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Class Struggle in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Mansoor Moaddel
Mansoor Moaddel
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology Eastern Michigan University, Ypsiklanti
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Abstract

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Classes are objective positions defined by the social relations of production. These positions broadly determine, among other things, the occupants' political and ideological orientations and their potential to participate in revolutionary movements. The conflict between and the contradictory nature of these positions are the underlying mechanisms for the generation and reproduction of class struggle. Nevertheless, a simple structural analysis is insufficient for analyzing the role of classes in a revolutionary movement. Classes are not static entities fixed once and for all, nor are they completely determined by “objective” economic “facts” such as the social relations of production.1 To understand the success of the dominated classes in a revolutionary movement, one must analyze their level of class formation—namely, the capacity of the members of a class to realize their interests. Class capacity is contingent, among other things, on the level of organization and mobilization of the members of the class. Rather than deriving automatically from the structural positions, class capacity is “rooted in traditional culture and communities.”2 Class boundaries, interests, and mobilization are always shifting: interests change, coalitions are formed and break up, positions in the economy are created or destroyed, and demobilization occurs.3 Classes are continually organized, disorganized, and reorganized.4 The methodological strategy adopted in this article to demonstrate the importance of class in shaping the economic policy of the Islamic Republic is based on the analysis of the significant and controversial issues that appeared in the post-revolutionary period. It will be argued that these issues were a manifestation of class struggle and that the way they were finally resolved reflected the balance of class forces.5

Type
Research Article
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 23 , Issue 3 , August 1991 , pp. 317 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

References

Author's note: This article was supported by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities and a grant from the dean of the Graduate School, Ronald E. Goldenberg, and the head of the Sociology Department, Jay Weinstein. I would like to thank Nadir Sohrabi for his assistance in extracting and organizing relevant information from Persian newspapers and the staff of the Middle East section at Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago. Comments by anonymous reviewers for IJMES are also gratefully acknowledged.

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13 Iran International Labor Office, Employment and Income Policies for Iran (1979), p. 55, table 8.Google Scholar See also Kambakhsh, Abdossamad, A Short Survey of the Workers' and Communists' Movement in Iran (Stassfurt, Salzland, 1972)Google Scholar; Ṣafarī, Ḥamīd, “Siyāsat-I Kārgarī-I Rizhīm Va Ṭabaqah-I Kārgar-I Īrān” (The Labor Policy of the Regime and the Iranian Working Class), Dunyā, 2 (1972), p. 29Google Scholar; Halliday, Iran; Nāhīd, N., “Dar bārah-i Gustarish-i Iʿtiṣabāt-i Kārgarī dar Īrān” (On the Expansion of the Workers' Strike in Iran), Dunyā, 9 (1976)Google Scholar; and Kayhān, M., “Junbish-i Iʿtiṣābĩ-i Kārgarãn” (Strike Movement of Workers in Iran), Dunyā, 8 (1978).Google Scholar

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17 These figures were reported to a seminar organized by the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture concerning the problems of agriculture in Iran in mid-November 1979 (see Nīkāʾīn, , Dar bārah-i Masʾalah-i Arżī, p. 105).Google Scholar

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19 See Ummat, 10 Bahman, 1358 (1980), p. 5; and Ummat, 11Tīr 1359 (1980), p. 4.

20 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 13 Mihr 1358 (1979).

21 Cited in Inqilāb-i Islāmī, 19 Mihr, 1358 (1979), p. 5. See also Mardum, 26 Mihr 1358 (1979); and Eizadi interview with Jumhūrī-i Islāmī, 19 Mihr, 1358 (1979), pp. 5, 8.

22 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 16 Isfand, 1358 (1980), p. 1.

23 Jumhūrī-i Islāmi, 9 Ābān, 1358 (1979), pp. 1–2.

24 Ibid., 11 Khurdād, 1359 (1980), pp. 1, 4.

25 Cited in Mardum, 17 Ābān, 1358 (1979), p. 6.

26 See Kayhān, 6 Shahrīvar, 1362 (1983).

27 Ashraf, , “Dihqānān,” pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

28 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 10 Āzar, 1358 (1979); and Ashraf, “Dihqānān,” p. 31.

