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Why do judges talk the way they do?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 June 2009

Richard Nobles  and
David Schiff
Richard Nobles
Affiliation:
Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London
David Schiff
Affiliation:
Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London
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Abstract

The Hartian tradition of jurisprudence utilises linguistic philosophy to examine legal communications, most particularly those made by judges, and seeks to reach conclusions about the commitment of legal actors towards legal systems, the part played by morality, and what aspects of law involve the exercise of discretion. But this approach fails to take account of the nature of communication within modern society. If one approaches these issues through the application of communication theory, applying Niklas Luhmann’s concept of redundancy, our understanding alters radically. Systems theory explains how and why the communication resources available to legal actors are both limited and system specific. Whilst one can accept that actors use communications to achieve particular legal operations, one cannot attribute the meaning of these communications to their intentions, motivations or commitments. This conclusion and reasons for it change our understanding of long-standing and unresolved jurisprudential debates about the nature of judicial discourse.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 25 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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