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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
“Sharing” the Wealth? Minerals, oil, timber, medicines and now genetic wealth, all play a major role in development and all are the source of conflict, dispute and violations of indigenous peoples’ centuries-old rights. The driving force behind the relentless conflict between indigenous peoples and the waves of outsiders making forceful contact with them is the search for resources. Driven by an increasing realization that the Earth's riches are limited and at the same time by the fierce competition that globalization and economic policies have unleashed, and using increasingly sophisticated technology, both for discovery and exploitation, states and multinationals have been motivated and able to go, literally, where no outsider has gone before.
The natural resources located in some of the Earth's most remote or inhospitable locations became especially available for exploitation when a number of new states sprung up in the post-World War II, postcolonial period. Elites and dominant groups, empowered to maintain security and promote trade, spurred by multinationals’ offers that they could not refuse and by international financial institutions loans and grants ”developed” natural resources, often igniting conflicts with indigenous nations. Frequently, these clashes led to the growth of the military, to arm races to ensure the monopoly on “development”, to authoritarian and corrupt regimes, and to the opposite of what was expected, increased poverty and inequality.
The conflict is over the very issue of who owns the resources — a question that has been central to the rise of nationalism and the assertion of “ethnic” identity throughout the world. First Nation peoples realize that without their resource base, they have no future. They also believe that modem states, some of them relatively young, cannot legitimately claim resources that nation peoples have utilized and maintained for centuries. The manner in which this is done is also the subject of fierce disputes (e.g. damage or destruction of ancestral lands, food and water sources, way of life, income).
States have traditionally received considerable help from other states and international organizations in appropriating the resources of indigenous peoples. Ironically, the improving economic conditions worldwide and the growing wealth of many in emerging economies have made this hunt and exploitation of natural resources even more urgent and seemingly legitimize it, given the increasing demand for consumer goods and technological items.
Worldwide, multinational development industries help states to seize resources and put them up for sale on the world market — especially through “obvious” projects such as mining, oil exploration, and hydroelectric development.
One issue is never, or at best rarely, addressed: Who owns the resources to begin with? Whose agreement is needed before proceeding? What is an equitable formula for sharing the earnings and mitigate displacement and environmental pollution and destruction? Laws introduced in the past few decades by ruling groups often deny first nations’ claims to their resources. Such laws, many indigenous groups argue, do not take precedence over their prior claims to resources. At stake are not only the issue of ownerships, but also the value of resources and who has the right to manage, extract and consume them. It is also a question of survival and identity.
This work of critical criminology reviews the historical record of “exploration” and exploitation of resources showing that it is not a new phenomenon but rather a chronic situation that indigenous peoples have endured throughout the centuries. It examines the role that the state, the multinationals and the international financial institutions play in this clash over resources when indigenous peoples’ rights are often ignored, stepped upon and disregarded. It critically examines current efforts, treaties and policies meant to recognize and respect Native peoples’ rights. It shows that current measures are not truly addressing the key issues and that a concerted effort must be undertaken to change the equation and dynamics of power, dominion and use of the earth's riches.
Development must be redefined, crafted and targeted in the right way taking into account and respecting all legitimate claims to the earth's wealth, especially those of the “First Nations” that have suffered throughout the centuries the impact of colonialism, racism, and wholesale theft of their riches on the part of the “developed” world.
«Partager» la richesse ? Minéraux, pétrole, le bois, les médicaments et la richesse génétique aujourd'hui jouent tous un rôle majeur dans le développement et tous sont la source de conflit, crimes et violations des droits centenaires des peuples autochtones. La force motrice derrière le conflit incessant entre les peuples autochtones et les vagues d’étrangers qui entrent en contact avec eux par la force est la recherche de ressources. Poussé par une prise de conscience croissante que les richesses de la Terre sont limitées et en même temps par la concurrence féroce que la mondialisation et les politiques économiques ont déclenché, et en utilisant la technologie de plus en plus sophistiquée, à la fois pour la découverte et l'exploitation, les Etats et les multinationales ont été motivés et capables d'aller, littéralement, où aucun étranger n'est allé avant.
Les ressources naturelles situées dans certains des endroits les plus reculées ou inhospitalières de la planète sont devenus particulièrement disponibles pour l'exploitation quand un certain nombre de nouveaux Etats surgi dans la période postcoloniale post-Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les élites et les groupes dominants, habilités à maintenir la sécurité et promouvoir le commerce, stimulés par les offres des multinationales qu'ils ne pouvaient pas refuser et par les institutions financières des prêts et des subventions internationales « développent » les ressources naturelles, enflammant souvent des conflits avec les nations autochtones. Souvent, ces affrontements ont conduit à la croissance de l'armée, pour assurer le monopole du « développement » à des régimes autoritaires et corrompus. A l'opposé de ce qui était attendu, ce développement augmente la pauvreté et l'inégalité.
