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RESILIENCE TECHNIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN TIMES OF RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2021

Salvatore Caserta  and
Pola Cebulak
Salvatore Caserta
Affiliation:
Salvatore Caserta, Assistant Professor of Sociology of Law and International Law, iCourts – the Centre of Excellence for International Courts, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, [email protected]; Pola Cebulak, Assistant Professor in European Law, University of Amsterdam, [email protected].
Pola Cebulak
Affiliation:
Salvatore Caserta, Assistant Professor of Sociology of Law and International Law, iCourts – the Centre of Excellence for International Courts, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, [email protected]; Pola Cebulak, Assistant Professor in European Law, University of Amsterdam, [email protected].
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Abstract

International courts are increasingly called upon to adjudicate socially divisive disputes. They are therefore exposed to a heightened risk of backlash that questions their authority and impedes the implementation of their judgments. This article puts forward an analytical framework for mapping the resilience techniques used by international courts to counter this growing resistance. Case studies involve the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has been cautious in its stance regarding democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, and the Caribbean Court of Justice, which has engaged in legal diplomacy while adjudicating both on the land rights of indigenous groups and on Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer and Intersex (LGBTQI) rights. It is argued that, in order to effectively avoid and mitigate backlash, international courts should deploy resilience techniques that go beyond merely exercising their judicial function. The successful deployment of resilience techniques can allow international courts to become significant actors in global governance during a time of crisis for the international liberal order.

Keywords

human rightspublic international lawinternational courtshuman rights courtsbacklash against liberal democracyresilience techniques
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 70 , Issue 3 , July 2021 , pp. 737 - 768
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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Footnotes

This research is funded by the Danish National Research Foundation Grant no DNRF105 and conducted under the auspices of the Danish National Research Foundation's Centre of Excellence for International Courts (iCourts). The authors wish to thank Jed Odermatt for his precious help in finalising the text.

References

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19 Thus far, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, and Dominica. See S Caserta and MR Madsen, ‘Between Community Law and Common Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration and Post-Colonial Legacies’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 89.

20 See, for instance, X Soley and S Steininger, ‘Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, Backlash, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2018) 14 IJLC 237.

21 These conclusions on the CCJ were reached chiefly thanks to our extensive empirical field work in the Caribbean region, constituted by 38 semi-structured qualitative interviews with CCJ judges and other actors in the Court's operational field. The data on the CJEU are mainly drawn from already existing secondary literature on the Court's response to the rule of law crisis in Poland and Hungary and from an analysis of the Court's judicial decisions in this particular subject matter.

22 As argued in KJ Alter, ‘Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice’ (1998) 52 IO 1.

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24 N Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ (2013) 86 TLR 61; N Grossman et al, Legitimacy and International Courts (Cambridge University Press 2018). On the legitimacy of international organisations, T Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990); I Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton University Press 2008).

25 Madsen et al (n 13); W Sandholtz et al, ‘Backlash and International Human Rights Courts – Crisis, Accountability, and Opportunity’ in A Brysk and M Stohl (eds), Contracting Human Rights: Crisis, Accountability, and Opportunity (Edward Elgar 2018); M Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation (Oxford University Press 2018); KJ Alter and M Zürn, ‘Theorising Backlash Politics: Conclusion to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison’ (2020) 22 BJPIR 739.

26 AV Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’ (2013) 25 LJIL 49.

27 Alter et al (n 1).

28 Zürn (n 25).

29 Alter et al (n 1).

30 Madsen et al (n 13).

31 ibid.

32 For a different, more State-centric stance, see Sandholtz et al (n 25).

33 See, for instance, A Hofmann, ‘Resistance against the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2018) 14 IJLC 258.

34 K Cox, ‘Vetoing WTO Appellate Body Judges’ Reappointments: Analyzing the United States’ Actions through Neo-Realist Lenses’ (2019) 42 HJIL 1.

35 D David, ‘Britain Must Defy the European Court of Human Rights on Prisoner Voting as Strasbourg Is Exceeding Its Authority' in F Spyridon et al (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and Its Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013).

