

1 I will use the name Yazidis as it is usually found in the European and Muslim sources which I employed in this article. “Yazidis” is the Arabic form of the Kurdish “Êzdīni.” I shall use the term “ethnicity” as an analytical and descriptive category indicating subsocietal divisions in modern nation-states. These divisions usually correspond to prenational social groupings as suggested in Estman, M. J. and Rabinovic, I., eds., Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar. For a debate on the applicability of the concept of ethnie to tribal groups in the Middle East, see Tibi, B., “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Khoury, P. S. and Kostiner, J. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 127–52Google Scholar.

2 According to 1932 estimates for Sinjar, there were 17,550 Yazidi Kurds, 2,380 Sunni Kurds, 1,060 Ali-Ilahi Kurds, 6,675 Muslim Arabs, and 1,225 Muslim Turks. All the Muslim and Ali-Ilahi Kurds lived integrated in the Yazidi tribes, whereas in Balad Sinjar, the local capital of the mountain, there were also 650 Arab Christians and 15 Jews. “Evidence regarding the Yazidis: Tribal” supplement D to n. 18, 22 April 1932, 13–14, incl. in Documents presented before the Syro–Iraqi Frontier Commission by British Assessors; “Balad Sinjar” supplement B to n. 18, 22 April 1932, incl. in Documents of the Syro–Iraqi Frontier Commission, C. J. Edmonds' Personal Papers, St. Antony's College, Oxford, box IV, file 1.

3 Although the ethnic dimension in the development of Iraqi politics and society in the interwar period is generally acknowledged, it has not received much academic attention. See Esman, and Rabinovich, , Ethnicity, 11Google Scholar, and Lukitz, L., Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Franz Cass, 1995)Google Scholar.

4 The study of interethnic relations poses a number of methodological problems when dealing with postcolonial states such as Iraq. A holistic functionalist approach to interethnic relations (system analysis) requires the existence of a consolidated and pervasive state structure within which interethnic relations are clarified through the position occupied by each group in the wider sociopolitical system. A structuralist approach (power-conflict theory) is probably more appropriate in the Iraqi context. It places the emphasis on single social groups, which are studied on the assumption that their interaction with other groups is dictated by hierarchical power structures. Schermerhorn, R. A., Comparative Ethnic Relations. A Framework for Theory and Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 20–62Google Scholar.

5 Quote from Batatu, H., The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 8Google Scholar. Batatu's excellent work on Iraqi society focuses on the transition from old status groups to new social classes whose identity rested on the acquisition of private property. Therefore, Batatu deals with the issue of ethnicity only marginally; Ibid., 5–361. On British tribal policy in Iraq, see Sluglett, P., Britain in Iraq (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 239–52Google Scholar. The interaction between state and tribes in the Kut and Amara provinces of southern Iraq is discussed in Fernea, R. A., “State and Tribes in Southern Iraq: The Struggle for Hegemony Before the 1958 Revolution,” in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The Old Social Classes Revisited, ed. Fernea, R. A. and Louis, R. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 142–53Google Scholar.

6 See Zubaida, S., “Components of Popular Culture,” in Islam, the People and the State (London: Routledge, 1989), 99–120Google Scholar. Zubaida stresses the importance of the instrumentality and solidarity of religion in Middle Eastern societies, which explains the fluidity of group and community boundaries.

7 Hobsbawm has defined forms of supralocal identification as “proto-national,” applying these to the European context. In the case of Iraq and, more generally, of the Middle East as a whole, the “protonational” identification—quite ironically—does not favor national integration, partly because of the extreme multiethnic and multireligious composition of the local populations and partly because of the colonial experience. Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46–79Google Scholar.

8 Sami Zubaida analyzes the issue of ethnic versus national solidarity as it affected the construction of communal politics in monarchical Iraq. He also highlights the diversified political affiliations chosen by members of larger ethnic groups. Zubaida, S., “Community, Class and Minorities in Iraqi Politics,” in Iraqi Revolution of 1958, 197–210Google Scholar.

