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Ghazâlî's Argument from Creation* (II)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Lenn E. Goodman
Lenn E. Goodman
Affiliation:
University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii
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Extract

If, as Ghazâlî presumes, the fact of creation can serve as evidence of the existence of God, and if, as he attempts to show, creation is the only binding, reasoned proof of God's existence, Ghazâlî must, to fulfill his program of reconstructing the intellectual basis of Islam, somehow find arguments adequate to prove that creation did in fact take place. He must disprove what was in his time the still vital claim that the Universe had not come to be but had existed forever differing in no essential way from the world we know today.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , April 1971 , pp. 168 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

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References

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