Despite an ongoing drive by governments and law enforcers around the world to improve the sophistication of their risk mitigation measures, cyber-attacks are continually increasing. A study from Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) shows more than 4,000 ransomware attacks occurred daily in 2016. That's a 300 percent increase over 2015, where 1,000 ransomware attacks were seen per day. Cyber criminals are successfully penetrating even the most high-profile companies and governmental agencies. The breach at the NSA was truly alarming and just one recent example of the dire situation the country, and world, face as cybercrime intensifies and the cyber security talent shortage becomes more serious.

Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to focus on cyber education at the national, government, and law enforcement level examining the methodology to set the tone from the top ensuring alignment between governments, law enforcers, private sector, and academic level. It also examines the gaps in cyber laws and educational governance initiatives and their impact on efficient execution of cyber policies for various regions of the world with a focus on the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.

Finally, this article recommends policy guidelines and a compliance manual framework for governments and law enforcers to consider ensuring that cyber risks are properly addressed and mitigated in a structured and coherent way.

The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 and brought together countries from around the world for the purpose of fairly regulating the trade of goods, services, and intellectual property between its member states. While treaties and other trade agreements have existed between countries for hundreds of years, the WTO's most significant innovation is its dispute settlement process through the Dispute Settlement Body. Countries agree to be bound to the decisions of the DSB upon their admittance into the WTO. The DSB is a two-tiered adjudicative system consisting of the lower panels and the higher Appellate Body.

The United States, under both the Obama and Trump administrations, has blocked the appointment of AB judges. This tactic has limited the number of active judges to three. The AB normally has seven members. The United States has listed a number of reasons for their boycott of the system, among them is that the AB is functioning as if its reports are to be binding precedent on the lower panel and to future DSB cases, in a manner similar to stare decisis. This issue has been observed over the years and there is conflict between interpretations of precedent under Article 3:2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement. Caselaw of the DSB from over the years has also raised interesting questions and the appearance of the use of precedent.

This article will be examining the historical fundamentals and use of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis. It will then turn into an examination of the institutional and regulatory framework of the WTO, particularly Article 3:2 of the DSU and Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, and whether it allows or leaves room for a system of binding precedent. Finally, jurisprudence of the DSB will be surveyed for evidence of this system. Reports that will be examined are Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, India-Patents, India-Autos, and Australia-Plain Packaging Tobacco.

Weaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.

On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.

There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.