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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009
The purpose of this essay is to explore the role of the traditional leader as one source of legitimization of modernization in a preindustrial society. Although of significance in its own right, the role of the traditional leader becomes the more potent when linked with that of the marginal person. This expanded conceptual framework is applied to the analysis of the Iranian situation in which the mutual reinforcement of traditional leadership and marginality appears to explain a certain type of directed social change.
1 Bendix, Reinhart, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, 1964), p. 16. The idea was initially suggested by Max Weber.Google Scholar
2 Fathi, Asghar, “Expressive Behavior and Social Integration in Small Groups: A Comparative Analysis,” Pacific Sociological Review, 11 (Spring, 1968), 31–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Ibid.
4 This statement should not imply that the legitimizing authorities always function properly. They may refuse to reinterpret the old standards in the light of new circumstances, or the course of action they prescribe may turn out to be dysfunctional for the social system.
5 Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization trans. Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, Talcott (New York, 1947), pp. 341–342.Google Scholar
6 In the case of Japan, for instance, the divine emperor, one of the very foundations of the old traditional order, provided the main leverage in modernization of the society. See Bellah, Robert N., “Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan,” in Finkle, Jason L. and Gable, Richard W., Political Development and Social Change (New York, 1968), pp. 188–193.Google Scholar
7 On the Tobacco movement in Persian, see, among others, Kasravi, Ahmad, Tārīkh-e Mashrūte-ye Irān (The History of Constitutional Movement in Iran) (6th ed.; Tehran, 1965), pp. 15–18;Google Scholar and in English, see, among others, Lambton, A. K. S., ‘Persia: The Breakdown of Society,” in Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 1, Holt, P. M., Lambton, A. K., and Lewis, B., (eds.) (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 430–467;Google Scholar and Keddie, Nikkie R., Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 (London, 1966).Google Scholar
8 The story of the Constitutional movement appears in Persian, among others, in Kasravi, Tārīkh-e Mashrăte-ye Irān, and Kasravi, Ahmad, Tārīkhe Hijdah Sāle-ye Āzarbāiyjān (An Eighteen Years History of Azarbalyjan) (5th ed.; Tehran, 1971).Google Scholar In English see, among others, Lambton, , “Persia: The Breakdown of Society,” and Browne, Edward G., Persian Revolution of 1905–1909 (Cambridge, 1910).Google Scholar
9 For a report on the religious leaders who opposed the Constitution, especially after 1906, see Abrahamian, Ervand, “The Crowd in the Persian Revolution,” in Iranian Studies, 2 (Fall, 1969), 128–150.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Because he does not make the distinction between spontaneous, natural crowds and staged political demonstrations, his conclusion is sociologically unwarranted. But his analysis of the opposition to the constitution is valuable.
10 On this point see Algar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles,1969).Google Scholar
11 For discussions on the power of the Iranian Shiʻa religious leaders in terms of Shīʻa doctrine and historical and geographical accidents, see, among others, Keddie, N. R., “The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran” in Keddie, N. R., ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), pp. 211–229;Google Scholar and Lambton, Ann K. S., “A Re-consideration of the Position of Marjaʻ al-Taqlīd and the Religious Institutions,” Studia Islamica, 20 (1964), 115–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 That the tribal chief, like the religious leader, plays an important role in novel situations, and that his authority is also a personal authority conferred on him by virtue of his traditional position in the tribe have been reported by Fredrik Barth. In his analysis of the authority of the chiefs of the Bāserī tribes located in the Fārs province in Southern Iran Barth writes: “In small and closely knit communities that constitute camps, most matters of law are governed by customs and compromise and regulated by diffuse sanctions. Where disputes cannot be settled informally, recourse may be had to the chief, who alone constitutes the only ‘court’ in the tribal system. The chief is not bound by custom or precedent in his decision…. Quite explicitly he is expected to make the decision which he feels is ‘best for the tribe’—he is expected to exercise his privileged arbitrary authority within a very wide area of free grace, unhampered by consideration of individual justice as derived from rules” (emphasis added). (Barth, Fredrik, Nomads of South Persia [London, n.d.], p. 77).Google Scholar
The similarity in the processes of succession for the chief of the tribe and the Shiʻa religious leader is also noteworthy. In both cases the demonstrated effectiveness among the qualified candidates determines which one would attain the vacant position. Thus according to Barth when the old khān dies, the contenders, that is, the members of the dynasty such as his sons, brothers, and maybe uncles, continue to exercise their authority and to compete with one another until one is successful in providing the most effective protection for the tribesmen. Few of the commoners take sides in the successional disputes (ibid., p. 84).
In the case of the death of a mujtahid, or a prominent religious leader, there is no designated successor either. It takes a while until one of the competing contenders, usually highly respected religious scholars, is gradually accepted in place of the former leader. See Lambton, Ann K. S., “A Re-consideration of the Position of Marjaʻ al-Taqlīd and the Religious Institutions,” p. 119.Google Scholar For a similar situation among the Balūchī tribes in the southwest of Iran on the occasion of succession to the positions of both religious leader and the tribal chief, see Spooner, Brian “Religion and Society Today: An Anthropological Perspective” in Yār-Shāter, Ehsān, Iran Faces the Seventies (New York, 1971), pp. 166–188.Google Scholar Spooner also discusses the interesting subject of the rivalry between the two traditional leaders for power within the tribe.