9 In early 1921, there were 33 battalions in Iraq. These were progressively reduced to one in October 1928. The RAF presence steadily increased between 1921 and 1923 (from four to eight squadrons, with four supporting armored-car companies). When the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty was signed in 1930, four squadrons and one-and-a-half armored-car companies were still operating in the country. The Levies consisted mainly of cavalry and infantry units. The greatest number serving was 2,500 in 1923, which had been reduced to 1,500 by June 1932. Special Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq During the Period 1920–1931 (London: Colonial Office, 1931), 39, 47–48Google Scholar; Hempill, P. P. J., “The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 1921–1933,” in The Integration of Modern Iraq, ed. Kelidar, A., 94Google Scholar; Stafford, R. S., The Tragedy of the Assyrians (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935), 72Google Scholar.

10 Sluglett, , Britain in Iraq, 142–47, 259–70Google Scholar; Tarbush, M. A., The Role of the Military in Politics. A Case Study of Iraq to 1941 (London: Routledge, 1985), 74–77, 86–91Google Scholar. During the Mandate, the Iraqi army grew slowly, from 3,500 men in 1921 to 12,000 in 1932: Sluglett, , Britain in Iraq, 260Google Scholar. In 1927, the nucleus of the Royal Iraqi Air Force was established. Between 1930 and 1936, the numbers of airplanes increased from five to fifty-six: Tarbush, , Role of the Military, 78Google Scholar.

11 The Shiʾis shared this view on conscription with the British. Shiʿi tribes were generally unwilling to serve in a national army, as they had been able to buy off their exemption from Ottoman conscription since the end of the 19th century. Shiʿi politicians saw conscription as a threat to their constituencies, which usually included large numbers of tribesmen. However, some of them supported the introduction of universal conscription to obtain larger political participation in the Parliament: Simon, Reeva S., Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology (New York: 1986), 118–19Google Scholar.

12 Articles 4 and 5 of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, 30 June 1930; appendix IV to Tarbush, , Role of the Military, 200–201Google Scholar.

13 See Ibid., 94–101. The National Defence Act was passed by the Parliament on 12 February 1934. Text included in Foreign Office correspondence, Public Record Office, London (hereafter FO), FO 371/17850 E 10.

14 Simon, , Iraq, 119Google Scholar; Article 3 National Defence Act, n. 9, 1934, FO 371/17850 E 10.

15 Simon, , Iraq, 120–21Google Scholar. The circumstances that led to the 1933 clashes between the Assyrians and the Iraqi army in Mosul are analyzed in great if somewhat partisan detail in Husry, K. S., “The Assyrian Affair of 1933,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (1974): 171–76, 344–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and in Stafford, , Tragedy of the Assyrians, 132–208Google Scholar.

16 Simon, , Iraq, 117Google Scholar.

17 Ibid., 122. In May 1935, tribes of the districts of Rumaitha and Diwaniyyah rebelled against the imposition of conscription. The army put down the revolt and declared martial law. Similarly, in the summer the military authorities were compelled to impose martial law in the northern areas occupied by the Kurdish tribes of Barzan: Kedourie, E., The Chatam House Version and other Middle Eastern Studies (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1984), 237Google Scholar.

18 At present, the Yazidis number approximately 200,000: Guest, J. S., Survival Among the Kurds. A History of the Yazidis, 2nd ed. (London: Keegan Paul, 1993), xiiiGoogle Scholar.

19 The main contributions to the study of Muslim sources dealing with ʿAdi and his brotherhood are Siouffi, N., “Notice sur le Cheik Adi et la secte des Yezidis,” Journal Asiatique série 8/5 (1885): 78–98Google Scholar; Frank, R., Scheich ʾAdi, der grosse heilige der Jezidis (Berlin, 1911)Google Scholar; Guidi, M., “Nuove Ricerce sui Yazidi,” Rivista degli Studi Orientali 13 (1931–1932): 408–25Google Scholar.

20 There is no comprehensive critical reference work on the Yazidi religion. Useful information can be found in Driver, G. R., “An Account of the Religion of the Yazidi Kurds,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 2 (1922): 197–213, 509–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Furlani, G., Testi religiosi dei Yazidi (Bologna, 1930)Google Scholar; Giamil, S., Monte Singar: Storia di un popolo ignoto (Rome, 1900)Google Scholar; Jarry, J., “La Yazidiyyah: un vernis d'Islam sur une hérésie gnostique,” Annales Islamologiques 7 (1967): 1–20Google Scholar; Kreyenbroek, P. G., Yezidism. Its Background, Observances and Textual Tradition (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995)Google Scholar. For the publication of the Yazidi sacred books and the academic debate on their authenticity, see Guest, , Survival among the Kurds, 141–58Google Scholar.

