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Moving from Impunity to Accountability in Post-War Liberia: Possibilities, Cautions, and Challenges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2019

Rena L. Scott
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Abstract

Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed state. Though Liberia's civil war is officially over, war criminals are free and some are even helping run the transitional government under the authority of Liberia's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This peace agreement calls for the consideration of a general amnesty for those involved in the Liberian civil war alongside the parceling of governmental functions among members of various rebel groups. The drafters of the agreement claim that this was the only viable solution for sustainable peace in Liberia. Meanwhile, Charles Taylor relaxes in Nigeria's resort city of Calabar.

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Articles
Information
International Journal of Legal Information , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , Winter 2005 , pp. 345 - 417
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Copyright © 2005 by the International Association of Law Libraries 

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References

Notes

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357 This is especially true when it is African societies that are now beginning to insist on punitive and retributive mechanisms. One recent manifestation of the preference of retributive justice over amnesty for example is the gacaca system (traditional Rwandan community courts) in Rwanda. It is important to note that Rwandan people rather than the Western world has chosen this system as a means to cope with the large number of Rwandans who participated in the Genocide. From the outset, the transitional Rwandan government has declined to privilege reconciliation over retributive justice. There has been widespread support for these community courts because of their emphasis on individual responsibility, their ability to strengthen the communities in which they operate, and the national democratic rule of law values promoted through the participatory process. See Daly, supra note 296, at 366.Google Scholar

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390 Golub, Stephen, a lecturer in international development and law, argues that the international aid field of law and development focuses too much on law, lawyers, and state institutions, and too little on development, the poor, and civil society. Golub, supra note 163, at 5. While the rule of law (a situation where (1) the government itself is bound by the law, (2) every person in society is treated equally under the law, (3) the human dignity of each individual is recognized and protected by law, and (4) justice is accessible to all) is a noble goal, the “rule of law” orthodoxy (a set of ideas, activities, and strategies geared toward bringing about the rule of law) takes an ineffective route. Id. at 7. This “top-down,” state-centered approach concentrates on law reform and government institutions, particularly judiciaries, to build business-friendly legal systems that presumably spur poverty alleviation. Id. at 5. Also development organizations use the rule of law orthodoxy to promote goals such as good governance and public safety. The problem as Golub sees it is not in these economic and political goals, per se, but rather “its questionable assumptions, unproven impact, and insufficient attention to the legal needs of the disadvantaged.” Id. Golub ultimately argues that international institutions should stop assuming that assistance to state institutions yields greater impact and more sustainable outcomes than does support for civil society.Google Scholar

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452 Open Letter, supra note 386.Google Scholar

453 See, e.g., Christopher Marquis & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Leaders Warn of Danger for U.S. in Liberia, N.Y. times, July 25, 2003, at A1; but see, Chinua Akukwe, Liberia: The Failure of Africa and United States Leadership, perspective, July 25, 2003.Google Scholar

454 O'Connell, supra note 77 at 241, 244.Google Scholar

455 Sengupta, Somini, Liberia Seen As Icon of World's Neglect of Africa, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2003, at A4.Google Scholar

456 O'Connell, supra note 77 at 241.Google Scholar

457 Id. Google Scholar

458 Id. at 209.Google Scholar

459 Id. at 209.Google Scholar

460 In the midst of the second Liberian civil war, Charles Taylor attempted to invoke the sympathy of the United States and President George Bush by drawing upon the historical relationship between the two countries: “Our capital is named after your President Monroe. Our flag is a replica of yours. Our laws are patterned after your laws. We in Liberia have always considered ourselves ‘stepchildren’ of the United States. We implore you to come help your stepchildren who are in danger of losing their lives and their freedom.” Pham, supra note 1, at 100.Google Scholar

461 Pham, supra note 1, at 100.Google Scholar

462 Open Petition to the United States Government, perspective, July 24, 2003, at http://www.theperspective.org/openpetitionus.htrm.Google Scholar

463 Howland, Todd & Kadili, Abdelilah, Liberia: The Need for a Robust Intervention and Planning for an Effective Transition, center for hum. rts Newsletter 1 (2003).Google Scholar

464 U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, supra note 7, at 9 (statement of Walter Kansteiner).Google Scholar

465 See also O'Connell, supra note 77, at 244 (arguing that the United States bears some responsibility for Liberia's disintegration. By supporting Samuel Doe, the United States sent the message that there was no point to moderate opposition and that only rebellion could oust him. This continual support of corrupt leaders in Liberia might give the US some moral responsibility to provide a small portion of military and financial resources to help Liberia rebuild).Google Scholar

466 U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Donald Payne).Google Scholar

467 Id. at 8 (statement of Walter H. Kansteiner).Google Scholar

468 Id. at 7.Google Scholar

469 Id. Google Scholar

470 Id. at 12 (statement of Theresa Whelan)Google Scholar

471 Id. Google Scholar

472 Id. at 11.Google Scholar

473 Id. at 12.Google Scholar

474 Id. at 18 (statement of Donald M. Payne). Yet Payne expressed his frustration with the Department of Defense's dual policy foreign policy: “We have our hands full in Iraq, there is no question about it, but I think it is absolutely disgraceful that Secretary Rumsfeld continually arguing against deploying a single person in Liberia. It is disgraceful, it is unconscionable, and it just makes me feel that if it is a black person dying in Africa, Rumsfeld doesn't think they are worth our men on the ground.”Google Scholar

475 Id. at 21 (statement of Gregory Meeks).Google Scholar

476 See, generally U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, supra note 7.Google Scholar

477 Id. at 21 (statement of Gregory Meeks).Google Scholar

478 Bravin, supra note 273, at A1.Google Scholar

479 O'Connell, supra note 77, at 241, 246.Google Scholar

480 Id. at 207, 208.Google Scholar

481 Id. at 208.Google Scholar

482 Id. Google Scholar

483 Id. at 244.Google Scholar

484 Id. (citing Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook, An Update 8 (2003)).Google Scholar

485 Rotberg, supra note 108, at 4.Google Scholar

486 Abbott, supra note 425, at 376.Google Scholar

487 Leonard & Straus, supra note 4, at 1-20.Google Scholar