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The Alchemy of Domination? Some Ashʿarite Responses to Muʾtazilite Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Sherman A. Jackson
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Extract

In his provocative essay Knowledge and Politics, Harvard Law School professor Roberto Unger undertook what has since become a familiar critique of the contemporary social and political order. Beginning with the main postulates of Enlightenment epistemology, Unger contended that our acceptance of “liberal philosophy” has divided us, as moral beings, between the private world of value and desire and the public world of rules and reason. Since, moreover, reason functions as the medium of public (and ostensibly egalitarian) discourse, its inevitable exaltation over desire threatens, where it does not undermine, our sense of self and personality. Modern man, according to Unger, is inextricably ensconced between the irreconcilable poles of individuality and citizenship. From religious fundamentalism to Afro-centrism, from classical and radical feminism to multi-culturalism, modernity is evolving into an endless concatenation of reactions against the threat of domination that lurks beneath the demand to justify personal values and predilections through the impersonal language of reason, a medium over which some of us possess greater mastery than others, even if, as moderns (or perhaps post-moderns) we recognize that reason is not autonomous but can operate only in the interest of values already present.

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Articles
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International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , May 1999 , pp. 185 - 201
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999

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References

Notes

Author's note: A version of this paper was presented at the 1995 annual conference of the Middle East Studies Association in Washington, D.c. I thank Professor A. Kevin Reinhart for his valuable comments on an earlier draft. I also thank the anonymous readers for IJMES for their careful scrutiny and constructive criticisms.

1 Unger, Roberto, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975).Google Scholar

2 By domination I do not mean every instance where the community imposes upon groups or individuals laws with which the latter disagree. Domination obtains, rather, where in addition to this claim of legal authority (i.e., the right to impose limits on behavior) there is an attempt to impose the belief that these laws or limits are in conformity with some “natural” or “objective” order that is obvious to all save the stupid or morally depraved. When a Shafiʿi judge, for example, annuls a Maliki marriage contracted in the absence of witnesses, this is not necessarily an instance of domination. Indeed, few rules in any legal system are the object of unanimous consensus. But when in addition to having this marriage overturned, Malikis are condemned as heretics and the clearly plausible basis of their position is denied all recognition, this constitutes an attempt to dominate. So is it the case when historically and geographically bound scriptural extrapolations are reified and passed off as objective truths that are binding on all generations to come. Or, where clearly subjective biases are disguised, defended and imposed as rational, as, for ex- ample, in the ban on polygyny in the United States (see Posner, R. A., Sex and Reason [cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992], 253–60, esp. 259 n. 40,Google Scholar where, following a list of ostensibly “rational” critiques of the institution, the subjective basis of the ban is admitted: “but the taboo against polygamy runs too deep to make the suggestion to permit it a feasible one in any state of the U.S.”). In short, domination as I use it refers to the unjustified denial to members within an interpretive community of the right to believe in their own minds, their own senses, and their own experiences. Its instruments can range any where from reason to tradition to the imposition of false criteria (e.g., the claim that a man must be an M.D. in order to know that he has a fever).

3 Hobbes was by no means the originator of the idea. As far back as ancient Greece, the post-Socratic thinker Aristippus (before Plato) claimed (following Protagoras) that we can know nothing of things without us except their impressions on us. See Sidgwick, H., Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (London: Macmillan and co., Ltd., 1939), 32.Google Scholar It was Hobbes, however, and the responses he elicited that rendered this the dominant perspective from which modern thinkers have yet to retreat.

4 Unger, Knowledge, 32.

5 Ibid., 43.

6 See, for example, Hourani, G., “Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam,” The Muslim World 50 (1960): 269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Reinhart, A. Kevin, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 162.Google Scholar

8 Ibid.

9 Hourani, “Two Theories,” 269. Among the ancillary conclusions to be drawn from all of this is that, despite the view of those who seem to imply that the survival of Muʿtazilism would have provided for a more satisfactory Muslim political thought (see, e.g., Kerr, M., Islamic Political Reform: The Political Theories of ʿAbduh and Rashid Riḍā [Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of california Press, 1966], 58 ff.), Ashʿarism can no more be said to have stifled the development of political thinking in Islam than Hobbes and his successors stifled political thought in the West.Google Scholar

10 Reinhart has suggested that the Ashʿarite response was informed by the fact that by the 11th century, Muslims had become the majority in their societies, by virtue of which fact they outgrew the minoritarian missionary perspective of the Muʿtazilites. See his Before Revelation, 180, 183, and passim.