36 Soley and Steininger (n 20).

37 Caserta (n 4).

38 For an overview, see MA Graber, S Levinson and M Tushnet (eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018).

39 Hirschl (n 14).

40 Constitutional capture is a systematic weakening of the checks and balances in the constitutional order of a State.

41 Rule of law backsliding is ‘the process through which elected public authorities deliberately implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal checks on power with a view to dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party’ (L Pech and KL Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 CYELS 3).

42 W Sadurski, ‘Constitutional Crisis in Poland’ in Graber, Levinson and Tushnet (n 38); M Bánkuti, G Halmai and KL Scheppele, ‘Disabling the Constitution’ (2012) 23(3) Journal of Democracy 138; G Halmai, ‘A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Hungary’ in Graber, Levinson and Tushnet (n 38).

43 Walker and Salt (n 15).

44 M Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (John Wiley & Sons 2011).

45 R Alcaro, ‘The Liberal Order and its Contestations. A Conceptual Framework’ (2018) 53 International Spectator 1.

46 J Ikenberry, ‘The End of Liberal International Order?’ (2018) 94 IntlAff 7.

47 J Odermatt, ‘Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International Courts’ (2018) 14 IJLC 221.

48 Y Lupu and E Voeten, ‘Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 42 BJPS 2.

49 Caserta (n 4). See futher in Section IV.B.1.

50 A de Mestral, ‘The Constitutional Functions of the Caribbean Court of Justice’ (2014) 1 MJDR 43. See further in Sections IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.

51 S Caserta, ‘Regional International Courts in Search of Relevance: Adjudicating Politically Sensitive Disputes in Central America and the Caribbean’ (2017) 28 DJCIL 59.

52 KJ Alter, The European Court's Political Power (Oxford University Press 2009) 115.

53 MR Madsen, ‘Legal Diplomacy: Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar European Human Rights’ in SL Hoffmann (ed), Human Rights in the Twentieth Century: A Critical History (Cambridge University Press 2011).

54 Caserta and Madsen (n 19).

55 Case C–64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas EU:C:2018:117.

56 See further in Section IV.A.2.

57 P Lambert, ‘The Lightning Impeachment of Paraguay's President Lugo’ (E-International Relations, 9 August 2012) <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/09/the-lightning-impeachment-of-paraguays-president-lugo/>.

58 Alter, Helfer and McAllister (n 11).

59 Odermatt (n 47).

60 D Kochenov and L Pech, ‘Better Late than Never? On the European Commission's Rule of Law Framework and Its First Activation’ (2016) 54 JCMS 1062.

61 Case C–286/12 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2012:687.

62 Case C–288/12 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2014:237.

63 Alter and Helfer (n 9).

64 See further in Section IV.B.2.

65 Alter et al (n 5).

66 L Schneider, ‘Responses by the CJEU to the European Crisis of Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2020) Re:constitution Working Paper, Forum Transregionale Studien 2/2020 <https://reconstitution.eu/workingpapers.html>.

67 D Kochenov, ‘Elephants in the Room: The European Commission's 2019 Communication on the Rule of Law’ (2019) 11 HJRL 423.

68 Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ COM(2014) 158 final/2.

69 European Parliament Resolution of 12 September 2018 on a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union is Founded (2017/2131(INL)) [2019] OJ C433/66; European Parliament Resolution of 17 September 2020 on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law (COM(2017)0835–2017/0360R(NLE).

70 KL Scheppele, D Kochenov and B Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, After All: Enforcing EU Values Through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union’ (2020) 38 YEL (forthcoming).

71 Case C–286/12 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2012:687.

72 ibid para 79.

73 Case C–288/12 (n 62).

74 ibid.

75 Opinion on Act XXV of 4 April 2017 on the Amendment of Act CCIV of 2011 on National Tertiary Education, CDL-AD(2017)022 (9 October 2017) endorsed by the Venice Commission at its 111th Plenary Session (Venice, 6–7 October 2017).

