Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009
In a recent book Michael Hudson referred to Lebanon as the “Precarious Republic.” The Lebanese Republic was said to be precarious because its citizens tended to identify more strongly with the ideologies of their various sects than with the state, because of the gulf separating the rich from the poor, and because of the growing restlessness of the latter. It was also said to be precarious because of growing disaffection of most segments of Lebanese society with most areas of government performance.
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6 The statistics cited in this section are derived from a number of tables which were precluded from the article for space limitations. Moreover, some of the trends established here can be observed in the Gamma coefficients of the tables incorporated in the preceding section.
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11 Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1938)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The problem of high alienation is further compounded by the fact that the prescriptions for change run in opposite directions as revealed by student political affiliations, orientations and actions.
12 In an article written in 1974, we observed that the majority of Lebanese college students were not highly active participants in politics. But a big majority of them were clearly oriented in this direction and that “the narrowing of the gap between orientation and operation depends on the continuity of widely “attractive” issues and the development of a student movement.” See Nasr, Nafhat and Palmer, Monte, “Family, Peers, Social Control and Political Participation among Lebanese University Students,” Journal of Developing Areas, n.v. (04, 1975), 377–393Google Scholar. Keen observers of the political scene in Lebanon would agree that since the early 1970s perennial divisive issues relating to the identity of the state, the structure of power, the “sovereignty” of the state and the direction of policy were compounded and increasingly provoked student activism and diversity. Concurrently, student organizations (mostly proxy actors for national political parties and organizations) were clustering in adversely poised student unions, thus providing the nervous system for broader activation of students.
13 It is perhaps simplistic to attribute the civil war in Lebanon to alienation as it relates to protest, but the degree and content of alienation (normlessness and cynicism) revealed in this study clearly demonstrate the extent to which the Lebanese were prepared to contribute to the destruction of the status quo of 1975.