29 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 20 Farvardīn, 1359 (1980); and Ummat (19 Day 1358 [1980]), p. 5.

30 Ibid., 19 Ābān, 1359 (1980).

31 Ibid., 20 Farvardin, 1359 (1980).

32 Ibid., 2 Urdībihisht, 1359 (1980), p. 4.

33 Ibid., 19 Ābān, 1359 (1980), p. 5.

34 Jumhūrī-i Islāmi (5 Day, 1358 [1979], pp. 1, 6) reported the rallies of tens of thousands in favor of an Islamic land reform.

35 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 19 AIṭṭilāʿātb AIṭṭilāʿātn, 1359 (1981), p. 5.

36 Bakhash, , Reign, p. 202.Google Scholar

37 Ashraf, , “Dihqānān,” p. 33.Google Scholar

38 Cited in OIPF (majority), Kārgarān Pīshtāz-i Junbish-i Tūdah-i (Bahman, 1984), p. 4.Google Scholar

39 Cited in ibid., p. 48.

40 Azad, Shahrzad, “Workers' and Peasants' Councils in Iran,” Monthly Review, 32, 5 (October, 1980), p. 17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

41 Ibid., p. 21.

42 Goodey, Chris, “Workers Councils in Iranian Factories,” Middle East Research and Information Project Reports, 88 (June, 1980), p. 5.Google Scholar

43 Bakhash, , Reign, pp. 179–80.Google Scholar For the list of names of the fifty-one individuals whose properties were nationalized, see Inqilāb-i Islāmī, 14 Tīr 1358 (1979), p. 12.

44 Rāh-i Tūdah (January 13, 1984), p. 9.Google Scholar See also interview with the Iranian minister of heavy industry in Iṭṭilāʿāt, 17 May 1982.

45 Azad, , “Workers' and Peasants' Councils,” p. 20.Google Scholar

46 Ibid., p. 22.

47 Ummat, 5 Isfand, 1358 (1980), p. 5.

48 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 7 Farvardīn, 1359 (1980), p. 9.

49 To gain a background on the seriousness of the problem of hoarding and for a partial list of the items that were hoarded, see Kayhān, 8 Farvardīn, 26 and 27 Urdībihisht, 3 Khurdād, and 24 Shahrīvar, 1360 (1981), and Iṭṭilāʿāt, 26 and 28 Farvardīn, 1361 (1982).

50 For example, see Iṭṭilāʿāt, 4 Day, 1361 (1982), pp. 5–6.

51 See OIPF (majority) (Keshtgar faction), Kār, no. 142 (16 Day, 1360 [1982]), p. 25.

52 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 23 Urdībihisht, 1361 (1982), p. 7.

53 Ibid., 23 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 5; and 21 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 5.

54 Ibid., 31 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 6.

55 Ibid., 12 Khurdād, 1362 (1983), p. 14.

56 This claim is made by Reza Isfahani; see ibid., 18 Day, 1359 (1981).

57 Bakhash, Reign, p. 204; and Ummat, 11 Isfand, 1359 (1981), pp. 1, 4.

58 Ummat, 24 Day, 1359 (1981), p. 11.

59 According to Harandi, Hojjat-ul Eslam, “In the new plan … the principal objective is the omission of the seven-member committees and their central organs,” Iṭṭilāʿāt, 13 Ābān, 1363 (1984).Google Scholar Sharif, a member of the central organ of these committees, indicated that “based on our sources, we have come to the conclusion that the existence of these committees … is in danger” (ibid.). See also Nāmah Mardum, 29 (December 20, 1984), p. 5.

60 In late 1983 and early 1984, the parliament passed a law concerning barren lands (ṭarḥ-i qānūn-i arāżī-i mawqūfah). According to this law, all the endowed lands that were sold without legal grounds or somehow came under the ownership of peasants have no validity and should be returned to their previous status (cited in Aksariyyat 2 [April 13, 1984], p. 3). Evidently, this law provides a legal ground for the intensification of pressure by landlords on the peasants to return the lands they obtained during the initial revolutionary phase.

61 Cited in Azad, , “Workers' and Peasants' Councils,” p. 19.Google Scholar

62 Cited in OIPF (majority), Taḥlīlī az Ḥuqūq-Ṣinfī va Shūrā-yi Kārgarān va Zaḥmatkashān dar Jumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān (An Analysis of the Occupational and Organizational Rights of Workers and Toilers under the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1982), p. 10.

