The seat of arbitration is fundamental to defining the legal framework for international arbitral proceedings. Although parties are able to select the arbitral seat, arbitration clauses are frequently ‘pathological’, failing to designate the seat or failing to do so clearly. If the seat is not clearly identified by the parties’ agreement, the court may be called upon to decide which country is the seat (typically, in order to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain certain types of arbitration application). The simplest situations are ‘uni-directional’ cases in which, in procedural terms, the parties' agreement points expressly or impliedly towards a single location. More difficult are ‘pluri-directional’ cases in which the agreement refers to more than one possible location. While certain scenarios are relatively straightforward, what constitutes a choice by the parties is more complicated if the parties' agreement contains signposts pointing in different directions. In ‘uni-directional’ cases, the English courts have developed a series of interpretative guidelines which solve most of the problems posed by potentially ambiguous clauses. However, in ‘pluri-directional’ situations, the English case law is less convincing. In such cases, the courts have not approached the identification of the arbitral seat in a consistent way; they have not laid down a clear doctrinal framework; and they may be legitimately criticized for displaying a measure of ‘forum preference’.

Codification conventions and draft articles completed by the International Law Commission are often—and increasingly—invoked by courts, tribunals, governments and international organizations as ‘reflections of customary international law’. This article discusses the factors explaining the authority that these ‘non-legislative codifications’ have come to enjoy in international legal reasoning. Moving beyond the traditional explanations of codification conventions as evidence of State practice and ILC draft articles as the teaching of publicists, it considers how, against the backdrop of the uncertainty of customary international law, institutional factors (relating to authorship, representation and procedure) and textual factors (including prescriptive form and the absence of a distinction between ‘codification’ and ‘progressive development’) converge to convey the image that the resulting texts constitute the most authoritative restatement of the existing law. It then assesses this phenomenon in light of the political ideal of the international rule of law. While non-legislative codifications contribute to enhancing the clarity, consistency and congruence of international law, the fact that they may portray novel rules as reflecting existing law inevitably raises legality concerns.

Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human rights documents which treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its introduction and its relationship with the established right to privacy merit an explanation. This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it proactively promotes individual personality rights which are threatened by personal data processing and, second, it reduces the power and information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data. For these reasons, this paper suggests that there ought to be explicit judicial recognition of the distinction between the two rights.

How to address invalid reservations has been an ongoing struggle for States, legal practitioners and academics. This article considers the evolution of severability and whether States intend the language of severance to serve as a signal of their view on legality to reserving States or simply use severability to bolster their own public reputation. Over the past decade, State practice toward invalid reservations to norm-creating treaties has shifted and both this shift and its impact on treaty law must be acknowledged. The arguments and assertions that follow rely heavily on contemporary practice relating to reservations made to the core UN human rights treaties which, admittedly, limits the application of the doctrine in many ways. Review of State practice, especially to human rights treaties, demonstrates that a broader number of States are slowly opting for severability when defining their treaty relations with States authoring invalid reservations. The doctrine of severability is gaining a slow but steady following by a growing number of States though there is tension about whether severing reservations is lex specialis, pertaining only to human rights treaties, or lex ferenda. This article examines the evolving practice and forecasts the role it will play in the future of treaty law.

In 1976 the UK ratified the ICCPR with a reservation that prevented individuals without the right to ‘enter and remain’ in the UK from invoking Article 12(4) and ‘other provisions’ of the covenant. Upon Hong Kong's reunification with China, the ICCPR ‘as applied to Hong Kong’ in accordance with the UK's ratification was constitutionally guaranteed. It will be argued that the legislation implementing the ICCPR does not reflect the constitutional guarantee ‘as applied to Hong Kong’ because it amounts to a blanket exclusion of all ICCPR rights in immigration matters, impermissibly going beyond the UK's reservation.