11 Throughout this essay, I translate al-ṭabʿ as “appetitive self,” as opposed to “human nature” or “human disposition,” because in most instances it is used in such a way that any universal dimension is weak or absent. In most instances, what is referred to is not a general proclivity in human beings, but rather the particular idiosyncrasies and predilections we possess as individuals. See, however, the exception with al-Razi's use of the term (see n. 37).

12 See, for example, Jackson, S. A., Islamic Law and the State: The constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 63, where, in defense of the principle of maṣlaḥah, al-Qarafi points out that everyone who practices qiyās inevitably indulges subjective judgments, because the ratio essendi (ʿillah) underlying scriptural rulings is more often than not a matter of conjecture based on what is perceived to promote personal or group interest.Google Scholar

13 Reinhart points out that al-Ghazali focused seemingly exclusively on Baghdadi Muʿtazilism, ignoring the more subtle and less objectivist arguments of later Basrans such as ʿAbd al-Jabbar; see Reinhart, Before Revelation, 161.

14 al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl, 2 vols. (cairo: al-Amīrīyah Press, 1322/1904), 1:56.Google Scholar Al-Qarafi explicitly attributes this latter claim to the Muʿtazilites as being fundamental to their doctrine. See al-fuṣūl, Sharḥ tanqiḥ, ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿd (cairo: Maktabat Kullīyāt al-Azhar, 1393/1973), 89.Google Scholar

15 al-Mustasfā, 1:56.

16 Ibid.

17 See 194 ff.

18 al-Mttstasfā, 1:56.

19 Ibid., 1:56–57.

20 Ibid., 1:57.

21 Ibid. Al-Ghazali seems to ignore, however, the doctrine of the Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Jabbar, who holds that blame or praise is earned by such actions only on the assumption that there are no extraneous impediments (māniʾ to such. See al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥītd wa al-ādl, ed. al-Ahwānī, A., Madkūr, I., and Ḥusayn, Ṭ., 16 vols. (cairo: al-Muʾassasah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʿĀmmah li al-Taʾlif wa al-Tarjamah wa al-Ṭibāʾah wa al-Nashr, 1960-1968), 6:19.Google Scholar Al-Razi, however, provides a would-be response, noting that if the possibility of impediments is admitted, then the most one could ever achieve would be the possibility (or likelihood) of a thing being ḥasan or qabīḥ, which could be confirmed only by the subsequent establishment of the absence of would-be impediments. This, however, would undermine the claimed inherentness of the ḥusn or qubḥ in question. See al-Maḥsūl fi ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh, 6 vols., 2nd ed., ed. al-ʿAlwāni, T. J. F. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risālah, 1312/1992), 1:138.Google Scholar

22 al-Mustasfā, 1:57.

23 Ibid., 1:57–58.

24 He notes in this regard that were it not for revelation asserting the impossibility of the Muslim community unanimously agreeing on an error, the hallowed ijmāʿ would not constitute any proof. See ibid., 1:58.

25 These include: (1) the mixing of subjective with objective judgments, whereby a person projects personal interests onto objects in the world and then attributes these to the objects in question as intrinsic attributes; (2) failure to note exceptions to what is commonly preferred, whereby just because a person prefers a thing most of the time, he fails to note those instances in which that thing would not be preferable (which would undermine the notion of the positive attribute being intrinsic); (3) identification of things that are preferred or disliked with other things that are associated with them—for example, a beautiful woman might be judged to be ugly simply because she has a Jewish name. See ibid., 1:58–60.

26 Ibid., 1:60. Al-Ghazali's position is echoed in Sidgwick's anticipation of the rationalist reaction to Hobbes's psychological egoism: “Let us grant that there is as much intellectual absurdity in acting unjustly as in denying that two and two make four; still, if a man has to choose between absurdity and unhappiness, he will naturally prefer the former”; Sidgwick, Outlines, 184.