Le conflit est sur la question même de qui possède les ressources — une question qui a été au centre de la montée du nationalisme et de l'affirmation de l'identité « ethnique » dans le monde entier. Les peuples des Premières nations se rendent compte que, sans leur base de ressources, ils n'ont aucun avenir. Ils croient également que les États modernes, certains d'entre eux relativement jeunes, ne peuvent prétendre légitimement les ressources que les peuples de la nation ont utilisés et entretenus depuis des siècles. La façon dont cela est fait est également l'objet de litiges féroces (par exemple sur les dommages ou la destruction de leurs terres ancestrales, sources de nourriture et d'eau, mode de vie, et revenu).
Les États ont traditionnellement reçu une aide considérable de la part d'autres Etats et organisations internationales à s'approprier les ressources des peuples autochtones. Ironiquement, l'amelioration des conditions économiques à travers le monde et la richesse croissante de beaucoup dans les économies émergentes ont fait cette chasse et exploitation des ressources naturelles encore plus urgentes et l'ont apparemment légitimé, compte tenu de la demande croissante de biens de consommation et d'objets technologiques.
Dans le monde entier, les industries multinationales de développement aident les États à saisir des ressources et à les mettre en vente sur le marché mondial — en particulier à travers des projets « évidentes » comme l'exploitation minière, l'exploration pétrolière, et le développement hydroélectrique.
Une question qui n'est jamais, ou rarement, au mieux, addressée est : Qui possède les ressources pour commencer ? L'accord de quelle personne ou autorité est nécessaire avant de procéder ? Quelle est une formule équitable pour partager les recettes et atténuer le déplacement et la pollution de l'environnement et sa destruction ? Lois introduites au cours des dernières décennies par des groupes dirigeants refusent souvent de reconnaitre ou entretenir les revendications des Premières nations à leurs ressources. Ces lois, de nombreux groupes autochtones soutiennent, ne prévalent pas sur leurs revendications antérieures sur les ressources. L'enjeu est non seulement la question de copropriétés, mais aussi la valeur des ressources et qui a le droit de les gérer, extraire et les consommer. C'est aussi une question de survie et de l'identité.
Ce travail de la criminologie critique examine l'histoire des « explorations » et exploitation des ressources, montrant que ce n'est pas un phénomène nouveau mais plutôt une situation chronique que les peuples autochtones ont subi à travers les siècles. Il examine le rôle que l’État, les multinationales et les institutions financières internationales jouent dans ce conflit sur les ressources, lorsque les droits des peuples autochtones sont souvent ignorés, méprisés et méconnus. Il examine de façon critique les efforts actuels, les traités et les politiques destinées à reconnaître et respecter les droits des peuples autochtones. Il montre que les mesures actuelles ne abordent pas vraiment les questions clés et qu'un effort concerté doit être entrepris pour changer l’équation et de la dynamique du pouvoir, la domination et l'utilisation des richesses de la terre.
Le développement doit être redéfini, conçu et ciblée dans le droit chemin en prenant en compte et en respectant toutes les demandes légitimes de la richesse de la terre, en particulier ceux des « Premières Nations » qui ont souffert tout au long des siècles l'impact du colonialisme, du racisme, et du vol de leurs richesses par la partie du monde « développé ».
“Compartir” la riqueza? Minerales, petróleo, madera, medicamentos y ahora tambien la riqueza genética, todos juegan un papel importante en el desarrollo y todos son una mayor fuente de conflicto, controversia y violaciones de los derechos de siglos de antigüedad de los pueblos indígenas. La fuerza impulsora detrás del conflicto incesante entre los pueblos indígenas y las olas de los extranjeros que entran en contacto con ellos de manera contundente es la búsqueda de recursos. Impulsados por una creciente toma de conciencia de que la riqueza de la Tierra es limitada y, al mismo tiempo, por la competencia feroz que la globalización y las políticas económicas han desatado, y el uso de tecnología cada vez más sofisticada, tanto para el descubrimiento que para la explotación, los estados y las multinacionales han sido motivados y capaces de ir, literalmente, donde ningún extraño ha ido antes.
Los recursos naturales ubicados en algunos de los lugares más remotos o inhóspitos de la Tierra se hicieron especialmente disponible para la explotación, cuando una serie de nuevos estados establecidos en el período postcolonial posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Las élites y grupos dominantes, con el poder para mantener la seguridad y promover el comercio, espoleados por las ofertas de las multinacionales que no podían rechazar y por las instituciones financieras de préstamos y donaciones internacionales “desarrolaron” los recursos naturales a menudo encendiendo conflictos con las naciones indígenas. Con frecuencia, estos enfrentamientos provocaron el crecimiento de las fuerzas armadas, carreras para armamentos para asegurar el monopolio de “desarrollo” a regímenes autoritarios y corruptos, y al contrario de lo que se esperaba, el aumento de la pobreza y la desigualdad.
Una pregunta basica raramente contestada justamente es sobre quién posee los recursos — algo que ha sido fundamental para el auge del nacionalismo y la afirmación de la identidad “étnica” en todo el mundo. Los pueblos de las Primeras Naciones se han dado cuenta de que sin su base de recursos, no tienen futuro. También creen que los estados modernos, algunos de ellos relativamente joven, no pueden legítimamente reclamar los recursos que ellos,los pueblos originarios, han utilizados y mantenidos durante siglos. La forma en que esto se hace es también el tema de conflictos violentos (por ejemplo, daño o destrucción de las tierras ancestrales, de las fuentes de alimentos y agua, forma de vida, ingresos).
