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Why and How Human Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2019

Extract

The existing state of human beings, to which the present international movement for human rights addresses itself, is no reason for applause for the success of that movement. It is true that there are several reasons for the lack of success and not all blame is to be borne by the deficiencies in the present approach. True also is the fact that the struggle for protection of the human being from excesses of the state or powerful elements within society is a continuing saga of organized society with only the promise that the struggle and its causes have more of an enduring existence than the various efforts for seeking protection for the human being attempted in the history of mankind, of which human-rights is one instance. However, to the extent it is legitimate to explore if improvements in the present approach are possible, one might well be permitted to raise anew questions about the philosophical foundation for human rights and the pragmatic approach to their achievement.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1982 by International Association of Law Libraries 

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References

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