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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2009
Any exploration of the wider implications of the 1988 electoral campaign for the Israeli Knesset invites two questions: first, were the surprising conduct and results aberrations? Or were they the effects of underlying forces slowly changing the patterns of Israeli politics? If the latter, then, second, to what extent are such forces controllable by party leaders and at what cost? My contention is that what happened in 1988 did, in fact, herald changes that were not ephemeral but indi cated the beginnings of a shift in the entire Israeli party system.
1 For an analysis of this pattern, see Etzioni, Amitai, “Alternative Ways to Democracy: The Example of Israel,” Political Science Quarterly 79 (June 1959): 196–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Gahal Herut-Liberal Bloc Electoral Program, 1965. For an analysis of the bloc-formation pro cesses in Israel, see Mendilow, Jonathan, “Party Clustering in Multi-Party Systems: The Example of Israel 1965–1981,” American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1983): 64–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Kirchheimer, Otto, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” in Political Parties and Political Development, eds. LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177–200;Google ScholarEpstein, Leon D., Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar.
4 See Mendilow, Jonathan, “Party Cluster Formations in Multi-Party Systems,” Political Studies 30 (December 1982): 485–503CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 On the 1977 elections, see Shapiro, Jonathan, “The End of a Dominant Party System,” in The Election in Israel, 1977, ed. Arian, A. (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1980), 23–38Google Scholar. On the subsequent dissen sions within the Likud, see Sprinzak, Ehud, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 71–105Google Scholar.
6 Mendilow, Jonathan, “Israel's Labor Alignment in the 1984 Elections: Catch-All Tactics in a Di vided Society,” Comparative Politics 20 (July 1988): 446–50Google Scholar.
7 Haʾaretz, 3 October 1987. Similar analyses of what happened in 1984 were voiced in the Likud. For example, David Levy, minister of housing, “If we draw conclusions from earlier elections … we shouldn't confuse the public with lots of different and contradictory messages … the undecided will never prefer imitations—they will always favor the original” (Haʾaretz, 23 September 1988)Google Scholar.
8 Jerusalem Post, 19 December 1987, International edition.
9 Arens, Moshe, “From Unrest to Peace,” Jerusalem Post, 23 April 1988Google Scholar, International edition; Shamir, Yizhak, quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 11 March 1988Google Scholar, International edition.
10 Shamir, Yizhak, quoted in Haʾaretz, 3 November 1987; Peres, Shimon, quoted in Haʾaretz, 5 January 1988. For analysis of the main issues in the electionsGoogle Scholar, see Herzog, Hanna, “Was It on the Agenda? The Hidden Agenda of the 1988 Campaign,” in The Elections in Israel—1988, ed. Arian, A. and Shamir, M. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), 37–62Google Scholar.
11 Jerusalem Post, 2 April 1988, International edition, and 19 December 1987Google Scholar.
12 Jerusalem Post, 28 October 1987, International editionGoogle Scholar.
13 Nehemkin, Arik, quoted in Eyal Erlich, “Mapai Haʾhistorit,” Haʾaretz Weekly Magazine, 5 May 1988;Google Scholar and Samet, Gideon, “Haʾhaftaʾah Habaʾah,” Haʾaretz, 1 January 1988, International editionGoogle Scholar.
14 Maʾariv, 22 January 1988; “McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,” 29 January 1988.
15 Quoted in Yael Marcus, “Haʾim Haʾmedina Boʾeret?,” Haʾaretz, 15 June 1988.
16 See Maʾariv, 15 January 1988, and Jerusalem Post, 16 and 23 January 1988, International edition.
17 Jerusalem Post, 28 June 1988.
18 Israeli Broadcasting Service, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 29 October 1988.
19 Jerusalem Post, 8 October 1988, International edition.
20 Interview with MK Micha Goldman, Maʾariv, 26 November 1988.
21 Haʾaretz, 6 May 1988, International edition; Jerusalem Post 19 and 26 August 1988. For an analysis of the short- and long-term electoral effects of the Intifada, see Barzilai, Gad, “National Security Crises and Voting Behavior: The Intifada and the 1988 Elections,” in The Elections in Israel–1988, 65–76Google Scholar.