The almost two decade-long bonanza of civil litigation concerning gross human rights violations committed by corporations under the US Alien Tort Statute 1789 was scaled back by the US Supreme Court in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum in April 2013. The court restricted the territorial reach of human rights claims against transnational corporations by holding that the presumption against extra-territoriality applied to the Act. Thus Shell, the Dutch/British defendant, and the role it played in the brutal suppression by the Nigerian military of the Ogoni peoples' protest movement against the environmental devastation caused by oil exploration, lay outside the territorial scope of the Act. Legal accountability must lie in a State with a stronger connection with the dispute. While this article briefly engages with the Supreme Court decision, its main focus is on the attitude of Western governments to the corporate human rights litigation under the ATS as articulated in their amicus briefs. In these briefs they objected to the statute's excessive extraterritoriality and horizontal application of human rights to artificial non-State actors. In these two respects corporate ATS litigation created significant inroads into the conventional State-centric approach to human rights and thus provided an opportunity for more effective human rights enjoyment. This article tests the validity of the objections of Western governments to corporate human rights obligations under the ATS against the norms of public international law and against the substantive demands arising out of the shortfalls of the international human rights enforcement.

The jurisdictional reach of causes of action brought under the Alien Tort Statute 17891 (ATS) was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum.2 The claimants in this decision sought to bring an action before a US District Court asserting universal civil jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign corporations performed against non-US nationals in the territory of a foreign State. Although the Supreme Court dismissed the particular claim on the basis of a domestic canon of statutory interpretation (the presumption against extraterritoriality), the narrowness of its reasoning left open the possibility for actions to continue being brought under the ATS which assert universal civil jurisdiction over the harm caused by individuals rather than corporations. Moreover, this position was specifically endorsed by a four-member minority of the Supreme Court in the Concurring Opinion of Justice Breyer. This paper argues that the reasoning of Justice Breyer is unconvincing and goes on to suggest that assertions of civil jurisdiction made under the universal principle are unlawful in international law as they fail to find a legal basis in either customary or conventional international law.

The Warsaw conference, 2013, marked the halfway point from the Durban conference, 2011, that launched negotiations towards a 2015 climate agreement and the Paris conference, 2015, slated as the deadline for these negotiations. As such, the Warsaw conference needed to register a step change in the process—from the airing of differences to negotiating them. It also needed to create the conditions necessary to reach agreement in 2015. This article analyses the outcome of the Warsaw negotiations with a view to determining the extent to which it paves the way for a 2015 climate agreement. In particular, this article explores the divisions over, prospects for and contours of a likely 2015 agreement. The 2015 agreement is likely to be shaped by the resolution Parties arrive at on three overarching issues. These are: architecture—whether the agreement will be ‘top-down’ (prescriptive) or ‘bottom-up’ (facilitative) or a hybrid version of the two; differentiation—the nature and extent of it, and in particular whether it will eschew or replicate the Kyoto model of differentiation and related vision of equity; and legal form—whether the 2015 agreement will be legally binding, and if yes, as is likely, which elements of the 2015 package will be in the legally binding instrument and which elements will be in non-binding complementary decisions. The Warsaw outcome will therefore be analysed with a view to providing insights into the likely architecture and legal form of as well as treatment of differentiation and equity in the 2015 agreement.

This article examines the recent development of mainland Chinese law and judicial practice regarding the law applicable to arbitration agreements. It identifies potential changes to mainland Chinese law and practice that may help to further develop the People's Republic of China (PRC) into a truly international-arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. It argues that in the absence of explicit statutory provisions and a consistent approach in the People's Courts to the determination of the place of arbitration and the law applicable to arbitration agreements, it is important for parties negotiating arbitration clauses with a seat in China and/or for contracts involving mainland Chinese elements to explicitly designate the place of arbitration as well as the law governing their arbitration agreements.

Following the enactment of the 2009 Tort Liability Law the product liability system in China is largely complete. This article sketches the development of this system before outlining some of the main substantive provisions in force today and drawing comparisons between the Chinese approach and the US and European provisions. The Article will conclude that China's product liability system provides an interesting case study which enriches the study of global trends and norms in the product liability arena. In line with many other countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, the main influence on China has been the EC Directive rather than the US model.