Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T02:38:56.222Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

How Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Jan Wouters  and
Frederik Naert
Jan Wouters
Affiliation:
Professor of International Law and the Law of International Organisations, Catholic University of Leuven.
Frederik Naert
Affiliation:
Assistant in International Law, Catholic University of Leuven.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Security (in a broad sense, see infra, II.B) in Europe is the realm of several regional international organisations, mainly the European Union (“EU”), Western European Union (“WEU”), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe, creating a patchwork of regional security institutions that is unique in the world. These organisations interact in many ways and claim to be mutually reinforcing. Is that the case? Is there room for improvement?

Type
Research Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , July 2001 , pp. 540 - 576
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. This article is up to date as at 4 Sept. 2000. For a chronology (from 1989 to May 1994), see Bethlehem, and Weller, (eds.), The “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law: General Issues (Cambridge University Press, 1997), xix–lviGoogle Scholar, hereafter “The Yugoslav Crisis” and UN, The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (UN, 1996), 487–509, hereafter “The Blue Helmets.” For Kosovo, see BASIC, “Kosovo: The long road to war. A Chronology. 1988–1999”, http://www.basicint.org/eur_kos_chron.htm.

2. The Yugoslav Crisis, xxxiv.

3. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes (hereafter “Dayton Agreement”), Paris, 14 Dec. 1995, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 75 or http//www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm. For a commentary, see Sorel, “L”accord de paix sur la Bosnie-Herzégovine du 14 décembre 1995: Un traité sous bénéfice d“inventaire” (1995) A.F.D.I. 65–99.

4. Even though there was a cease-fire from 12 Oct. 1995 (The Blue Helmets, 560) and the formal signing of the Dayton Agreement took place on 14 Dec. 1995.

5. Leurdijk, “Kosovo: A case of “coercive diplomacy” (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor 8. The first Contact group (infra, n.75) meeting on Kosovo took place on 9 March 1998. The UN Security Council first discussed Kosovo on 31 March 1998.

6. Cologne, 10 June 1999 (hereafter “Stability Pact”), text in (2000) 39 I.L.M. 962. A political agreement was reached on 3 June and a military agreement (Yugoslavia-NATO) on 9 June, texts at UN Docs. S/1999/649 and S/1999/682.

7. See article V North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4 April 1949) and article V Brussels Treaty (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948, as amended in Paris on 23 Oct. 1954). The latter contains a stronger legal obligation than the former.

8. Articles 24–25 and Chapter VII UN Charter.

9. A definition from the UN Department of Political Affairs (“UNDPA”), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm. See also Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995, hereafter “Supplement AfP”)), paras 77–80.

10. An Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, hereafter “An Agenda for Peace”), para. 21.

11. See Supplement AfP, paras 47–49 and 55–56.

12. See the definition of preventive diplomacy in An Agenda for Peace, para. 20. Since prevention consists of more than diplomacy, “preventive action” is more appropriate, as has been recognised by the UN, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm.

13. An Agenda for Peace, paras 21 and 57. Kooijmans, , “De Verenigde Naties: van impasse naar preventie en dynamiek”, (1995) 49 Internationale Spectator 366 Google Scholar, states that one should “advance peace-building in time, so as to make it an element of preventive action,…” (our translation).

14. An Agenda for Peace, paras 20 and 34.

15. Declaration of the WEU Ministerial Council, Petersberg, 19 June 1992, para. 4 and TEU, Article 17, para. 2. The French and German (authentic) texts of the TEU use the words “rétablissement de la paix” and “friedensschaffender Massnahmen”.

16. Based on the definition in An Agenda for Peace, para. 20.

17. An Agenda for Peace, para. 20 states “hitherto with the consent of all parties” (emphasis added), possibly anticipating change. The consent and the rule only allowing the use of force in self-defence had been essential for peacekeeping operations, see e.g. Brown, “The role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and truce-monitoring: what are the applicable norms”, (1994) Revue beige de droit international 559–602. Bad experiences with “peacekeeping plus” operations seemed to have promted a return to the traditional consent and use of force requirements (see e.g. Supplement AfP, paras 33–36). However, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (17 Aug. 2000, A/55/305-S/2000/809, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations) blames a lack of means and/or an unclear mandate for these failures: it recommends maintaining the traditional requirements for the initiation of a mission, but after a mission has been deployed it recommends that missions be given sufficient means, a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement to deal with “spoilers”, to defend the missions and its mandate and at times also to defend the local civilian population, see paras 48–64 of the report.