22 Jerusalem Post, 20 February 1988, International edition; Israeli Broadcast System, 25 October 1988.
23 Quoted in Frankel, Glenn, “In a Tight Israeli Election Arab Voters Don't Like Either Choice,” Washington Post National Weekly, 17–23 October 1988Google Scholar.
24 See Rodmer, Roth, “Haʾoptsiot Shel Heʾbokher Haʾaravi,” Haʾaretz, 28 October 1988Google Scholar, Interna tional edition. For an analysis of the Arab vote in 1988 and 1984, see Lustick, Ian, “The Changing Po litical Role of Israeli Arabs,” in The Elections in Israel—1988, 115–31Google Scholar.
25 The most obvious of these concerned the military status of Yeshiva students, the status of women, and abortions; see Labor Alignment, Electoral Platform, 1988.
26 Labor Alignment, Propaganda Strategy, 1988 (Tel Aviv: Labor Press, n.d.); see also Haʾaretz, 15 October 1988, International editionGoogle Scholar.
27 interview with Avraham Shohat, 22 October 1988.
28 Marcus, Yoel, “Haʾmatslema Aina Meshakeret,” Haʾaretz, 13 October 1988Google Scholar.
29 The ultra-Orthodox parties failed however to realize this advantage because of rivalries among them, negative public reactions in Israel and in the Jewish diaspora to Orthodox demands especially on the issue of “Who is a Jew?,” and the agreement arrived at by the Alignment and the Likud to form a national unity government. For an analysis of the electoral results and their consequences, see Peretz, Don and Smooha, Sammy, “Israel's Twelfth Knesset Election: An All-loser Game,” Middle East Journal 43 (Summer 1989): 388–405Google Scholar.
30 Yediot Aharonot, 13 July 1984; see also Herzog, Hanna, “Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspec tive,” Comparative Politics 19 (April 1987): 324–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 The Desima polls, commissioned by the Alignment, predicted on the day before the bus attack 42 Alignment seats and on the day after the bus attack 39 (the number that actually won). The poll was re leased on election eve by NBC news, but suppressed by the Alignment in Israel itself. The Smith polls predicted 40 before the attack and 38 after, and similar predictions were offered by the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research. See Maʾariv, 4 November 1988 and 28 October 1988.
32 Cf. Labor Alignment, Propaganda Strategy, 3, and the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research polls, Jerusalem Post 14 and 16 October 1988.
33 Katz, Elihu, “Haʾpiguim Hotsiyu Et Haʾyamin Lakalfi,” Yediot Aharonot, 2 November 1988Google Scholar.
34 Quoted in Jerusalem Post, 25 November 1988.
35 Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research polls, Jerusalem Post, 16 October 1988, International edition.
36 Haʾaretz, 16 October 1988, International edition.
37 Joseph Ahimeir, personal communication.
38 See Yediot Aharonot, 28 June and 30 July 1988, and Haʾaretz, 14 October 1988, International edi tion; Shlomo Hillel, quoted in Jerusalem Post, 4 November 1988.
39 See Freedman, Robert O., “Religion, Politics, and the Israeli Elections of 1988,” Middle East Journal 43 (Summer 1989): 406–22Google Scholar.
40 This is especially evident in the development towns. In 1984 the Likud won in these 44.0 percent. In 1988 its percentage declined to 37.9. The ultra-Orthodox, by contrast, rose from 4.8 percent to 11.9 percent. See Bureau, Central of Statistics, Totsaot Haʾbehirot LaʾKnesset Haʾshnaim Asar (special is sue, Jerusalem 1988)Google Scholar.
41 Quoted in Jerusalem Post, 4 November 1988.
42 Haʾaretz, 14 October 1988, International edition.
43 Der Spiegel, 26 February 1988; Yediot Aharonot, 4 November 1988.
44 Oz, Amos, “Anachnu Od Nireh,” Davar, 4 November 1988Google Scholar.