The Arab Boycott of Israel

Donald L. Losman

doi:10.1017/S0020743800024831

The Arab Boycott of Israel

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009

Donald L. Losman

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Donald L. Losman: Affiliation:
Loyola University, New Orleans, Louisiana

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Abstract

A boycott may be denned as ‘The refusal and incitement to refusal to have commercial or social dealings with offending groups or individuals’.1 More specifically, international economic boycotts are devices by which one or more states (or their citizens) attempt to inflict economic hardship upon a target nation. The method of coercion takes the form of a disruption of the target state's normal foreign trade and financial flows. In the vast majority of instances, the imposition of a boycott is a political act, designed to influence the practices and policies of the offending country, utilizing economic weapons as the coercive force. A boycott may be deemed successful if it attains the ends desired by its initiators. As a rule, economic sanctions must be effective (i.e. cause economic damage) in order to succeed; however, it is quite possible, indeed, often probable, that boycotts may be effective without being successful.

Type: Articles
Information: International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , April 1972 , pp. 99 - 122

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800024831 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

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^{page 99 note 1} A. R. C., De Crespigny and R. T., McKinnel, ‘The Nature and Significance of Economic Boycott’, South African Journal of Economics (12 1960), p. 319:Google Scholar

^{page 99 note 2} It is even more applicable to two other current boycotts, the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and the United States and O.A.S. embargo against Cuba, both boycotts being considerably effective, but nevertheless failing to achieve their political ends.

^{page 99 note 3} B. Y., Boutros-Ghali, ‘The Arab League: Ten-Years of Struggle’, International Conciliation (May 1954), p. 421.Google Scholar

^{page 100 note 1} The Protocol of Alexandria was signed by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen and delegates from the Palestinian Arabs.

^{page 101 note 1} Edmund, Asfour, ‘The Economic Framework of the Palestine Problem’, in W. R., Pol, D. M., Stamier and E., Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy (Boston, Beacon Press, 1957), p. 311.Google Scholar

^{page 101 note 2} Robert, Nathan, Oscar Gass and Daniel Creamer, Palestine: Problem and Promise(Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1946), p. 147.Google Scholar

^{page 101 note 3} Gur, Ofer, The Service Industries in a Developing Economy: Israel as a Case Study (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 88.Google Scholar

^{page 101 note 4} ibid.

^{page 102 note 1} ibid.

^{page 102 note 2} ibid.

^{page 102 note 3} Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Facts about Israel (Jerusalem, Government Press, 1963). P- 46.Google Scholar

^{page 102 note 4} Nathan, , Gass and Creamer, p. 224.Google Scholar

^{page 102 note 5} Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: a Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, vol. 11 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947), p. 696.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 1} ibid.

^{page 103 note 3} To protect themselves against cheap Arab competition, some Jews effected what amounted to a boycott of Arab production and expected their fellows to do the same.

^{page 102 note 5} D., Horowitz and R., Hinden, Economic Survey of Palestine (Tel Aviv, Economic Research Institute, 1938), p. 118.Google Scholar

^{page 104 note 1} ibid.

^{page 105 note 1} E., Kleiman, ‘The Place of Manufacturing in the Growth of the Israel Economy‘, Journal of Development Studies (04 1967), p. 230.Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 2} ibid.

^{page 105 note 3} Nathan, Gass and Creamer, p. 272.Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 5} Horowitz and Hinden, p. 134.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 1} Esco Foundation, p. 735.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 2} Nathan, Creamer and Gass, pp. 331-2.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 3} Kleiman, p. 231.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 4} Nathan, Creamer and Gass, p. 333.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 1} Robert, Weigand, ‘The Arab League Boycott of Israel:‘, Business Topics (1968), p. 76.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 3} Since its inception the League has grown in size, its present membership including thirteen Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen-, and Kuwait) and several Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.

^{page 107 note 4} See Joseph Churba, U.A.R.-Israel Rivalry over Aid and Trade in Saharan Africa:I957-I93 Columbia University dissertation, 1965, and particularly pp. 103-8.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 1} Business International, Coping with the Arab Boycott of Israel, Management Monograph no. 19 (New York: Business International, 1963), p. 1. For a listing of eighteen offenses, most quite broadly defined, which result in blacklisting, see pp. 3-5.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 2} See Susan, Dworkin, ‘The Japanese and the Arab Boycott‘, Near East Report(October 1968), pp. 11-13; and ‘Japanese Firms Misread Arab Boycott Terms‘, Business International (17 May 1968), p. 155.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 3} See D., Losman, International Economic Sanctions: The Boycotts Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia, University of Florida dissertation, 1969, pp. 231-3.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 1} One Israeli official, commenting upon this statement, is alleged to have quipped:‘ Of course it was an economic decision - there are 80 million thirsty Arabs but only a handful of Israelis.’