18. See Principle VII and the “basket” titled “Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields”. See also the European Security Charter (Istanbul, 19 Nov. 1999, (2000) 39 I.L.M. 255, hereafter “European Security Charter”), para. 9.

19. CSCE, “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, Budapest, 6 Dec. 1994. We will hereafter always use “OSCE”, even when reference is made to the CSCE.

20. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Paris, 19 Nov. 1990 (thoroughly amended at Istanbul on 19 Nov. 1999, but the amendment has not yet entered into force).

21. OSCE, , OSCE Handbook (1999), 28–29.Google Scholar

22. By the North-Atlantic Treaty, supra, n.7.

23. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, 23–24 April 1999 (para. 10).

24. See the Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Sintra, 30 May 1997); the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (Brussels, 10–11 Jan. 1994) juncto Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century. The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership (25 April 1999—it includes the Political-Military Framework Document for NATO-led PfP Operations) and Woodliffe, , “The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe” (1998) 93 I.C.L.Q. 176–180.Google Scholar

25. NATO's main decisions on ESDI were taken at the North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels (17–18 Dec. 1990 and 10–11 Jan. 1994) and Berlin (3 June 1996). On NATO-EU co-operation, see infra, n.35.

26. See article V Brussels Treaty, supra, n.7.

27. See the Declaration [of the members of the WEU and of the EU] on The Role of the [WEU] and its Relations with the [EU] and with [NATO] (Maastricht, 10 Dec. 1991); Declaration of the WEU on the Role of [WEU] and its Relations with the [EU] and with [NATO] (Brussels, 22 July 1997) and Protocol (No 1) on Article 17 [TEU] (Amsterdam, 2 Oct. 1997).

28. See Title V TEU, especially art. 11 juncto art. 17, para. 1 (ex articles J.1 and J.7).

29. Earlier, Article 30(6) Single European Act had granted the European Political Co-operation the competence for political and economic aspects of security.

30. The Secretary-General of the Council is now also “High Representative for the CFSP”, the Council can conclude international agreements, “constructive abstention” is possible, common strategies and qualified majority voting have been introduced (though in the end a Member State retains a veto right), and a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was created.

31. Respectively held on 3–4 June 1999; 10–11 Dec. 1999 and 19–20 June 2000.

32. European Council Conclusions and presidency report on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence.

33. Council Dec. 2000/354/CFSP setting up Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (2000) O.J. L127/1.

34. European Council Conclusions and annexed Presidency reports on “strengthening the common European policy on security and defence” and “non-military crisis management of the European Union”. Meanwhile, interim military and political bodies have been set up (Council Decisions 2000/143/CFSP setting up the Interim Political and Security Committee (2000) O.J. L49/1; 2000/144/CFSP setting up the Interim Military Body (2000) O.J. L49/2 and 2000/145/CFSP on the secondment of national experts in the military field to the General Secretariat of the Council during an interim period (2000) O.J. L49/3).

35. European Council Conclusions and Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

36. See NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept (supra, n.23), para. 25 and WEU, European Security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries, Madrid, 14 Nov. 1995. For the OSCE, see supra, n.18.

37. Joint declaration of the six Yugoslav republics and the EC, 7 July 1991, text at http://www.dalmatia.net/croatia/politics/brioni_declaration.htm.

38. For more information, see http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/index.htm.

39. The model Memorandum of Understanding in its Art. 1 describes the ECMM's tasks as “monitor[ing]… developments … for the purpose of reporting to the Council”, whereas Art. 6 stipulates: “Monitors will not carry arms”, see http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/html/memoranda_of_understanding.htm.

40. See e.g. the suspension of trade concessions by the EC by Art. 1 of Council Dec. 91/586/ECCS, EEC (1991) O.J. L315/47.

41. Holbrooke writes that the EC wanted to but was unable whereas the opposite was true for the U.S. ( To End a War (The Modern Library, 1998)Google Scholar , 27–31). On the U.S. position, see Zimmermann, , Origins of a Catastrophe (Random House, 1996), 214–217.Google Scholar

42. After the Brioni declaration (supra, n.37), the EC-sponsored Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia started on 7 Sept. 1991: see The Yugoslav Crisis, xxix.