63 Jumhūrī-i Islāmī, 6 Isfand, 1359 (1981), p. 5.

64 The allegations of Kianouri, the first secretary of the Tudeh Party, were not without substance. In Tavakkoli's draft bill the word “work-taker” (kārpazīr) was used instead of the word “worker” (kār-gar), and “work-giver” (kārdih) was substituted for “manager” (kārfarmā). Kianouri charged that these terminologies were borrowed from Nazi labor theories, for the words “work-taker” and “work-giver” are the literal translations of the German words Arbeitnehmer (employee) and Arbeitgeber (employer). Furthermore, when Tavakkoli and his assistant Motamid Rezaʾie argued that there was a unity between labor and capital, Kianouri responded that such an assertion was also derived from Nazi labor theory. Under the pretext of advancing a labor front (Arbeitsfront), the Nazis destroyed working-class organizations (see Kianouri, Nuroddin, Questions and Answers [Tehran: 29 Ābān 1361 (1982)], pp. 21–34).Google Scholar

65 Cited in Rāh-i Tūdah, 79 (February 10, 1984), p. 16Google Scholar; see also Iṭṭilāʿāt, 14 Mihr, 1362 (1983).

66 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 25 Ābān, 1359 (1981), p. 4; Mīzān, 19 Ābān 1359 (1981), p. 1, and 25 Ābān, 1359 (1981), p. 2; and Jumhūrī-i Islāmī, 25 Ābān, 1359 (1981), p. 2.

67 Cited in Ummat, 2 Day, 1359 (1981), p. 3.

68 Bakhash, , Reign, p. 194.Google Scholar

69 For the guardians' reasons for rejecting the nationalization bill, see Iṭṭilāʿāt, 6 Āzar, 1361 (1982), pp. 15–16; and “Iran Foreign Trade—The Guardians' View,” Middle East Economic Digest, 28, 35 (31 August, 1984), p. 12.Google Scholar

70 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 31 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 6.

71 Ibid., 22 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 5.

72 Ibid., 5 Ābān, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

73 Īrān, Makaz-i Āmār-i, Āmār-i Kārgāhʾhā-yi Buzurg-i Ṣanʿatī-i Sāl-i 1360 (Tehran: 1983), p. 7, table 13Google Scholar; p. 13; p. 37, table 45.

74 Ibid., p. 13.

75 Halliday, , Iran, pp. 108–9Google Scholar; and Kazemi, Farhad and Abrahamian, Ervand, “The Non-Revolutionary Peasantry of Modern Īrãn,” Iranian Studies, 11 (1978), pp. 259–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76 For a discussion of bunah and its transformation under the shah, see Nizhād, Javād Ṣafi, Bunah: Qabl va Baʿd az Iṣlāḥāt-i Arżī (Boneh: Before and After the Land Reform) (Tehran, 1974), esp. pp. 180–83.Google Scholar

77 Ashraf, , “Dihqānān,” p. 26Google Scholar; Bakhash, , Reign, p. 198Google Scholar; and Momeni, Baqir, Masʾalahi-i Arżī va Jang-i Ṭabaqātī dar Īrān (The Agrarian Problem and Class Struggle in Iran) (Tehran, Iran, 1980), pp 338–39.Google Scholar

78 At that time the leaders of the Islamic Republic denied their involvement in the murder of these Turkman popular leaders. Ayatollah Khalkhali, who was suspected of the act, declared, “I announce that I did not have anything to do with the killing of the four leaders of Turkman-Sahra. If anyone can provide evidence that they were executed under my order I shall condemn myself to death” (Iṭṭilāʿāt, 6 Isfand 1358 [1980], p. 4; and Jumhūrī-i Islāmi, 7 Isfand 1358 [1980], p. 6). In another interview, Khalkhali claimed that he had been unaware of the leaders' arrest, that he did not even know their names, and that he was in Tehran when he heard the news of their executions (Jumhūrī-i Islāmī, 9 Isfand 1358 [1980], p. 4). Over four years later, in the fall of 1984, Khalkhali confessed that it was indeed he who had murdered these people: “In Gonabad I executed ninety-four people, including Tooma'j, Jorjani, Vahedi, Makhtoom. I myself executed these people. I executed ninety-four people, not just one person.… I suppressed the people of Turkman” (cited in Aksariyyat, 44 [February 11, 1985], pp. 1–2). Khalkhali was making these confessions to indicate his loyalty and service to the Islamic Republic and not to be punished as he had offered four years earlier.

