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Looting and Smuggling of Artifacts as a Strategy to Finance Terrorism Global Sanctions as a Disruptive and Preventive Tool

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2019

Hans-Jakob Schindler
Affiliation:
Senior Director, Counter Extremism Project, New York; Former Coordinator, ISIL, Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team, United Nations Security Council, New York, United States; Email: [email protected]
Frederique Gautier
Affiliation:
Former Expert, ISIL, Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team, United Nations Security Council, New York, United States

Abstract:

In recent years, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 as well as several Al-Qaida affiliates have used the systematic and large-scale looting of antiquities as one of their income streams. Due to the large-scale and organized looting activities of these groups, in particular, in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), following various reports and recommendations by the ISIL, Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team has adopted a range of measures, chiefly among them the landmark UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017) to counter this threat. These measures demand that both member states’ regulators as well as private sector stakeholders take specific action to ensure that the art and antiquity trading industry is capable of defending itself against the misuse of their services to finance terrorism. This article outlines the various challenges member states and private industry are facing in this regard and explains how the various new UNSC provisions, including the measures outlined in UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), could be employed effectively to counter this threat.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © International Cultural Property Society 2019 

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References

1 Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) in the United Nations Security Council Sanctions List.

2 Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) in the United Nations Security Council Sanctions List.

3 Information provided by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT).

4 Listed as Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (QDe.129) in the United Nations Security Council Sanctions List.

5 See UNSC Doc. S/2016/501, 31 May 2016, para. 11.

6 United States Department of Justice, “United States Files Complaint Seeking Forfeiture of Antiquities Associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),” press release, 15 December 2016, particularly the attachments to the lawsuit.

7 See, e.g., the reports of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Observatory of Syrian Cultural Heritage, https://en.unesco.org/syrian-observatory/reports/looting (accessed 23 June 2019) or the weekly reports of the American Schools of Oriental Research’s Cultural Heritage Initiatives, http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/weekly-reports/ (accessed 23 June 2019).

8 UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, 4 April 2016, paras. 24–36.

9 After cultural artifacts have been smuggled out of the areas from which they were looted, collectors, art dealers, and auction houses are not only the interface between the potentially looted antiquities and the international market, but they are also an important mechanism that creates provenance data and certifications through their sales. Consequently, the check of prior provenance at this juncture is of the utmost importance and, if done in a diligent manner, presents a last opportunity to stop looted antiquities before they enter the overall market.

10 UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999), 15 October 1999, para. 4 (b). This asset freeze relates to all funds, financial assets, or economic resources. See UNSC Resolution 2368 (2017), 20 July 2017, para. 1 (a).

11 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), 17 November 2017, para. 10; UNSC Doc. S/2017/573, 7 August 2017, para. 69.

12 First reported by the team in 2014 in its special report on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). See UNSC Doc. S/2014/815, 14 November 2014, paras. 72, 73)

13 See UNSC Resolution 2199 (2015), 12 February 2015, paras. 15–17.

14 UNSC Resolution 2253 (2015), 17 December 2015.

15 See UNSC Resolution 2253 (2015), para. 14.

16 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 10.

17 See UNSC Resolution 2253 (2015), para. 15.

18 See UNSC Resolution 2199 (2015), para. 17.

19 This is particularly the case for items of particular time periods, such as, for example, Roman or Byzantine artifacts. Some of these had a wide geographical distribution and require expert knowledge to locate precisely.

20 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(i).

21 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(j). The ISIL, Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team (Monitoring Team) had highlighted the usefulness of such inventories already in 2016. See UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, 4 April 2016, para. 32.

22 These include the International Police Organization’s (INTERPOL) Database of Stolen Works of Art, the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) ARCHEO platform, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s SHERLOC portal. See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para 17(f). Prior to the passing of UNSC Resolution 2347, the Monitoring Team had already recommended that member states actively exchange information on seized antiquities via the INTERPOL stolen works of art database (UNSC Doc. S/2016/210, 5 April 2016, para 10) and on seizures and investigations via the ARCHEO platform of the WCO (UNSC Doc. S/2016/629, 19 July 2016, para. 86).

23 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(b).

24 The Monitoring Team highlighted this issue in 2016. See UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, 4 April 2016, para. 30.

25 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(e).

26 UNSC Doc. S/2016/210, para. 8. The text of the WCO resolution is available at http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/about-us/legal-instruments/resolutions/resolution_cultural-objects.pdf?la=en (accessed 23 June 2019).

27 UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, para 28. This recommendation was implemented as UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(c).

28 UNSC Doc. S/2016/629, paras. 83–84.

29 UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, para. 29.

30 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(e).

31 UNSC Doc. S/2017/35, para. 69–70.

32 UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, para. 34; UNSC Doc. S/2016/629, para. 89.

33 UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, paras. 35–36.

34 UNSC Doc. S/2016/629, para. 89.

35 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(g). One potential additional measure that could be effective is for member states to work with the private sector concerning a minimum period during which records of a sale of antiquities should be maintained. The ability to access existing records of sales during customs controls or law enforcement investigations would enable such agencies to access data on past sales more easily and, therefore, introduce an additional risk factor for smugglers of illicit antiquities. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231, Art. 10(a) may be said to offer a first guiding principle for this work: “The States Parties to this Convention undertake: To restrict by education, information and vigilance, movement of cultural property illegally removed from any State Party to this Convention and, as appropriate for each country, oblige antique dealers, subject to penal or administrative sanctions, to maintain a register recording the origin of each item of cultural property, names and addresses of the supplier, description and price of each item sold and to inform the purchaser of the cultural property of the export prohibition to which such property may be subject.” See UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, para. 35.

36 Doc. S/2016/213, para. 32.

37 See UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), para. 17(h).

38 Private sector stakeholders and member states explained to the Monitoring Team that antiquities of Mesopotamian origin could be traced because they were concentrated in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but Roman or Byzantine antiquities originating in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic were difficult to distinguish because similar antiquities could also be found in the wider region. Antiquities experts explained, however, that, if it could be clarified which archaeological sites, museums, and excavation storage houses had been looted by ISIL or the Al-Nusrah Front, they would have a better chance of identifying relevant antiquities as a result of aesthetic differences. UNSC Doc. S/2016/213, para. 32.

39 UNSC Resolution 2199 (2015).

40 For example, in July 2017, the European Commission proposed a new regulation on the import of cultural goods. The legislative process is currently ongoing. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Import of Cultural Goods, Doc. COM(2017) 375 final, 13 July 2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e1fd9ba7-67a8-11e7-b2f2-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed 23 June 2019).

41 Due diligence describes the process prior to a business transaction during which all relevant information pertaining to the attempted transaction is collected in order to enable a detailed risk analysis concerning the operation. In the case of antiquities sales, this pertains primarily to detailed provenance checks.

42 Know-your-customer procedures, sometimes also referred to in a broader sense as customer due diligence is also part of a business risk assessment and refers to the systematic collection and storing of information concerning the identity of the potential customer. See Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation. The FATF Recommendations,” February 2012, 14, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/internationalstandardsoncombatingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-thefatfrecommendations.html (accessed 23 June 2019).

43 UNSC Doc. S/2016/2123, para. 26.