43. See Sica, , “The role of the OSCE in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Peace Agreement”, in Bothe, , Ronzitti, and Rosas, (eds.), The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 479 Google Scholar. On the EC/EU-OSCE relationship, see Ghebali, , “Préface”, in Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Uniesdans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie (Bruylant, 1995), vi.Google Scholar

44. On additional sanctions, see UNSC Resolutions 724, 757, 787 and 820, the latter two authorising enforcement under the Security Council's authority. UNSC Res. 942 ordered an embargo against the Bosnian Serbs. The sanctions were suspended and terminated by UNSC Resolutions 943, 1021, 1022 and 1074 (1 Oct. 1996). For a legal analysis, see Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie, 3–73.

45. The agreement is reprinted in The Yugoslav Crisis, 472–473.

46. UNSC Resolutions 721 and 724, both para. 2.

47. See UNSC Res 727, paras 2–3. The agreement is reprinted in The Yugoslav Crisis, 486.

48. UNSC Res. 740, paras 1–5.

49. UNSC Res. 743 (21 Feb. 1992), para. 2. UNSC Res. 749 authorised full deployment. The mandate changed (see UNSC Resolutions 769; 770, para. 2 juncto 776, para. 2; 815, paras 3–4 and 836, para. 5), was extended and then terminated by the Dayton Agreement, Annex 1-A, Art. VII and UNSC Res. 1031 (15 Dec. 1995), para. 19. See also The Blue Helmets, 488–491, 513–538 and 556–563.

50. UNPROFOR's mandate is contained in UN Doc. S/23280, 11 Dec. 1991, Annex 3 (The Yugoslav Crisis, 478–80).

51. UN Doc. S/23836,24 April 1992, para. 20 (reprinted in The Yugoslav Crisis, 502–504).

52. UNPROFOR became a Chapter VII operation (UNSC Res. 807, preamble), which is not necessary for a peacekeeping operation (see supra, II.A). In comparison to previous peacekeeping operations the use of force was more liberally authorised: see e.g. UNSC Res. 836, paras 9–10 (on the use of air power). On the nature of UNPROFOR, see the Secretary-General's report of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444), paras 56–79 and Weller, , “Peace-keeping and peace-enforcement in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1996) 56 Z.a.ö.R.V. 70–177.Google Scholar

53. S/1995/444, para. 66.

54. See e.g. The Blue Helmets, 556–560.

55. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), 15 Nov. 1999.

56. Zimmermann, , Origins of a Catastrophe, 219–220.Google Scholar

57. UNSC Resolutions 795 and 983.

58. Due to a Chinese veto, see http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpredep.htm.

59. On 18 March 1994 Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed upon a constitution for their Federation, The Yugoslav Crisis, liv. For the constitution, para. II.B of which deals with the Ombudsmen, see (1994) 33 I.L.M. 740–784 Google Scholar. The OSCE mission was set up by a Permanent Committee decision of 2 June 1994 and started in Oct. 1994.

60. See Ghebali, in Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie, vii, n.3.

61. See http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey01.htm. Having been established by a decision of the Committee of Senior Officials (hereafter “CSO”) of 14 Aug. 1992, this mission deployed on 8 Sept. 1992

62. Established by a CSO decision of 18 Sept. 1992, see http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey02. htm.

63. The OSCE mission has an authorised strength of eight persons.

64. Rosas, and Lahelma, , “OSCE Long-Term Missions”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 184.Google Scholar

65. For the HCNM's mandate, see CSCE, “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, para. 23 juncto the section on the HCNM and Estebanez, , “The High Commissioner on National Minorities: Development of the Mandate”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 123–166.Google Scholar

66. OSCE Annual reports 1993–1998, all at para. 3.

67. OSCE Annual reports 1993–1996, respectively at paras 2.7, 2.1.5, 2.3 and 2.3.4 and Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie, 75–112.

68. Both NATO and WEU began supervising compliance in July 1992 and began enforcing the embargo in Nov. 1992. From June 1993 until June 1996 this continued through a joint operation (Sharp Guard), see http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v080.htm and http://www.weu.int/eng/info/yugo.htm#adriatic.

69. Established by UNSC Resolutions 781 and 816. NATO started enforcement (which was authorised by UNSC Res. 816, paras 4–5) in April 1993, see http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v080.htm.

70. See supra, n.52.

71. On the mechanism, see UN Docs. S/1994/50 (18 Jan. 1994) and S/1994/159 (11 Feb. 1994), The Yugoslav Crisis, 669–670 and 673–674; on its utilisation, Holbrooke, To End a War, 72 and The Yugoslav Crisis, lvi.

