Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right to liberty, one of the oldest and most fundamental rights in the human rights tradition, and one of the core rights in the Convention. Central to the judicial understanding of Article 5 is the ‘exhaustive justification principle’: unlike with other rights, such as the right to privacy, interferences with liberty can only be justified by one of the specific reasons listed in Article 5 itself. This article shows that this rigidity has posed problems in practice: faced with modern developments unforeseeable at the time of the Convention's writing, such as the use of novel policing techniques and the COVID-19 pandemic, judges have interpreted Article 5 in an unusual and artificial way, sacrificing the exhaustive justification principle in doing so, in order to achieve sensible outcomes. The integrity of Article 5 has been threatened, with serious consequences for the future protection of the right to liberty. This trend is explained, evidenced and evaluated, and some (partial) solutions and concessions are considered.

Courts in a number of jurisdictions have attempted to resolve the relationship between winding-up proceedings and arbitration clauses, but a unified approach is yet to appear. A fundamental disagreement exists between courts which believe that the approach of insolvency law should be applied, and those which prefer to prioritise arbitration law. This article argues that a more principled solution emerges if the problem is understood as one of competing values in which the process of characterisation can offer guidance. This would allow both a more principled approach in individual cases, and a more coherent dialogue between courts which take different approaches to the issue.

Public participation in international environmental decision-making can seek to fulfil different goals. This article explains how these goals can affect the design and appraisal of participatory processes and highlights the under-recognised value of law in determining the objectives of public participation in international environmental forums. A doctrinal analysis finds that substantive goals are most prominent in current international environmental law, but that a normative rationale for public participation could be gaining more formal endorsement through the growing legal recognition of linkages between procedural human rights and environmental protection.

The Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has featured remarkable solidarity over diplomatic and sanctioning initiatives. This unity of action, however, has largely not extended to developing or non-Western States. Many such States have, instead, expressed their non-alignment in respect of Western ‘economic warfare’, albeit not infrequently while also condemning Russia's military actions. This article proposes an approach to reconciling the positions of States in different economic, geopolitical and regional/cultural alignments. First, it suggests that current norms on State responsibility do not rule out using collective countermeasures against States accused of erga omnes norm violations, including via sanctions not authorised by the United Nations but rather imposed by coalitions. At the same time, however, it is argued that individual third-party States retain extensive rights to decide whether or not to participate in such initiatives. This autonomous agency can be derived, in part, through the continued applicability of traditional neutrality principles that require all sides to a conflict to respect the status of neutral States. As collective countermeasure initiatives come to be used more frequently in response to global conflicts, the ‘forgotten’ rules of neutrality provide a useful guide for balancing inter-State legal relations.

The negotiation of the free trade agreement (FTA) between Australia and the United Kingdom promised to integrate trade and climate policies. As a leader of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference in Glasgow, the UK seemed well-placed to exert pressure on Australia, a country that was yet to embrace a target of net zero emissions by 2050. This article asks whether the FTA achieves this aim. It explains the link between trade liberalisation and climate change, referring to the scale and composition of economic activity and drawing upon examples from energy, agriculture, building and transportation sectors, as well as strategic factors. It provides an original analytical framework to assess the FTA's contributions to climate change goals, pointing to: (1) provisions to strengthen climate commitments, including net zero targets; (2) provisions to facilitate trade and investment in climate-related areas; and (3) provisions relating to enforcement and cooperation. It compares selected initiatives of other FTAs, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the European Union–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the UK–New Zealand FTA and the Singapore–Australia Green Economy Agreement. It reviews the FTA's negotiating process and its aftermath, including complaints about public participation. The article's conclusion that the FTA makes minimal contribution to climate change mitigation has implications for the broader quest for mutually supportive trade and climate policies, and, now that a net zero target has been legislated by the newly elected Australian Parliament, for the FTA's future implementation.

Binding taxpayer-initiated international dispute resolution has traditionally played a minor role in the international tax system. Despite being long pursued by corporate interests and increasingly accepted by developed countries, international tax arbitration has remained less developed and less respectful of private interests than investor–State arbitration. The binding multilateral dispute settlement endorsed by over 130 countries as part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Two Pillar Solution to issues raised under Action 1 of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project marks a change and is noteworthy at a time when some States are reconsidering their consent to the international adjudication of trade and investment disputes. The design of international dispute settlement in the Two Pillar Solution, and the focus on the protection of multinationals from juridical double taxation, displays little appreciation of the experience with dispute settlement in international trade and investment over the past two decades.

This article presents the first feminist doctrinal textual analysis of cross-pillar synergies within thematic resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Specifically, it examines the pillars relating to ‘participation’ and ‘protection’ under the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. In attempts to balance agency with victimhood, normative advancement of both pillars has until recently evolved along parallel tracks, with little acknowledgment of how protection relates to women's participation. This article identifies synergies, gaps and productive tensions as the WPS agenda begins to engage with the inter-relationship between the pillars. It outlines critical implications and considerations for any future moves towards cross-pillar congruence.

This article explores the doctrine of separability, as understood in particular in the English legal tradition. It does so by reference to the decisions in Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA and others v Enesa Engelharia SA and others and ENKA İnşaat ve Sanayi A.Ş. v OOO ‘Insurance Company Chubb’ & Ors that explore the relevance of the concept when determining the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. These decisions largely treat the doctrine as irrelevant to the determination of the law governing the arbitration agreement. They do so because of the way in which English law views separability as tied inimically to the concept of enforcement of the arbitration agreement. This is unsurprising given the content of section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and the position of the doctrine of separability as a legal fiction that must be restricted to its defined purpose. Viewed against the potential reform of the Arbitration Act 1996, the author asks whether a broader view of separability can be adopted. The author's view is that there are cogent and compelling reasons for adopting a broader view, that would promote certainty and consistency in a way that is not best served by the current approach.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, numerous Western States have supplied Ukraine with arms, munitions and war material, in ostensible breach of their obligations as neutral, non-participating States. States have failed to provide any legal explanation for such transfers, leaving the task to scholars and commentators to provide legal argumentation as to the compatibility of arms transfers to victims of aggression with neutral duties. This article analyses and seeks to evaluate these arguments in favour of ‘qualified neutrality’ and assess which of the proposed grounds, if any, are the most compelling.

The discussion on Taiwan's status under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has picked up steam. After providing some historical background, it is argued that neither doctrinal nor policy arguments can support the application of the Convention to Taiwanese parties. Drawing on case law in the context of other uniform law treaties, the article concludes that the approbation of the CISG by the People's Republic of China should not bind Taiwan and that, as a consequence, Taiwanese parties should be treated as parties from non-Contracting States.