Tradicionalmente, los Estados han recibido una considerable ayuda de otros Estados y organizaciones internacionales en la apropiación de los recursos de los pueblos indígenas. Irónicamente, las condiciones económicas en todo el mundo, la mejora economica y la creciente riqueza de muchas de las economías emergentes han hecho esta caza y la explotación de los recursos naturales aún más urgente y aparentemente la legitiman, dada la creciente demanda de bienes de consumo y de artículos tecnológicos.
A nivel mundial, las industrias multinacionales de desarrollo ayudan a los Estados a aprovechar de los recursos y ponerlos a la venta en el mercado mundial — especialmente a través de proyectos “obvios”, como la minería, la explotación petrolera y el desarrollo hidroeléctrico.
Una cuestión no es nunca, o al mejor raramente abordada: ¿Quién posee los recursos para empezar? Se necesita cuyo acuerdo antes de proceder? ¿Cual es una fórmula equitativa para compartir los ingresos y mitigar el desplazamiento y la contaminación ambiental y la destrucción? Las leyes introducidas en las últimas décadas por grupos dominantes suelen negar reclamaciones de las primeras naciones a sus recursos. Tales leyes, muchos grupos indígenas argumentan, no tienen prioridad sobre sus reclamaciones previas a los recursos. Están en juego no sólo la cuestión de titularidades, sino también el valor de los recursos y de quien tiene el derecho de administrarlos, extraerlos y consumirlos. También es una cuestión de supervivencia y de identidad.
Esta obra de la criminología crítica examina los antecedentes históricos de “exploración” y explotación de los recursos que demuestran que no es un fenómeno nuevo, sino más bien una situación crónica que los pueblos indígenas han perdurado a lo largo de los siglos. Examina el papel que el Estado, las multinacionales y las instituciones financieras internacionales desempeñan en este choque sobre los recursos cuando los derechos de los pueblos indígenas son a menudo ignorados, pisados y desatendidos. En este trabajo se examinan críticamente los esfuerzos actuales, los tratados y las políticas destinadas a reconocer y respetar los derechos de los pueblos nativos. Esto demuestra que las medidas actuales no se ocupan realmente de las cuestiones fundamentales y que un esfuerzo concertado debe llevarse a cabo para cambiar la ecuación y la dinámica de poder, dominio y uso de las riquezas de la tierra.
El desarrollo debe ser redefinido, recreado y dirigido de manera correcta, teniendo en cuenta y respetando todas las demandas legítimas de la riqueza de la tierra, sobre todo los de las “primeras naciones” que han sufrido a lo largo de los siglos el impacto del colonialismo, del racismo y del robo al por mayor de sus riquezas por parte de el mundo “desarrollado”.
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145 A month after President Obama announced in December 2010 that the United States would support UNDRIP, the U. S. State Department clarified that by stating: “the United States understands [the importance of a] call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders, before the actions addressed in those consultations are taken.” See the following note for details. See more at: http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/united-states/victory-us-endorsesun-declaration-rights-indigenous-peoples#sthash.06NvUV9w.dpuf Google Scholar
146 Shortly after President Obama declared that the United States would lend its support to UNDRIP, the commitment of the U. S. to UNDRIP and to genuine consultation and taking indigenous people's interests into account is being tested by the proposed TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline. If constructed, the Keystone XL pipeline would transport hundreds of thousands of barrels of crude oil from Alberta to Nebraska, crossing six states and thousands of square miles of indigenous lands. Since the proposed pipeline must cross an international border, the project must obtain a Presidential Permit from the State Department before it can be built. In September 2011, Native leaders delivered to the President “The Mother Earth Accord”, a rejection of the pipeline grounded on “the principles of traditional indigenous knowledge, spiritual values, and respectful use of the land.” It is a clear invocation of the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) as provided by the UNDRIP, and the president's first major chance to demonstrate his administration's acceptance of the Declaration by honoring the tribes’ decision. The position of the Native leaders is that, without the right to decide what happens on their lands, indigenous people are left with no control of their assets, and therefore no say in their future. TransCanada, responsible for the construction and operation of the pipeline, reportedly has stated that it has “no legal obligation to work with the tribes,” adding, “We do it because we have a policy. We believe it's a good, neighborly thing to do.” Tribal leaders also complain that the U. S. State Department is not living up to UNDRIP's consultation requirement, raising questions about the Obama administration's commitment to indigenous rights. One of the obstacles is the Native leaders’ insistence that negotiations be conducted on nation-to-nation basis. Pressure to allow the pipeline is enormous. The pushback is also strong. No decision has been announced as of May 2014. For the source of quotations included in this note, see: Decision Time for Keystone XL – Was Obama's UNDRIP Endorsement an Empty Promise? First Peoples Worldwide Newsletter (June 4, 2013), http://firstpeoples.org/wp/decision-time-for-keystone-xl-was-obamas-undrip-endorsementan-empty-promise/ Google Scholar
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