76 Case C–78/18 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2020:476.

77 Case C–66/18 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2020:792.

78 JP Brekke and G Brochmann, ‘Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum Seekers in Europe, National Differences, and the Dublin Regulation’ (2015) 28 Journal of Refugee Studies 145.

79 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece [2015] OJ L248/80.

80 Case C–643/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union EU:C:2017:631. The Visegrad Group is a political alliance between four countries of Central Europe—Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—aimed at furthering their integration to the EU, which in recent times has grown increasingly critical of EU policies.

81 M Braun, ‘Postfunctionalism, Identity and the Visegrad Group’ (2020) 58(4) JCMS 925.

82 ibid para 302.

83 Case C–643/15 (n 80) paras 96 and 123.

84 See Table 1 and above in Section III.A.

85 L Bayer, ‘Hungary Says Refugee Ruling ‘‘Raped’’ EU Law’ (Politico, 6 September 2017) <https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-says-ecj-ruling-on-refugee-quotas-has-raped-eu-law-asylum-seekers-italy-greece-relocation-scheme/>.

86 Joined Cases C–715/17 Commission v Poland, C–718/17 Commission v Hungary, C–719/17 Commission v Czech Republic EU:C:2020:257.

87 See Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, ‘Komunikat Centrum Informacyjnego Rządu w Związku z Wyrokiem TSUE w Sprawie Relokacji Uchodźców’ (2 April 2020).

88 Case C–924/19 FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság EU:C:2020:367.

89 Case C–808/18 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2020:1029.

90 Case C–924/19 (n 88) paras 71 and 264.

91 Z Kovacs, ‘Hungary's Position on Migration Remains Unchanged: Hungarian Regulations Are in Line with EU Law’ (About Hungary, 14 May 2020) <https://abouthungary.hu/blog/hungarys-position-on-migration-remains-unchanged-hungarian-regulations-are-in-line-with-eu-law>.

92 See statement by the Polish Ministry of Justice on the fact that the CJEU does not have the right to undermine the primacy of the Polish constitution, ‘TSUE Nie Ma Prawa Podważać Nadrzędności Polskiej Konstytucji’ (2 March 2021) <https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/tsue-nie-ma-prawa-podwazac-nadrzednosci-polskiej-konstytucji>.

93 Case C–64/16 (n 55).

94 The preliminary case was Case C–192/18 Commission v Poland EU:C:2019:924.

95 Case C–619/18 Commission v Poland EU:C:2019:531, para 47.

96 J Rankin, ‘Poland Broke EU Law by Trying to Lower Age of Retirement for Judges’ The Guardian (Brussels, 5 November 2019).

97 ibid.

98 Commission, ‘European Commission Statement on the Judgment of the European Court of Justice on Poland's Supreme Court Law’ (24 June 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_3376>.

99 The Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer [2018] IEHC 119 (delivered by the High Court of Ireland on 12 March 2018).

100 ibid para 145.

101 ibid para 142.

102 Case C–216/18 PPU EU:C:2018:586, para 78.

103 See Lenaerts, K, ‘La Vie Après l'Avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust’ (2017) 54(3) CMLR 805Google Scholar.

104 ‘Irlandzka Sędzia-Lesbijka Wstrzymuje Ekstradycję Polskiego Przestępcy, Bo Obawia Się o Praworządność w Naszym Kraju’ (Dziennik Narodowy, 13 March 2018) <http://dzienniknarodowy.pl/irlandzka-sedzia-lesbijka-wstrzymuje-ekstradycje-polskiego-przestepcy-obawia-sie-o-praworzadnosc-naszym-kraju>.

105 ‘Irish Judges Condemn ‘‘Personalised Attacks’’ by Polish Media’ (Irish Legal News, 15 March 2018) <http://www.irishlegal.com/11683/irish-judges-condemn-personalised-attacks-polish-media/>.