^{page 110 note 1} See ‘Faisal Remark stirs up N.Y. Dinner Party’, Miami News (23 June 1966), p.1Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 2} ‘The Arab Boycott of Israel’, Business International (24 January 1964), p.1Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 3} ‘The Persistent Arab Boycott’, Business International (4 March 1966), p. 72.Business Week (23 August 1969), p. 80, reported that the blacklist was ‘down to about 1, 000 companies’.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 4} Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Export Control, 83rd Quarterly Report (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1968), pp. 16-17.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 1} Harry B., Ellis, ‘The Arab-Israeli Conflict Today‘, in Georgiana G. Stevens, The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 132.Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 1} ‘How the Arab Boycott Works’, Business Abroad (17 April 1967), p.22Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 2} For a discussion of boycott loopholes, methods of contravening the embargo, and examples of smuggling, see Losman, pp. 238-41.

^{page 112 note 3} It is probable that Jordan is the Arab country most seriously damaged by the boycott.Its loss of a direct route to the sea via the Haifa port and the failure to jointly utilize the Jordan waters constitute major direct impacts. The indirect costs in terms of other opportunities foregone are literally incalculable.

^{page 113 note 1} See Losman, , pp. 241-5, 383-6.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 1} Quoted in ‘How the Arab Boycott Works’, Business Abroad (17 April 1966), p. 23.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 2} ‘The Arab Boycott of Israel’, Business International (24 January 1966), p. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 3} Ellis, , in The United States and The Middle East, p. 130.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 1} Marwan, Iskandor, quoted in Imad Shehadeh, ‘Arab Boycott Hinders Israel‘, Beirut Daily Star (7 May 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 1} A. J., Meyer, Middle Eastern Capitalism (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959). P- 24.Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 2} Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Developments in the Middle East, ig6i-63 (New York, United Nations, 1064), pp. 76-8.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 1} For a concise account of Israel's initial overtures and Arab counter-pressures see Rouhollah K., Ramazani, The Middle East and the European Common Market (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1964), pp. 70-4.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 1} Finn B., Jensen and Ingo, Walter, The Common Market (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), pp. 123-4.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 2} Mordechai E., Kreinin, ‘Israel and the European Economic Community‘, Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1968).Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 3} J. H., Thompson and R. D., Reischauer, Modernization of the Arab World (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966), p. 74.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 1} Gardner, Patterson, ‘Israel's Economic Problems‘, Foreign Affairs (January 1954), p. 321.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 2} Harry B., Ellis, Israel and the Middle East (New York, Ronald Press Company, 1957), p. 162.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 3} It can be argued that the existence of the boycott stimulated Israeli effort and ingenuity which might not otherwise have been forthcoming. Such a hypothesis is not susceptible of empirical testing, but is rejected nevertheless by this writer after a careful consideration of all the relevant data. If any stimulus exists, it probably derives more from the past armed conflicts and the constant threat of future ones. Finally, if it has existed, its duration and impact have probably been quite marginal and short-lived.

^{page 121 note 1} Mordehai, Nahumi, ‘Policies and Practice of Occupation‘, New Outlook (May 1968), P- 32.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 2} Walter, Schwarz, ‘Israel's Bitter Honeymoon‘, Manchester Guardian (8 May 1969), p: 7.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 3} Economist Intelligence Unit, Israel, Quarterly Economic Review (no. 4, 1968), p. 8.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 4} Economist Intelligence Unit, Israel, Quarterly Economic Review (no. i, 1968), p. 7.Google Scholar

^{page 122 note 1} The inefficacy of boycott pressures in this regard is brought to the fore by the examples of air sabotage. Having failed in the purely economic sphere, other forms of warfare are being employed to bring an economic collapse.

^{page 122 note 2} See, for example, B'nai B'rith Current Issues Series, no. 197, Arab Boycott, Washington, D.C. (undated) where the statement is made that the boycott ‘has not hampered Israel's economic growth’.Google Scholar

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The Arab Boycott of Israel

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