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Iran's ‘White Revolution’: a Study in Political Development1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Rouhollah K. Ramazani
Rouhollah K. Ramazani
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

Iran is entering the second decade of its ‘White Revolution’. The Shâh has set forth his own account of it,2 but the scholarly community has, as yet, made no serious attempt at analysing it.3 This omission is glaring regardless of justifications. It is, in fact, an omission which verges on scholarly neglect because, if there is any validity in the propositions of this study, better understanding of Iran's contemporary achievements and dilemmas would seem to require probing the very meaning of the ‘White Revolution’ by going beyond its official label and the adumbration of its programs. The purpose of this paper is to do exactly that. And toward that end it shall seek to utilize concepts of political development as suggested in particular by Professor Gabriel Almond. We prefer these concepts because they facilitate examination of the ‘White Revolution’ within the broad and fundamental framework of the major challenges of Western civilization to Iran.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , April 1974 , pp. 124 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1974

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References

page 124 note 2 Mubammad Reżâ Shâh's book, Enqelâb Sefid, was published in Tehran in 1965/66, and appeared in a number of languages, including English, subsequently. It is currently used as a text in Iranian high schools, where students are encouraged to take a course in the ‘White Revolution’. The only extensive commentary on the Shâh's book in Persian is the apologetic work of Zarrynqalam, 'Ali, Sayri dar Ketâb Enqelâb Sefid (Tehran, 1966/1967).Google Scholar English readers may find useful Points for Progress: A Glimpse into the Far-reaching Effects of Iran's ‘White Revolution’, published by the Iranian Ministry of Information in 1967. Also see note 3 below.

page 124 note 3 Of course, whoever writes about contemporary Iran deals in one way or another with aspects of problems and programs related to the ‘White Revolution’, but this is not the same as subjecting it specifically to analysis with the special purpose of exploring its meaning and place in Iran's modern political development. For first-hand descriptive accounts of Iran during the 1960s see, for example, two articles by Avery, Peter, ‘Trends in Iran in the Past Five Years’, World Today vol. 21, no. 7 (07 1965), pp. 279–90;Google Scholar and ‘Iran 1964–8: the Mood of Growing Confidence’, World Today, vol. 24, no. 11 (11 1968), pp. 354–466.Google Scholar

page 125 note 1 See Almond, Gabriel A., Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 223–33.Google ScholarThese pages are reprinted from Stanford Today, Autumn 1964, series I, no. 10.Google Scholar

page 125 note 2 See Ramazani, Rouhollah K., The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500–1914: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Charlottesville, 1966).Google Scholar

page 125 note 3 See Almond, Gabriel A., ‘National Politics and International Politics’, in Lepawsky, Albert, Buehrig, Edward H. and Lasswell, Harold D. (eds.), The Search for World Order: Studies by Students and Colleagues of Quincy Wright (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), pp. 283–97.Google Scholar

page 125 note 4 For a succinct social history of Iran from the dawn of the nineteenth century to 1969 see Keddie, Nikki R., ‘The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800–1969: An Overview’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (01 1971), pp. 3–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an earlier sketch of the Western challenge to the Iranian society see Lambton, Ann K. S., ‘The Impact of the West on Persia’, International Affairs, vol. 33, no. 1 (01 1957), pp. 12–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 126 note 1 The evidence for the adoption of independence, modernization, and democratization as well as centralization of authority, and national integration as the fundamental goals of modern Iran is spread throughout early constitutional documents, namely The Royal Proclamation of 5 August 1906, The Fundamental Laws of 30 December 1906, and the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 7 October 1907, and subsequent amendments. For the texts see Davis, Helen Miller, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East (Durham, 1953), pp. 104–30.Google Scholar

page 127 note 1 See Almond, Gabriel A., Political Development, op. cit. pp. 229–30.Google Scholar

page 127 note 2 See Browne, E. G., ‘The Persian Constitutional Movement’, in Proceedings of the British Academy (London, 1917–1918), pp. 223–4.Google Scholar

page 128 note 1 See Ramazani, Rouhollah K., op. cit. pp. 256–7.Google Scholar

page 128 note 2 This portrayal is perhaps much induced by Banani, Amin, The Modernization of Iran, 1921–1941 (Stanford, 1961)Google Scholar, although the author does not seem to suggest that Reżâ Shâh accorded the goal of modernization the highest priority throughout his rule.

page 128 note 3 Reżâ Shâh's own statement to the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph of September 1930 clearly reveals that he believed that the construction of the railway would first and foremost contribute to Iran's political and economic independence. See the text of this statement as reproduced in Persian in Fathullâh Nuri Esfandiyâri, Rastâkhiz Irân (Tehran, 1956/1957), pp. 486–90.Google Scholar Even a leading Western student of Iran regarded the construction of this gigantic feat significant as a sign of Iran's financial independence. Elwell-Sutton, L. P. wrote that ‘perhaps for the first time since the Middle Ages, a major undertaking was carried through in an Oriental country without leaving it indebted to the finances of the West’. See his Modern Iran (London, 1942), p. 94.Google Scholar