79 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 10 Ābān, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

80 Ibid., 6 Ābān, 1360 (1981), pp. 5, 11.

81 Ibid., 4 Tīr, 1359 (1980).

82 Ibid., 31 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 6.

83 Ibid., 24 Farvardīn, 1359 (1980), p. 2.

84 Ibid., 14 Khurdad, 1359, p. 12.

85 Ibid., 21 Day, 1361 (1983), p. 5.

86 Ibid., 10 Aban, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

87 Ibid., 7 Aban, 1360 (1981), p. 5 and 2 Day, 1360 (1981), pp. 3, 21.

88 Ibid., 10 Aban, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

89 Ibid., 11 Aban, 1360 (1981), p. 6.

90 Ibid., 4 Murdad, 1360 (1981), p. 5, and 4 Tir, 1360 (1981).

91 Ibid., 31 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 5.

92 Ibid., 20 Farvardīn, 1362 (1983), p. 1.

93 For example, ʿĀbidīzādah, the representative of Khouy in the parliament, complained that millionaires had become billionaires (ibid., 13 Urdibihisht, 1362 [1983]). Ayatollah Malakhouti said that “after the revolution, the profits of some people were even higher than under the Shah. For example, I know someone who has made 36 million tomans within a period of four months” (Kayhān, 4 Ābān, 1361 [1982]). Ayatollah Sedouqi complained that “one of these carpet sellers told a friend that the profit they made in this year was equal to twenty years of carpet selling [under the Shah]” (Jumhūrī-i Islāmi, 13 Tīr 1362 [1983]).

94 Bakhash, , Reign, p. 191.Google Scholar

95 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 2 Day, 1360 (1981), p. 3, and 16 Āzar, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

96 Ibid., 28 Murdād, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

97 Rāh-i Tūdah, 77 (January 27, 1984), p. 9.

98 Jumhūrī-i Islāmī, 7 Urdībihisht, 1360 (1981), pp. 1, 3.

99 Ibid., 15 Urdībihisht, 1360 (1981), p. 1.

100 Ibid., 22 Urdībihisht, 1360 (1981), pp. 1, 5.

101 Rāh-i Tūdah, 77 (January 27, 1984), p. 8.

102 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 16 Farvardīn, 1361 (1982), pp. 5, 14. Noteworthy is Khomoushi's statement: Initially, the Ministry of Commerce had little interest in cooperating with us. But recently, particularly after the appointment of our esteemed brother, Mr. Asgar-Owladi, the ministry has become more cooperative. The minister of commerce has even appointed a person in the Committee on Guild Affairs to be an active liaison between us and the Ministry of Commerce” (Iṭṭilāʿāt, 16 Āzar, 1360 [1981], p. 5).

103 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 17 Āzar, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

104 Rāh-i Tūdah (January 27, 1984), p. 9.Google Scholar See also Tabatabaʾi, , “Report on the Six-Month Activities and Current Programs of the Mostazʿafin Foundation,” Iṭṭilāʿāt, 5 Khurdād, 1362 (1983), p. 14.Google Scholar

105 Rāh-i Tūdah, 77 (1362), p. 9.

106 Hiro, Dilip, Iran under the Ayatullahs (London, 1985), p. 243Google Scholar; and Hiro, Dilip, Māhiyyat-i Żid-i Inqilābī-i Anjumanī Hujjatiyyah rā Bishināsīm (Exposing the Counter-Revolutionary Essence of Huj-jatiyyah Organization), 3 vols, (n.d.; n.p.).Google Scholar Although these volumes are underground publications, they contain some reliable documents on the history, activities, resources, and social bases of the Hujjatiyyah. For example, in the city of Isfahan alone, the Hujjatiyyah had nineteen large wealthy capitalists and landowners as its members and leaders (see ibid., vol. III, pp. 23–24); had connections with ayatollahs Khademi, Golpayegani, Khoʿei, Shams-Abadi, and other less influential ulama (ibid., pp. 19–21); and owned and controlled twelve financial organizations, foundations, hospitals, and high schools.