27 “Thoughts are to the Desires as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to things desired: All Stedines of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence”: from Hobbes' Leviathan, cited in Unger, Knowledge, 38.

28 al-Mustasfā, 1:61.

29 See, for example, Kitāb al-irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adillah fi uṣūl al-iʿtiqād, ed. Mūsā, M. Y. and al-Hamid, A. ʿAbd (cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 1369/1950), 258, 265 ff.Google Scholar

30 Reinhart, Before Revelation, 25.

31 al-Maḥṣūl, 1:124–26.

32 al-Mughnī, 6:7.

33 See al-Maḥṣūl, 1:123–27. Al-Razi states that the veracity of his argument is clear, “assuming (that we proceed on the basis of) our position,” which, again, I take to be an allusion to the Ashʿarite doctrine of kasb. On the other hand, he states, it is also clear assuming the Muʿtazilite rejection of taklīf mā lā yuṭāq-that is, “placing upon humans a responsibility they cannot fulfill”; see ibid., 1:127.

34 See, for example, Watt, W. M., The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 192–93;Google ScholarSwartz, M., “Acquisition” (Kasb) in Early Kalām,” Islamic Philosophy and the classical Tradition, ed. Stern, S. M., Hourani, A., and Brown, V. (columbia, S.c.: University of South carolina Press, 1972), 364 and passim.Google Scholar

35 al-Maḥṣūl, 1:132 ff.

36 The entire sentence reads: fa al-nafrah ʿan al-zulm mutamakkinah fi tabʿ al-zalim wa al-mazlūm iliā annahu raghiba fihi it ʿdridin yakhlass bihi wa huwa akhdh al-māl minh, al-Mahsūl, 1:130. In a footnote (n. 6), the editor kindly indicates that one of his manuscripts has sharaʿa in place of raghiba, though he holds raghiba to be the correct reading. If sharaca, however, is the correct reading, this would significantly change the implications of al-Razi's statement in that it would eliminate any element of attraction or appeal between the action (akhdh al-māl) and the actor.

37 Ibid., 1:130–31. Although al-Razi does not make the connection, his “group ethics” would appear to comport with the situation in Arabia at the time of the Prophet, as portrayed and at least tacitly endorsed by the Qurʾan. In many instances, the Qurʾan refers to or commands action in accordance with “al- maʿrūf” by which it appears to refer to what the community—including the jāhilīyah community—universally “knows” and accepts to be fair, right, good, or just. See, for example, 11:180, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 240, 241; 111:104, 110, 114; IV:6, 19, 114; VII:157; IX:67, 71, 112; XXII:41; LX:I2. It is verses such as these that the great traditionalist Ibn Taymiyah, who on the one hand disparages the nominalism of the Ashʿarites, but on the other hand cannot bring himself to endorse the objectivism of the Muʿtazilites, criticizes the Ashʿarites for overlooking. See, for example, al-fatāwā, Majmūʿ, ed. ʿAbd al- Rahmān ibn Muhammad Qāsim al-ʾAsimī al-Najdi al-Hanbalī, 37 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-ʿArabīyah, 1398/1977), 8:431–36.Google Scholar I should add that this is an instance wherein al-tabʿ, given its group affiliation, might be translated as “human nature.”

38 al-Mahsūl, 1:129.

39 Ibid., 1:139.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 1:131.

42 Ibid.

43 I have been unable to procure a copy of this manuscript. Sh. Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī, whose edition of al-Razi's al-Mahsūl includes several quotes from al-Qarafi's Nafāʾis, informs me that it is currently being edited for publication in Saudi Arabia by ʿIyād al-Sulamī.

44 Sharh, 88.

45 Ibid., 89.

46 See n. 13.

47 See Sharh, 90.

48 The phrase “clash of civilizations” was actually coined by Bernard Lewis in his 1989 Jefferson Lecture, sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution and later published in the Atlantic Monthly (September 1990) under the title “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” It was Samuel P. Huntington's essay, however, that transformed the phrase into an intellectually grounded tool for analyzing the world.