13 Bakhtiyārys consist of many tribes or many branches. Not all of them were involved in the attack on Mohammad Ali Shāh. In fact some of them, under Amīr Mufakhkham, the chief of their own branch, were on the Royalist side confronting Sardār Asad's men. During the siege of Tabriz by the Royalists there were also some Bakhtiyārys among them. This situation seems to support the point of view presented in this paper that the individual Bakhtiyāry had no strong feeling for either the Shah or the Constitution. His devotion was to his chief and it was the ideology or the interest of his chief that determined which side he would fight for.
14 Park, E., Race and Culture (Toronto, 1964), p. 345–356.Google Scholar
15 Fathi, Asghar, ”Mechanisms for Maintaining Jewish Identity,” Pacific Sociological Review, 5 (Spring, 1962), 44–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
16 La Piere, Richard T., A Theroy of Social Control (New York, 1954), p. 341.Google Scholar
17 Fathi, Asghar, “Marginality, Leadership, and Directed Change,” Human Organization, 27 (Summer, 1968), 143–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18 Ibid.
19 This paper is not directly concerned with the role of the intellectuals in the Constitutional movement. For a discussion on the intellectual background of the Constitutional movement in Iran, and specifically the role of some of the marginal men (although the author does not use this concept), see Keddie, N. R., “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 4 (04, 1962), 265–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also by the same author “The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran,” Past and Present, 34 (07, 1966), 70–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
20 Seyyed Ali Mohammad, from Shirāz, at the age of twenty-five first proclaimed himself the Bāb or the intermediary of the expected Hidden Imam of the Shīʻa in 1844, and later a prophet. His growing influence led to his imprisonment and execution in 1850. This was a movement against the religious leaders and despotism that was mixed with some esoteric and modern ideas. In clashes between the fast-growing followers of the Bāb and the government the former showed remarkable bravery and resistance. At one point there was also an attempt on the life of Nāser-ud-Dīn Shāh.
After the death of the Bāb his followers split. One group who call themselves Bāhāis believe in nonintervention in politics, brotherhood of all humanity, and universal peace. The minority group known as Azahs were closer to the original teachings of the Bāb in their anticlergy and revolutionary tendencies.
For further information on Bābī movement in Persian see Kasravi, Ahmad, Bāhāī-garī (The Bāhāī Faith) (Tehran, n.d.);Google Scholar and in English see Browne, Edward G., A Traveller's Narrative Written To Illustrate the Episode of the Bāb (Cambridge, 1893);Google Scholar and by the same author, Materials for the Study of Bābi Religion (Cambridge, reprinted in 1961).Google Scholar
21 For information about Malek-ul-Mutekallemīn in Persian, see, among others, Kermānī, Nāzem-ul-Eslām, Tārikh-e bīdārī-ye Irāniān (The History of the Awakening of the Iranians) (Tehran, 1967), III 259–260, and IV, 160, 168–169;Google Scholar and Kasravi, , Tārīkhe Mashrūte-ye Irān, pp. 66, 647–652, and 658–661;Google Scholar and in English see Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism.”
For information about Seyyed Jamāl-ud-Dīn Isfahānī in Persian, see, among others, Kermāmi, Nāzem-ul-Eslām, Tārīkh-e Bīdārī-ye Irāniān, II, 132, 134; and IV, 168, 170;Google Scholar and Kasravi, , Tārīkhe Mashrūte-ye Irān, pp. 596, 652;Google Scholar and in English see Keddie, ‘Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism.”
22 For information about Mīrzā Malkam Khān in Persian, see, among others, Ādamiyat, Fereidūn, Fekr-e Āzādī (The Thought of Freedom) (Tehran, 1961), pp. 94–181;Google Scholar and Kermānī, Nāzem-ul-Eslām, Tārikh-e Bidārī-ye Irāniān, Introduction, pp. 149, 153;Google Scholar and in English see Browne, Edward G., The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 18–19;Google Scholar Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism,” and Alezar, Hamid, Mīrzā Malkum Khān (Berkeley, 1973).Google Scholar
For information regarding Mīrzā Āqā Khān and Sheikh Ahmad Rūhī in Persian, see, among others, Kermānī, Nāzem-ul-Eslām, Tārīkh-e Bīdārī-ye Irāniān, Introduction, pp. 11–15Google Scholar and Qazvīnī, Mohammad, “Vafiyāt-e Moāserīn” (My Dead Comtemporaries), Yādegār, 3, 10 (05 and 06, 1947), 17–21.Google Scholar In English see Browne, , Materials for the Study of Bābi Religion, pp. xviii–xix, and 220–227;Google ScholarBrowne, , The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia, p. 18;Google Scholar and Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism.”
23 For information about Sardār Asad in Persian, see, among others, Qazvīnī, Mohammad, “Vafiyāt-e Moāserīn” Yādegār, 5, 1 and 2 (09 and 10 1948), pp. 99–101;Google Scholar and Kasravi, , Tārīkh-e Hijdah Sāle-ye Āzarbāiyjān, pp. 1–6 and 51–62.Google Scholar
24 For instance, Sardār Asad's father had been murdered by the uncle of Mohammad Ali Shāh who was the governor of Isfahān during the reign of Nāser-ud-Dīn Shāh. Thus the enmity between the Bakhtiyāry chiefs and the court probably had influenced their uprising.
25 Qazvīnī, , Yādegār, 5.Google Scholar
26 Kermānī, Nāzem-ul-Eslām, Tarīkh-e Bīdārī-ye Irāniān, II, 469.Google Scholar