21 Holy lineages had pious ancestors who were identified with legendary or historical characters closely related to Shaykh ʾAdi ibn Musafir. See Kreyenbroek, , Yezidism, 101–7Google Scholar. Unfortunately, not much is known about the historical development of the Yazidi socioreligious establishment. See Fuccaro, N., “A 17th Century Travel Account on the Yazidis: Implications for a Socioreligious History,” Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 53/3 (1993): 241–53Google Scholar.

22 On Yazidi tribes, see Charmoy, F. B., trans., Cheref-nameh ou Fastes de la Nation Kourde (St. Petersburg, 1868)Google Scholar; Sykes, M., “The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of the Anthropological Institute 38 (1908): 451–86Google Scholar; Driver, G. R., Kurdistan and the Kurds (Mount Carmel: G. S. I. Printing Section, 1919)Google Scholar.

23 N. Fuccaro, The “Other” Kurds: Yazidis Under Colonial Rule. Tribe, Sect and State in Modern Iraq, 1919–1932 (forthcoming).

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 The most famous of these Kurdish chiefs was Kor Muhammad Beg Mir of Rowanduz, who slaughtered half of the Yazidi population of Shaikhan in 1832. Layard, A. H., Nineveh and its Remains, 2 vols. (London, 1849), 1:275–76Google Scholar.

27 There is no literature concerning the Ottoman period based on Ottoman archival sources. The most recent history of the Yazidis is largely based on travel accounts and European diplomatic correspondence. See Guest, Survival among the Kurds.

28 Layard, A. H., Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon (London, 1853), 4Google Scholar.

29 “Notice du Lieutenant Lohéac sur les Yezidis” (typescript 18 pp.), 10 12 1935, 15Google Scholar, Archives of the Dominican Mission of Mosul, Saulchoir Library, Paris; “Service Militaire” by J. Tfindji (typescript 4 pp.), 3 October 1930, 2, Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes (hereafter BEY), BEY 608.

30 This petition was drafted in Arabic, Turkish, and French. The first English translation was published by Browne, E. G. in the appendix to O. Parry, Six Months in a Syrian Monastery (London, 1895), 372Google Scholar. See also Furlani, , Testi religiosi dei Yezidi, 92–102Google Scholar, and Nau, F. and Tfindji, J., “Recueil de textes et de documents sur les Yézidis,” Revue de l'Orient Chrétien 10(1915–1917): 168–71Google Scholar.

31 “In the 1880s, the Mosulawi authorities devised a major scheme to convert to Islam the Yazidis living under their jurisdiction. Guest, , Survival Among the Kurds, 132–33Google Scholar.

32 Article IX of the 1872 Petition reads as follows: “If one of our sect go to another place and remain there as much as one year, and afterward return to his place, then his wife is forbidden to him, and none of us will give him a wife, that one is an infidel”; Article XII: “We may not comb our heads with the comb of a Moslem or of a Christian or a Jew or any other. Nor may we shave our head with the razor used by any other than ourselves [Yazidis]”; Article XIII: “No Yazidi may enter the water-closet of a Moslem, or take a bath at a Moslem's house, or eat with a Moslem spoon, or drink from a Moslem's cup, from a cup used by any one of another sect.” Quotes from Joseph, I., “Yazidi Texts,” American Journal of Semitic Languages 25 (1908–1909): 246Google Scholar.

33 “Report on Tall Afar,” in Monthly Reports of Political Officers in the Occupied Territories of Iraq for the Month January 1920, London, India OfficeGoogle Scholar (hereafter IO) L-P&S-10/897. The project of raising Yazidi irregulars is included in the British Air Ministry Files (hereafter AIR) 23/423.

34 Secret memorandum from Administrative Inspector Mosul to Adviser Interior, 7 April 1928, no. S/ 502, AIR 23/155; secret memo from Special Service Officer Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, 27 July 1928, no. I.M./10, p. 2, AIR 23/156.

35 Confidential correspondence from British Consulate Mosul to Chargé d'Affaires British Embassy Baghdad, 12 August 1935, no. 31 (5/3/1), FO 624/4/335; dispatch from British Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Office, 28 September 1935, no. 520 (335/20/35), FO 371/18948 E 6140. Ahmad, S. S., al-Yazīdiyya: ahwāluhum wa mu'taqadātuhum, 2 vols. (Baghdad, 1971), 1:97Google Scholar; al-Hasani, S. ʿAbd al-Razzaq, al-Yazțdiyyūna fț hādirihim wa mādihim (Sayda: 1951), 98–99Google Scholar.