49 The Qurʿan itself appears to allude to this at 5:101: “O you who believe; do not ask about things which if made known to you will cause you difficulty.” Right down to modern times, this view has found its way into popular works on Islamic law, based on a hadith attributed to the Prophet: “God has imposed certain duties upon you, so do not be remiss about fulfilling them; and He has prescribed limits for you, so do not violate them; and He has remained silent about certain matters out of mercy for you, not out of forgetfulness, so do not ask about them”; see, for example, Sābiq, Sayyid,Fiqh al-Sunnah, 3 vols. (cairo: Dār al-Rayyān li al-Turāth, 1411/1990), 1:12.Google Scholar

50 Reinhart has pointed out that a number of early thinkers recognized that the legal category mubāh (neutral), under which an activity such as wearing a wristwatch would fall, can either refer to things that fall outside the scope of revelation or to things that occupy a medial position (between forbidden and obligatory) within the scope of revelation. In other words, mubāh can refer either to acts in which revelation is disinterested or to acts that are without consequence but regarding whose performance revelation grants positive permission; see Reinhart, Before Revelation, 128 ff.

51 Ibid., 16.

52 Ibid. Reinhart concludes that the Muʿtazilites also indulged a view of revelation that restricted its scope; ibid., 173.

53 Ibid., 16. Ibid., 131. The whole question of the moral value of the mubāh was debated among the jurists. The answers given, however, were not always based on a purely “objective” approach. Rather, jurists approached the question with specific conclusions in mind. Al-Shatibi, for example, insisted that the mubāh was medial and that mubāh acts were actually commanded by the Lawgiver. This had little to do, however, with the expandability of scripture. Rather, his aim was to refute the claims of certain Sufis who argued that it was an absolute virtue to avoid all mubāh acts absolutely. See Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shātibī, al- Muwāfaqāt, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Drāz, 4 vols. (cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijārīyah al-Kubrā), 1:109 ff. Ibn Rushd (the Grandson), on the other hand, flatly rejected the notion that the mubāh was medial and within the scope of commanded acts. This seems not to have been unrelated, however, to the fact that al-Ghazali, of whom he is quite critical, held the opposite view; see al-mustasfā, Talkhiṣ, ed. Jamal Eddine Alaoui (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1994), 47–48.Google Scholar

55 cf. Jackson, State, 24–26, where I give the impression that scholars such as Hourani and Kerr falsely attributed this type of scriptural determinism to the Ashʿarites. While their characterization was over inclusive, I see now that probably up to the time of al-Qarafi, mainstream Ashʿarism did support this type of scriptural determinism and that it was precisely this to which al-Qarafi was reacting.

56 See 185–86.

57 See, for example, Hourani, “Two Theories,” 273.

58 See Jackson, State, 53–56.

59See ibid., 113–41. It will be noticed that al-Qarafi devotes a very short portion of Sharḥ to the issue at hand. This raises the question of whether I have misrepresented him by giving the false impression that his redefinition of hasan and qabih played a major role in his thought. My point in the present essay, however, is not that this issue per se played a major role in al-Qarafi's thought but that al-Qarafi was con- cerned about the issue of domination (which my Islamic Law and the State deals with in detail), and that his approach to the question of hasan and qabih is consistent with such a concern.

60 Sharh, 90.

61 Ibid.

66 The Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Jabbar, for example, was known to have put forth the same thesis, at least in form-that is, that everything the law did not prohibit was good. See, for example, Hourani, G., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1985), 101 ff.;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFakhry, M., Ethical Theories in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 35. But, as I have shown, the substance of this definition in al-Qarafi is fundamentally different.Google Scholar

63 Al-Qarafi had in fact noted a theological advantage to his definition. On the traditional view (that hasan was what God commanded and qabīh what he forbade), the actions of God could not be deemed hasan, because God could not be subject to any command. According to al-Qarafi's definition, meanwhile, all divine actions are rendered hasan by virtue of their not being prohibited: see Sharh, 90.

64 Ibid.