106 Poland is the second EU Member State in terms of the amount of EAWs issued in 2017. It issued 2,432 out of a total of 17,491 EAWs (14 per cent) (Commission, ‘Replies to Questionnaire on Quantitative Information on the Practical Operation of the European Arrest Warrant – Year 2017’ SWD(2019) 318 final, 9).

107 Case C–354/20 PPU L and P EU:C:2020:1033.

108 See Table 2 and above in Section III.B.

109 J Varga, ‘Facts You Always Wanted to Know about Rule of Law but Never Dared to Ask’ (Euronews, 22 November 2019) <https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/19/judit-varga-facts-you-always-wanted-to-know-about-rule-of-law-hungary-view>.

110 V Orbán, ‘Address by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the Debate on the So-Called “Sargentini Report”’ (European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 11 September 2018).

111 ‘Ziobro: TSUE Nie Ma Kompetencji Ingerowania w Wewnętrze Sprawy Sądownictwa w Krajach UE’ Gazeta Prawna (27 September 2018).

112 ibid.

113 ‘Morawiecki o Możliwym Wyroku TSUE, Unia ma Obowiązek Szanować Różnorodne Tradycje Prawne Państw’ Gazeta Prawna (14 November 2019).

114 Case C–192/18 (n 94).

115 Joined Cases C–585/18, C–624/18 and C–625/18, AK, CP, DO v Supreme Court EU:C:2019:982.

116 ibid.

117 Zelazna, E, ‘The Rule of Law Crisis Deepens in Poland after A.K. v. Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa and CP, DO v. Sad Najwyzszy’ (2019) 4 European Papers 907Google Scholar.

118 Case C–791/19 Commission v Poland EU:C:2020:277.

119 See Cases C–55/20 Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości; C–895/19 A; C–487/19 W Ż; C–824/18 AB and Others.

120 K Lenaerts, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law through Judicial Dialogue’ (2019) 38 YEL 17.

121 The CCJ was created in 2005 by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas with a double jurisdiction: appellate, on appeals of national judicial decisions concerning civil and criminal law matters, and, original, on international and CARICOM law.

122 The Maya Leaders Alliance v The Attorney General of Belize [2015] CCJ 15 (AJ).

123 Belize Supreme Court, Toledo Maya Cultural Council, Toledo Alcaldes Association et al v Attorney General, Unreported, Action No 510 (29 November 1996).

124 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize (12 October 2004), Report No 40/04, Case 12.053.

125 The Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172 (28 November 2007); Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 79 (31 August 2001); Case of the Moiwana Community v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 124 (15 June 2005); the Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v Paraguay (Interpretation of the judgment of merits, reparations and costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 142 (6 February 2006).

126 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (art 2); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art 27); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (art 1); the 2007 Convention on the Rights of the Child (art 30); and, finally, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.

127 According to which, State policies must protect the culture and identity of the State's indigenous peoples but must also promote respect for international law and treaty obligations. See (e) of the Preamble of the Constitution of Belize.

128 The Maya Leaders Alliance (n 122) 49–54.

129 A list of the Court's outreach events is available on the Court's website: <https://www.ccj.org/category/events/page/2/>.

130 See Caserta (n 4).

131 Maya Leaders Alliance, ‘Update Report to the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR for the 124th Session Review of Belize’ (7 September 2018) <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/BLZ/INT_CCPR_CSS_BLZ_32402_E.pdf>.

132 ‘CCJ Holds Compliance Report Hearing Regarding Mayan Land Rights’ Amandala (1 August 2018) <https://amandala.com.bz/news/ccj-holds-compliance-report-hearing-mayan-land-rights/>.

133 ibid.

134 Tomlinson v Belize, Trinidad and Tobago [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ).

135 See, for instance, the decision of the Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations Human Rights in the Nicholas Toonen case, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992.

136 Belize Supreme Court, Orozco v The Attorney General of Belize, Claim No 668 of 2010 (2016).

137 McEvans and Others v The Attorney General of Guyana [2018] CCJ 30 (AJ).