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The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Hamied N. Ansari
Hamied N. Ansari
Affiliation:
School of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins University
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Extract

Because of the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, observers have felt a sense of urgency to analyze the conditions that favored the emergence of Islamic militancy in Egypt. Psychological, political, and socioeconomic categories have been widely used to explain—and even suggest the means to neutralize—the ill effects of sectarian and political violence on social harmony and the stability of the political order. Laudable as these attempts are, they must first be preceded by a clear conception as to whether the militants do represent a social movement whose existence can be supported by empirical data.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 123 - 144
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

NOTES

Author's note: I wish to thank Professors Fouad Ajami and Leonard Binder for giving me the opportunity to discuss the subject of this article with them and their students at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the University of Chicago. The discussions clarified many of my ideas. I am also grateful to Professor Fazlur Rahman and Dr. Ann Lesch for their comments on an earlier version. 1 am, however, alone responsible for the ideas expressed in this article.

1 Nazih, N. M. Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12 (1980), 481–499. See also Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups, Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings,”Google Scholaribid., 423–453.

2 al- Taqadum, 19 11 1981.Google Scholar

3 Louis, Awad quoted in Rose al-Yusif, 6 11 1981. See also Mustafa Amin's column, “Fikra,” in al-Akhbar, 29 01 1982.Google Scholar

4 Amina al-Said's article on youth in al-Musawwar, 13 11 1981.Google Scholar See also the comments of Ahmad Khalifa, the Director of the National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research, in al- Wadi, 11 March 1982. Hasan, , the President of Cairo University in al-Akhbar, 14 12 1981.Google Scholar See also the statement of Mustafa Kamel Murad, the leader of the Liberal Party, in al-Akhbar, 7 December 1981.Google Scholar

5 Mayo's interview with the Rector of al-Azhar, 22 March 1982. Shaykh Metwalli Sha⊃rawi, the former Minister of Al-Awqaf, expressed similar views when he said that “the extremists were the enemies of the regime and their principal motive was to capture power”Google Scholaral-Ahram, 18 11 1981.Google Scholar See also the interview of Abd al-Mun⊃im al-Nimr, the former Minister of al-Awqaf, in AlAhram, 15 12 1981.Google Scholar

6 See the interview of Shaykh Jad al-Haq, the Rector of al-Azhar, in al-Liwa⊃ al-lslami, 20 07 1981.Google Scholar

7 Anis Mansur's critical assessment of the Nasirite period in October, 24 01 1982, pp. 7–10.Google Scholar

8 See Omar al-Tilmisani's interview in al-Musawwar, 22 01 1982, pp. 14–19 and 74–77.Google Scholar

9 Most of the issues of al-Liwa⊃ al-Islami, the ruling party's Islamic organ, devoted large space in the early part of 1982 to the discussions which took place between prison inmates belonging to the various militant groups and the leading⊃ Ulama from al-Azhar. See, for example, 25 March 1982.

10 Saad al-Din Ibrahim is one of a few scholars who took an exceptional view of the notion that the militants were alien to the Egyptian society. See al-Ahram, 20 November 1981. See also Ali H. Dessouki's excellent review of the Islamic movements in Egypt, in Alexander, S. Cudsi and Ali, E. Hillal Dessouki, eds., Islam and Power (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

11 See the statement of Nabawi Ismail, the former Minister of the Interior, in al-Ahram, 23 12 1981.Google Scholar See also al-Gumhouriyya, 6 03 1982.Google Scholar

12 According to one newspaper report, a total of five groups participated in the plot to assassinate President Sadat, despite ideological differences. See al-Ahram, 6 11 1981.Google Scholar

13 See al-Musawwar, 13 11 1981.Google ScholarMohammad, Abd al-Qudus, al-Da⊃wa, 05 1981.Google Scholar Also, al-Ahram, 6 03 1981.Google Scholar

14 The Minister of Defence, Abu Ghazalah, denied the existence of a secret apparatus belonging to the Tanzim in the military services. However, he acknowledged the reports that an unspecified number of army personnel were either retired or transferred to civilian posts. See Akher Sa⊃a's interview with the Defence Minister, 11 04 1982.Google Scholar

15 Khalid Islambuli was selected to participte only eleven days before the annual military parade on October 6.

16 See al-Ahram, 25 03 1982.Google Scholar

17 Based on an interview by this author with Kamil Zuhayri, the former President of the Egyptian Press Syndicate on 24 November 1981.

18 See al-Gumhouriyya, 8 09 1981.Google Scholar

19 See al-Liwa⊂ al-Islami, 25 February 1982.

20 Interview with Shaykh Zakariya al-Burn, the Minister of Al-Awqaf in Mayo, 2 11 1981.Google Scholar

21 Shaykh Hafiz Salamah was the head of Jamiyyat al-Hidaya al-Islamiyya in Suez. He delivered sermons at both al-Shuhada⊃ mosque in Suez and al-Nur mosque in Cairo. Both were private mosques. The latter was a popular meeting place for the militants. Shaykh Salamah was one of the most outspoken critics of the Peace Treaty with Israel. In one of his sermons he described the treaty as the treaty of surrender,⊃ Isrislam. Among the accusations levied against him by the regime was his alleged role in the sectarian conflict in al-Zawiyya al-Hamna in June 1981. President Sadat called Shaykh Salamah “the mad Imam.”

Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahalawi was another critic of Sadat's peace policy with Israel in his sermons at al-Qa⊃id Ibrahim mosque in Alexandria. He was dismissed from the post in July 1981 by a decision of the Ministry of al-Awqaf. He was the Imam of the mosque for nine years. What angered President Sadat was Shaykh Mahalawi's constant reference to the corruption of his regime and to his ostentatious style of living. Both Islamic moderates and militants reacted indignantly when President Sadat publicly called Shaykh Mahalawi “the filthy Imam.” See President Sadat's speech of 5 September.

22 See al-Gumhouriyya, 9 09 1981.Google Scholar

23 See al-Ahram, 23 09 1981.Google Scholar After Sadat's assassination, the Minister of the Interior, Nabawi Ismail, acknowledged that the September crackdown did not go far enough to include all the members of the Islamic groups: “Although the backbone of the extremists was broken, some elements remained at large” (see al-Musawwar, 30 10 1981).Google Scholar

24 This finding was confirmed by the statement of the Governor of Asyut, who asserted that the assault by the militants against the security forces was led by the Amirs of the group who were on the wanted list since 5 September 1981. See al-Musawwar, 23 10 1981.Google Scholar

25 See al-Ahrar 2 11 1981. Also, 26 10 1981.Google Scholar

26 The security forces penetrated the group led by Col. Abbud al-Zomor and were actually able to film on videotape the transaction between one of the militants in the group and an underground arms dealer. Sadat himself viewed the tape just a few days before the actual assassination on 6 October.

27 Kamil Zuhayri in an interview with this author on 24 November 1981.

28 Data on population and other social indicators are derived from the 1978 census conducted by the Central Agency for Statistics and General Mobilization, Cairo, Egypt.

29 Akher Sa⊃a, 11 11 1981.Google Scholar

30 See al-Ahram, 18 11 1980.Google Scholar

31 John, Waterbury, Egypt, Burdens of the Past. Options for the Future (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 17. See also Ayubi's analysis of the consequences of rural migration to the cities, “The Political Revival of Islam,” 493–96.Google Scholar

32 It is interesting to note that one of the first decrees issued by President Mubarak shortly after assuming office was the demolition of all constructions on the Pyramids' plateau, including the presidential villa.

33 See Hamied, Ansari, “The Rural Elite: A Study of its Role in Egyptian Social and Political Development,” Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1979.Google Scholar

34 Akher Sa⊃a, 11 11 1981.Google Scholar

35 See al-Ahrar, 2 11 1981.Google Scholar

36 Abbud's cousin, named Tariq, was wounded in the leg during the sectarian conflict in al-Zawiyya al-Hamra. See al-Musawwar, 26 02 1982.Google Scholar

37 Obituary notice in al-Ahram, 23 03 1982.Google Scholar

38 Khalid Islambouli's aunt's husband is an army general. See al-Ahram 26 10 1981.Google Scholar

39 See the discussion of Sabri, Abu al-Majd in al-Ahram, 22 01 1982.Google Scholar

40 Hasan, Hanafi, “The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 1 &2 (Spring 1982), 61.Google Scholar

41 The militant group known as al-Takfir wa-al-Hijra was liquidated in 1977. See Ibrahim, , “Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups,” 423–453.Google Scholar

42 See al-Ahrar 14 12 1981. The paper claimed that it was publishing the unabridged version of the text.Google Scholar

43 The high casualty rate among security personnel was attributed to the fact that the majority of them were not carrying their weapons. See Rose al-Yusif, 19 10 1982, p. 78.Google Scholar

44 Text in al-Ahram, 8 12 1981.Google Scholar

45 Mayo, 26 10 1981.Google Scholar

46 Similar opinions were expressed by the former Minister of al-Awqaf, in al-Ahram, 6 12 1981.Google Scholar

47 See the interview with prison inmates belonging to various Islamic groups by a number of leading ⊃Ulama from al-Azhar, in al-Liwa⊃ al-Islami, 25 03 1982.Google Scholar See also ibid., 8 April 1982.

48 al-Ahram, 18 11 1981.Google Scholar

49 See the interview with the Grand, Mufti in October, 6 12 1981, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

50 Sayyid, Qutb, Ma⊃alim fi al-Tariq (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1981), pp. 10–81.Google Scholar

51 See al-Musawwar, 22 01 1982, p. 18.Google Scholar

52 See al-Ahrar's interview with Omar, al-Tilmisani, 22 03 1982.Google Scholar

53 Mayo, 28 12 1981.Google Scholar

54 al-Da⊃wa, 01 1977, p. 8.Google Scholar See also the argument of Saleh ⊃Ishmawi, ibid., May 1981.

55 See al-Musawwar, 22 01 1982, p. 18.Google Scholar

56 a1-Da⊃wa, 09 1976, p. 9.Google Scholar

57 See the criticism of the Islamic Jama⊃at, ibid., May 1981.

58 The “Islamic Left” sees the militants as part of a historical continuity whose secular movement is reflected in the rise and decline of successive Islamic attempts at Islamic revival. Thus the reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gradually lost their mass appeal as a result of their elitist tendencies. They were followed by the Muslim Brotherhood which led the fundamentalist appeal in the 1930s and 1940s. But in recent decades it lost its vigor as a populist movement capable of mobilizing a large segment of the population behind Islamic and nationalist causes. With the compromising attitudes and worldly views of the traditional ⊃Ulama, only the militant Jama⊃at continue to exist as a harbinger of a new era of Islamic resurgence. Hasan Hanafi, “The Contemporary Islamic Movement from al-lkhwan to al-Jama⊃at,” lecture at the Seminar of Islam and Society in Modern Egypt, The American Research Center in Egypt, 11–13 May 1982.