Long at the margins of international law, property is now among the key challenges facing international law- and decision-makers. A ‘shrinking’ planet and a polycentric international law regime provide the backdrop for contestation between different property concepts and claims. While presenting important commonalities in legal concepts and normative content, international investment law and international human rights law protect different and possibly competing rights, reflect different balances of commercial and non-commercial considerations, and embody different standards of legal protection. As the frontiers of natural resource extraction expand, natural resource investments can bring different property concepts and claims directly into tension. In this context, the articulation between investment law and human rights law influences the ways in which international law mediates competition for the world's natural resources, redefining the balance between public and private interests and reshaping spaces for the lawful exercise of state sovereignty.

Natural resources are critical to global value chains as minerals, good climate and fertile soil are commonly required for the beginning of the chain, with the consequence that any interruption in their supply threatens the chain's continued integrity. Trade in such resources provides a valuable source of income for resource-rich states. Yet exploitation of natural resources can result in their exhaustion and biodiversity loss, while their extraction can lead to environmental damage and human rights abuses, with the result that any positive contribution to sustainable development for resource-rich states is quickly undermined. Effective regulation is critical to maximise benefits and minimise potential harm. The WTO's rules seem ideally suited to allow the state to impose measures that militate against the overexploitation of the resource by corporations, whilst simultaneously ensuring that that regulation does not unnecessarily impede the flow of resources within the value chain. However, this paper will show that applying the WTO's rules to natural resource use in global value chains presents both substantive and normative challenges.

States utilise international law to create opportunities within global markets for private transnational economic actors, such as multinational oil companies, to invest and/or operate within foreign jurisdictions. However, there is a lack of directly enforceable international mechanisms against these private actors when they cause environmental damage abroad. International law responses to this problem range from the establishment of international compulsory compensation schemes, the proposed expansion of the doctrine of state responsibility to include liability for private actors, and more recently through litigation in the home states of multinational oil companies. However, both international jurisprudence and US, Dutch and British domestic case-law reveal an ambivalence towards holding such private transnational economic actors legally accountable in their home state jurisdictions for violations committed abroad. Certain states (the US and France) that have suffered environmental damage from the activities of multinational oil companies have responded by reasserting their domestic regulatory powers to require immediate clean up and compensation, prior to domestic judicial litigation. Other states (Nigeria) are unable to achieve the same level of effective enforcement due to their weaker political and economic bargaining positions.

This paper explores the implications of political risk insurance (PRI) in the regulation and governance of natural resources sectors in developing countries. Operating in a hybrid public–private sphere, PRI arrangements involve a more complex web of contractual and non-contractual relations than commercial insurance products, and parties to such arrangements are inserted into a much more intricate framework of legal and political governance, with correspondingly broader international and domestic implications. The paper argues that PRI represents a form of government rationality that provides a framework for organising and regulating the behaviour of actors involved in natural resource investments in developing countries. In natural resources projects where tensions regularly exist between the interests of the foreign investor, the host state and local communities, PRI arrangements can reframe the terms of engagement between these various stakeholders and redefine the host state's engagement with the broader international community.

This paper contains three main arguments. First, tropical forests have become objects of climate and environmental governance under the REDD+ mechanism in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that combines legal, market and scientific rationalities with measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) technologies in a neoliberal green governmentality regime. Second, the current structures and institutions of governance are contradictory and international environmental law provides inadequate means for regulating and protecting forests. Third, these deficiencies point to the need for imaginative alternative forms of governance to prevent further deforestation.