36 Confidential correspondence from British Consulate Mosul to Chargé d'Affaires British Embassy Baghdad, 12 August 1935, no. 31 (5/3/1), FO 624/4/335.

37 Edmonds, C. J., A Pilgrimage to Lalesh (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1967), 63Google Scholar; telegram from British Embassy Baghdad to FO, 9 October 1935, no. 25, FO 371/18948 E 6199; telegram from British Embassy to FO, 16 October 1935, no. 27, FO 371/18948 E 6294; Royal Air Force monthly intelligence summary, November 1935, Air HQ Hinaidi, FO 371/18949 E 7418; extracts Royal Air Force monthly intelligence summary, February 1936, FO 371/20002 E 2171. Ahmad, , al-Yazțdiyya, 1:97Google Scholar. Iraqi sources do not give precise figures for Yazidi and Iraqi losses but indicate that 389 Yazidis were put on trial by the military court: ibid., 1:98, Hasani, , al-Yazțdiyyūna, 100.Google Scholar

38 Telegram from Délégué Adjoint Dair az-Zur to French High Commissioner, 29 October 1935, no. 300/Q; telegram from Délégué to French High Commissioner, 2 November 1935, no. 304/Q; telegram from Délégué Adjoint to French High Commissioner, 13 November 1935, no. 315/Q BEY 608. Hasani reports the text of a communique issued on 17 October by the Iraqi government concerning the end of the Yazidi revolt: Hasani, , al-Yazțdiyyūna, 99Google Scholar.

39 Since the early years of the Mandate Dawud al-Dawud had become a very significant figure for the inhabitants of Sinjar as he continued the tradition of militant resistance against the central administration which had made the Mihirkani tribe renowned throughout the mountain since early Ottoman times. In 1925, he had led an uprising against the local protégé of the British, Hamu Shiru, which had degenerated into an open rebellion against the government. The Mihirkan were a fairly heterogeneous tribe that included sections of Muslim Kurds. Fuccaro, , The “Other” Kurds, 111–12, 187–99Google Scholar; Damluji, S., al-Yazīdiyya (Mosul, 1949), 234–35Google Scholar.

40 At the same time, it seems that 58 Yazidi families belonging to the Samuqa tribe settled in western Sinjar managed to cross the border: Extract Royal Air Force monthly intelligence, February 1936, FO 371/20002 E 2171.

41 Rapport Inspecteur Dé;légué Haute Djézireh au sujet des Yézidis du Djebel Sindjar, 21 April 1939, no. 597/DY, 3, BEY 608; telegram from Délégué; Dair az-Zur to French High Commissioner, 2 May 1936, 153/Q, BEY 608; telegram from Délégué Dair to French High Commissioner, 12 May 1936, 132/Q, BEY 608; telegram from Délégué Dair to Délégué French High Commissioner, 21 May 1936, 141/Q, BEY 608. Correspondence from British Ambassador Baghdad to FO, 28 May 1936, no. 99/35/36, FO 371/20002 E 3340.

42 Edmonds, , A Pilgrimage, 64–65Google Scholar. Confidential correspondence from British Consulate Mosul to British Embassy Baghdad, 2 March 1938, no. 54, FO 624/11/274; extracts from Mosul report, March 1938, no. 3/1938, FO 624/11/274; “Proportionate Recruiting Regulations no. 24 1935,” included in FO 371/18948 E 4201.

43 Rapport du Inspecteur Délégué', 3–4.

44 Extracts from Mosul report, no. 8/1936, 10 August–10 September 1936, FO 371/20004 E 6547.

45 Monthly intelligence summary Royal Air Force February/March/May/June 1939, 10/13/12/7, FO 371/23213.

46 Edmonds, , A Pilgrimage, 64–65Google Scholar. Dispatch from British Embassy Baghdad to FO, 29 July 1939, no. 413 (504/2/39), FO 371/23202 E 5573; dispatch from British Embassy Baghdad to FO, 7 August 1939, no. 430 (504/5/39), FO 371/23202 E 5721; Royal Air Force monthly intelligence summary, April 1939, FO 371/23213 E 6201.

