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Ethnic Ineqality in Iran: An Overview

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Akbar Aghajanian
Akbar Aghajanian
Affiliation:
Department of SociologyShiraz University
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Extract

In this paper we discussed socioeconomic inequality among ethnic communities in Iran. There were significant clues to the widening gap between Persian and non-Persian communities. That is, contrary to the existing theories, modernization and industrialization have not been accompanied with improvement in the distribution of the resources among ethnic communities; rather they have increased inequality. Thus, we looked into the particular nature of Iranian modernization for causes of interethnic inequality. Political centralization, domination of Persian language and culture, and centralization of early industrialization contributed much to the development of the interethnic inequality at early stage of the Iranian modernization. In the new area, the 1960s–1970s, the existing gap was further widened by centralized and urban-biased economic growth. This was possible only because of the government's unique access to the increasing oil revenues which were generated with very little help from the domestic means of production.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , May 1983 , pp. 211 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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References

NOTES

1 See Cahen, Claude, “Tribes, Cities, and Social Organization,” in Frye, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4: The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs (Cambridge, 1975);Google Scholarde Schooten, Marie-Therese Ullens, Lords of the Mountains (London: Chatto and Windows, 1956);Google ScholarSmith, Harry H. et al. , Area Handbook for Iran (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971);Google ScholarLimbert, John, “The Organization and Appearance for Kurds in Pre-Islamic Iran,” Iranian Studies 3, pp. 41–45;Google ScholarIrons, William, “Turkoman of Iran: A Brief Research Report,” Iranian Studies 2, pp. 27–38;CrossRefGoogle ScholarYasemi, Rashid, Kurd-va-Peyvastegihay Nezhadiva-Tarikhi (Tehran: Abnesina, K.J.);Google ScholarField, Henry, Contributions to the Anthropology of Iran, (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum, 1939).Google Scholar

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