page 128 note 4 A leading Iranian professor of jurisprudence, ‘Ali Pâshâ Sâleh, states that for many years prior to the adoption of the Civil Code several commissions of jurists had been constituted and dispersed, but for the purpose of abolition of capitulations in 1928 the first 955 articles of the Civil Code were presented to the Majlis for approval. See his Quveh Muqananneh va Quveh Qażâ'iyyeh (Legislative and Judicial Corps: A Glance at Iran's Legal History from the earliest times until 1962 is the work's English title although it is in Persian) (Tehran, 1964), p. 38.Google Scholar Amin Banani states that Reżâ Shâh's ‘interest in legal reforms was motivated by nationalistic considerations, for his first objective was to abolish the system of capitulations’. See his op. cit. p. 70.Google Scholar See also Ramazani, Rouhollah K., op. cit. pp. 243–5.Google Scholar

page 129 note 1 Ahmad Qavam went even so far as to decree the distribution of the state lands to peasants at the time in order to blunt the Tudeh and the Azeri Communist propaganda campaign for reforms. All observers in Iran at the time noted that Qavam's primary motive was to maintain Iran's national independence; under the circumstances he had no serious interest in economic welfare or political participation. See, for example, various revealing dispatches in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. VII, The Near East and Africa (Washington, 1969), pp. 490–1, 505.Google Scholar

page 129 note 2 Despite all the evidence accumulated between 1947 and 1951, showing the preponderance of political considerations, the basic law of nationalization of 20 March 1951 stated that the ‘happiness and prosperity of Iranian nation’ formed Iran's primary purpose in nationalizing the oil industry. But in many moments of frankness Iranian leaders emphasized that ‘true’ political independence was their primary concern. For the text of Dr Musaddq's speech before the Oil Commission mentioned in the text see Ettelâ'ât, 22 February 1951.Google Scholar

page 131 note 1 The other eleven points consist of nationalization of forests, shares in State-owned factories to compensate former landowners, profit-sharing by factory workers, reform of the electoral law, formation of the Literacy Corps, Health Corps, Extension Corps, the establishment of local courts, nationalization of underground water resources, ‘making anew the countryside’, and the ‘Administrative Revolution’. The points may be said to have increased to thirteen with the recent addition of the ‘Educational Revolution’, of which more will be said in the text of this paper.Google Scholar

page 132 note 1 Ramazani, Rouhollah K., ‘Iran's Changing Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Discussion’, The Middle East Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), pp. 421–37.Google Scholar For detailed analysis of Iran's new role in international politics with particular reference to its allimportant policy in the Persian Gulf see Ramazani, Rouhollah K., The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972).Google Scholar

page 133 note 1 See Ramazani, Rouhollah K., ‘The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic: Their Rise and Fall’, Studies on the Soviet Union, ser. 2, vol. XVI, no. 4 (1971), 401–27.Google Scholar

page 133 note 2 We call these ‘impressions’ because we did not undertake a systematic study of such attitudes: no questionnaires were prepared or formal interviews conducted. Yet, as anative Iranian (naturalized and educated in the United States) our ability to mingle freely with individuals from a wide variety of groups in the capital and several provinces during 1968–9 provided an unusual opportunity to observe the great diversity of attitudes toward the present regime.Google Scholar

page 135 note 1 Quite apart from the Shâh's well-known Mission for My Country (New York, 1961)Google Scholar, and the ‘White Revolution’ (mentioned in note 3, p. 124 above)Google Scholar, the recent volumes prepared by the Pahlavi Library can shedmuch light on his views on a variety of subjects. The Library's Bargozideh-ey az Neveshteh-hâ va Sukhanân Shâhhanshâh Âryâmehr (n.d.) is quite a convenient collection, but it is not as complete as Majmu'ah Muntakhab: Nutqhâ, Payamhâ, Neveshtehhâ, va Misâhebehhâ-ye A'alâhażat Humyâyoon, Muhammad Reżâ Shâh Pahlavi, Shâhanshâh Irân az Shahrivar 1320 tâ Mehr Mâh 1340 (n.d.), or as specialized a collection as the two volumes prepared by Ghulâmreżâ Nykpay, Surat Jalasât Shurâ-ye Eqtisâd dar Pyshgâh Shâhanshâh Âryâmehr yâ Majmu'ah-ey az Asnâd Târikh Mu'âser Irân (n.d.).

page 135 note 2 See Kayhan, International Edition, 3 October 1970.Google Scholar

page 136 note 1 This and the rest of this paragraph is based on probably the frankest remarks the Shâh has ever made about the monarchy in Iran. These remarks were contained in an extensive interview with NBC's Edwin Newman which was broadcast over the network's Speaking Freely program. For the transcript see Kayhan, International Edition, 28 February 1970.Google Scholar

page 137 note 1 The editorial stated also that: ‘The main lesson to be learnt from the general election is that parliamentary democracy is here to stay…This in itself is enough to show that an increasing number of people from all walks of life are beginning to consider parliamentary democracy as the backbone of the nation's political life.’ See Kayhan, International Edition, 17 July 1971.Google Scholar

page 137 note 2 See articles 90–3 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws. The text is in Helen Davis, Miller, op. cit. p. 127.Google Scholar