47 Rapport du Inspecteur Délégué, 4–5; correspondence from Délégué Djézireh to French High Commissioner, 5 July 1940, no. 1294/P, BEY 608; translation of correspondence from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Baghdad to French High Commissioner, 12 June 1940, no. 0/803/803/8, BEY 608; Royal Air Force monthly intelligence summary, June 1939, 7, FO 371/23213 E 6201.

48 Secret correspondence from Assistant Political Officer Mosul to Political Adviser Kirkuk, 8 February 11, 2009 1942, no. n., FO 624/28/325.

49 For the fixing of the Syrian–Iraqi border, see Report of the Commission Entrusted with the Study of the Frontier Between Syria and Iraq 10 Sept. 1932, C. 578, m. 285 1932 VII.Google Scholar

50 The official communique issued by the Iraqi government after the repression of the 1935 revolt clearly hints at French intrigues in Sinjar. See al-Hasani, , al-Yazțdiyyūna, 99Google Scholar.

51 Dispatch from Ministre de France en Iraq to Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Paris, 8 March 1940, no. 9 and enclosures (French trans): anon., “Karyo et Marcho sont libérés! Quant aux libéraux Syriens …,” al-Istiqtāl, 6 03 1940Google Scholar; anon, “Situation des Arabes à Hassetche,” al-Istiqlāl, 25 02 1940, BEY 608Google Scholar.

52 Evidence of the links between some Sinjari aghas and the Assyrian movement is to be found in file AIR 23/455. Christian–Yazidi relations had been very close, especially after 1915 when the Fuqaraʾ tribe led by Hamu Shiru sheltered Armenians and Christians, both Chaldean and Nestorian, who had escaped Kurdish and Turkish persecutions: “Les Chrètiens aux bêtes!” (anonymous written report in three notebooks, 1916 c.a.), cahier no. 3, chap. 15, pp. 243–45: 245bis; 245ter, Archives of the Dominican Mission of Mosul (Paris), colis n. 17.

53 According to Rondot 546 Assyrians settled in Syria in August 1933: Rondot, P., “Origine et caractère ancestraux du peuplement assyrian en Haute-Djèzireh syrienne; esquisse d'une Stude de la vie tribale,” Bulletin d'Études Orientates 41–42 (1989–1990): 109Google Scholar. Files on Assyrian migrations to Syria, AIR 23/589–655–656.

54 No literature exists on this rather obscure episode of the post-Mandate history of Iraq, which is well documented in FO/371 files 18948, 18949, 18951, 20002, 20003, 20004.

55 Article 22 of the Agreement of Bon Voisinage of 24 April 1937 pledged the Franco–Syrian authorities to “ne pas chercher à attirer en Syrie les habitants de l'Irak, à quelque classe qu'ils appartiennent et à ne pas chercher à les encourager à émigrer par des présents, des concessions ou tout autre moyen de seduction.” Text of the agreement incl. in BEY 608.

56 Correspondence from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Baghdad to French High Commissioner, 26 October 1940, no. SH/619/619/8/18607, BEY 608; letter from Dawud al-Dawud to Inspecteur Adjoint Djézireh, 12 October 1936, BEY 608.

57 Correspondence from Délégué Adjoint Djézireh to French High Commissioner, 21 October 1940, no. 1942/A, BEY 608; reply from French High Commissioner to Délégué Adjoint, 31 October 1940, no. 10600, BEY 608.

58 According to an unofficial census taken in 1937, approximately 2,000 Yazidis lived in Syria: 1,082 in the Jabal Akrad, 87 in the Hasaka district, and 797 in Qamishli. “Population sèdentaire de la Rèpublique Syrienne par rite et par caza au 31 Décembre 1937,” incl. in BEY 567. It is quite curious that no Yazidis are mentioned in the Jabal Sim'an, which represented the most important Yazidi stronghold in Syria. In 1936 Lescot reported that 1,500 Yazidis were permanently settled there. Lescot, R., Enquête sur les Yézidis de Syrie et du Djebel Sindjār (Beirut, 1938), 201Google Scholar.