107 Iṭṭilāʿāt, Shahrīvar, 1358 (1979), and 30 Day, 1358 (1980), p. 4.

108 Ibid., 20 Farvardīn, 1360 (1981), p. 14.

109 Ibid., 4 Khurdād, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

110 Ibid., 6 Ābān, 1360 (1981), p. 5.

111 Cited in Rāh-i Tūdah (January 27, 1984), p. 14.Google Scholar

112 Indeed, contrary to his previous pledges to defend the impoverished masses, Khomeini advised the officials of the government and the ulama to: “involve the bazaar in the affairs [of the government].… In my view this is a very important issue. I have repeatedly said this… This is among the issues which are of utmost importance” (Aksariyyat, no. 23 [September 7, 1984], p. 2). In another speech (January 2, 1984), Khomeini repeated his support for the bazaar: We must not feel disheartened and must try to have the bazaar nominate its own people for the elections. You must not feel obligated to anyone, to do as they decide. The bazaar should have its own will. You must awaken the people in the bazaar so that in Tehran and other cities they nominate good people to the parliament, so that the next parliament is better than the present one (Kar International, 12 [March–April, 1984], p. 16).

113 See OIPF (majority), Kār, no. 4 (1984).

114 Ummat, 26 Ābān, 1359 (1980), pp. 1, 4; and 11 Isfand, 1359 (1981), pp. 1, 4.

115 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 2 Urdībihisht, 1359 (1980), p. 4.

116 Ashraf, , “Dihqānān,” pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

117 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 9 Tīr, 1361 (1982).

118 For example, Tabatabaʾi, the director of the Mostazʿafin Foundation, indicated that the government has decided to sell land, real estate, and small industrial establishments to private citizens. Furthermore, in his response to a reporter's comment that “some workers of the [nationalized] factories have expressed their dismay with the government's decision to return these factories to the original owners,” Tabatabaʾi indicated that “our objectives are the implementation of the law of Islam not the satisfaction [of the people] (Iṭṭilāʿāt, 5 Khurdād, 1362 [1983], p. 14; see also Middle East Economic Digest [November 25, 1983], pp. 11–12Google Scholar).

119 The Eight Points Command of Ayatollah Khomeini which was issued in late 1982 is perhaps the official beginning of the Islamic Republic's economic liberalization in post-revolutionary Iran. Theoretically, such commands are measures to ensure the rule of law and to prevent arbitrary decisions by different ulama and government authorities. In practice, however, they became a legal weapon that was used by the landowners and capitalists to intensify their attacks on workers and peasants. The Eight Points Command, for example, sanctions the principle of private property and the right of individuals over their properties. Theoretically, it could be considered a positive step to protect individual rights and property. In practice, however, this right could easily be used by landowners and capitalists to gain control over their properties which were either seized by the peasants or nationalized by the government. (For more details, see Kayhān, 25 Āzar, 1361 [1982].) That the Eight Points Command of Ayatollah Khomeini enhanced the power of the dominant classes could be observed from a subsequent statement by Khamoushi (the head of the Committee on Guild Affairs): “Now no governor, if he is the follower of the command, dares to invalidate any member of a merchant guild who, for example, happens to be in a photograph with the Shah because they were passing through the same street 10 years ago” (cited in Rāh-i Tūdah [January 27, 1984], pp. 9, 14Google Scholar).

120 Ashraf, , “Bazaar-Mosque Alliance,” p. 563.Google Scholar This criticism, however, does not reduce the scholarly value of the whole article. Ashraf is a sociologist who takes social history quite seriously, as is evident in his many works.

121 Iṭṭilāʿāt, 4 Day, 1361 (1982), p. 5.

122 Ibid., 10 Bahman, 1361 (1982), p. 2. Sediq Taqvaʾie, the attorney on guild affairs (dādsitān-i umūr't ṣinfī) in Tehran, also has pointed to the connection between the ministry of commerce and large capitalists (see ibid., 23 Day, 1361 [1983], p. 2).

123 Ibid., 8 Isfand, 1361 (1983), p. 2.