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Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2011

Steffen Hertog
Steffen Hertog*
Affiliation:
Department of Government, London School of Economics, London, U.K.; e-mail: [email protected]
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Extract

Oil and dynastic rule have led to an idiosyncratic pattern of state formation in the Gulf, and in few parts of the state are the idiosyncrasies more pronounced than in the security sector. Oil income has allowed the ruling families of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to engineer a relatively soft, rent- and patronage-based authoritarianism characterized by multiple centers of power and huge institutional redundancies. Having constructed their police and military forces along these lines, their monarchical rule has become more resilient, but their armed forces also more hapless.

Type
The Arab Uprisings of 2011
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , August 2011 , pp. 400 - 402
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

NOTES

1 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Hertog, Steffen, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010)Google Scholar.