59 Gérant du Consulat de France a Baghdad to Ministè re des Affaires Étragères Paris, 25 September 1935, no. 16/296, BEY 608; correspondence from Dé1égué Adjoint Euphrates to Délégué French High Commissioner, 25 April 1939, no. 438/F, BEY 608. The Kurdish colonization of the Syrian Jazira started in the second half of the 19th century. The greatest numbers of Kurds arrived from eastern Turkey in the 1920s, when the Turkish government implemented harsh and repressive policies against the Kurdish tribes. The fixing of the border between Syria and Turkey in 1924 undoubtedly played a major role in Kurdish migration to Syria: Bruinessen, M. Van, Agha, Shaikh and State. The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992), 94–105Google Scholar. N. Fuccaro, “Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism in Mandatory Syria: Politics, Culture and Identity” (forthcoming).

60 This refusal was based on article 4 of the Convention of Extradition signed between the two governments in May 1929, which sanctioned that extradition could not be granted in cases of political crimes: correspondence from French High Commissioner to French Diplomacy Baghdad, 6 March 1936, no. 233, BEY 608/Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Diplomatique (hereafter MAE) 460: dispatch from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Baghdad to French Embassy Baghdad, 28 October 1935, no. S/2849, MAE 460; correspondence from French Diplomacy Baghdad to French High Commissioner, 29 October 1940, MAE 460; memo from French Chargé d'Affaires in Iraq to French High Commissioner (including evidence of Dawud's crimes committed in Sinjar), 5 February 1936, no. 35, BEY 608.

61 Until 1925,42 Yazidis had served in Les Troupes Spéciales, a Syrian military organization controlled by the French Mandatory power whose members were recruited from the local population. From 1925 to 1940, there are no traces of Yazidis being employed in the organization. This might have been a result of both the 1925 rebellion in Sinjar and the arrival in the Syrian Jazira in 1926 of the Kurdish nationalist chief, the Yazidi Hajo Agha of the Haverki tribe, which might have created a great deal of concern in the French local authorities about possible Yazidi antigovernment activities in the area: Bou-Nacklie, N. E., “Les Troupes Spéciales 1916–1946,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1993): 653Google Scholar, Table 3 “Ethnic and Religious Composition of the Troupes Spéciales in 1925, 1930, 1944.”

62 Ajil had been a British protégé since 1921, when he was appointed to the paramountship of the Iraqi Shammar with the support of King Faysal. In 1933, Ajil, described in a contemporary British report as “a fine man physically who has cleverly adapted himself to the changing political conditions which have followed the British occupation of Iraq,” had signed a truce with his enemy, Daham al-Hadi, chief of the Syrian Shammar. He had then started to plan the settlement of his tribe in the northern Jazira and to encourage agriculture among his tribesmen. Quote from “Ajil al-Yawar,” in Records of Leading Personalities in Iraq, 13 01 1936, 5Google Scholar, FO 371/20003.

63 Royal Air Force monthly summary, November 1935, Air HQ Hinaidi, 8, FO 371/18949 E 7418; secret correspondence from Assistant Political Adviser Mosul to Political Adviser Kirkuk, 19 June 1942, no. M/2/1100, FO 624/29/325. The Ajil–Dawud dispute over the lands of northern Sinjar was to continue for many years. While Dawud was in Syria, the Shammar regularly collected taxes from villages formerly controlled by the Mihirkani leader. When Dawud returned to Sinjar in June 1941, there was an escalation of tension between the two parties. By 1942, the dispute had still not been solved, although both the Iraqi government and the British were trying to find a suitable arrangement: correspondence from Adviser Interior to Political Adviser Northern Area, 28 June 1942, no. 826, FO 624/29/325.

64 Secret correspondence from Adviser Interior to British Embassy Baghdad, 19 April 1942, no. 538, FO 624/29/325.

65 See Text of “Iraqi Declaration of 1932” in League of Nations, Official Journal (1932), 1347–50Google Scholar.

66 Extract from Royal Air Force monthly intelligence, February 1936, FO 371/20002 E 2171; dispatch from Adviser Interior to British Embassy Baghdad, 14 January 1936, P S no. 30, FO 371/20004 E 478; dispatch from British Embassy Baghdad to FO, 4 February 1936, FO 371/20004 E 889.

67 The villages were mainly inhabited by sections of the bedouin Juhaish, the Arab tribe of the Albu Mutaywid formerly controlled by the Yazidi Fuqaraʾ and the Kurdish Ali-Ilahi Babawat group.

68 Ahmad Bek report on Sinjar (Arabic typescript, 29 pp., ca. 1944), 28, incl. in C. J. Edmonds' Papers, Box XIX, file 5.