72. Holbrooke, To End a War, 70, 72 and 103.

73. See http://www.weu.int/eng/info/yugo.htm#danube.

74. See http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/html/background.htm.

75. In July 1992, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (“ICFY”), led by an EC and a UN envoy, “replaced” the EC sponsored Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia (supra, n.42). In May 1994 a Contact Group was established; it was to co-operate with the ICFY and consisted of the U.S., Russia, Germany, France and the U.K. (later also Italy). See Szasz, , “Introductory Note”, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 75–77.Google Scholar

76. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, vii and Holbrooke, To End a War, 86 and 151–168.

77. A process not yet concluded, see WEU, Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations: Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations, 23 Nov. 1999. NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (Washington, 25 April 1999) is also aimed at strengthening European capabilities.

78. Rotfield, (1995) 3 ODIHR Bulletin No 3.

79. NATO press release (95) 73, 30 Aug. 1995.

80. Szasz, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 76 Google Scholar and Holbrooke, To End a War, 265. On the Contact Group, see supra, n.75.

81. Art. VIII juncto Annex 10 Dayton Agreement. The function of High Representative and his Office (the “OHR”), were established by Annex 10 Dayton Agreement and UNSC Res. 1031, paras 26–28.

82. According to the UN Secretary-General's Report of 11 June 1999 (S/1999/670), para. 63: “… difficulties … have forced the High Representative to use his authority creatively” (emphasis added).

83. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference, 10 Dec. 1997, Bonn, para. XI.2.

84. See Bird, , “Bosnian Serb president is sacked by the West”, The Guardian, 6 03 1999 Google Scholar and S/1999/1260, para. 18.

85. Conclusions of the London Conference, 8–9 Dec. 1995. See http://www.ohr.int for most OHR/PIC documents.

86. Respectively Art. II juncto Annex 1-B, Art. IV juncto Annex 3 and Art. VI and VII juncto Annex 6 Dayton Agreement.

87. Dayton Agreement, Annex 6, Art. VII.2 and Annex 4, Art. VI.1.A (appointment of the members of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and Human Rights Chamber); Conclusions of the London Conference, supra, n.85, para. 32 and the PIC, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work, 4–5 Dec. 1996, London, title “Human Rights”, paras 4 and 7.

88. Conclusions of the London Conference, supra, n.85, para. 33.

89. Annex 6, Art. XIII.

90. See http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v090.htm.

91. Established by a Ministerial Council decision of 8 Dec. 1995 and operational since 29 Dec. 1995, see http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey08.htm.

92. Art. VII juncto Art. I, Chapter I, Annex 7 Dayton Agreement.

93. S/1999/284, para. 50 and S/1999/670, para. 56.

94. In 1996 ECHO spent 187 million Euros in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia; in 1997 133 million (ECHO's Annual Report 1997) and in 1998 123 million, of which 88 was for Bosnia (ECHO Rapport annuel 1998 (1999), 28).

95. Annex 7, Art. III and VIII.

96. UNSC Res. 1035 (21 Dec. 1995), paras 2–3. The mandate was extended (most recently by UNSC Res. 1305) and currently runs until 21 June 2001, see http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh_p.htm.

97. Dayton Agreement, Annex 11, Art. I, II, III and V.

98. UNSC Res. 1088, para. 27; Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work (supra, n.87), “Police Assistance”, paras 3 and 4. The Dayton Agreement only requires the passing on of information about human rights violations (Annex 11, Art. VI).

99. UNSC Res. 1168 (21 May 1998), para. 1.

100. UNSC Res. 1035, para. 2 juncto S/1995/1031, paras 13–35.

101. IFOR was authorised by UNSC Res. 1031 (15 Dec. 1995) and transformed into SFOR by UNSC Res. 1088 (12 Dec. 1996). SFOR's mandate was extended, most recently by UNSC Res. 1305 until 20 June 2001. See also Woodliffe, , (1998) 93 I.C.L.Q. 184–187.Google Scholar

102. Dayton Agreement, Art. II juncto Annex 1-A.

103. Annex 1-A to the Dayton Agreement stipulates in Art. I, para. 1, (b)–(c): this force “will operate under the authority … of the North Atlantic Council… through the NATO chain of command”, the modalities of participation by other States being “the subject of agreement between such participating States and NATO”.

104. They are under the command of a Russian “Deputy” to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe and operate under tactical control of a U.S.-led division in theatre: see http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v083.htm and ~/v089.htm.

105. Dayton Agreement, Annex 1-A, respectively Art. I, para. 2, (b) and Art. VI, paras 3 and 5.

106. See the Dayton Agreement, Annex 10, Art. II, paras 2–7 and 9.

107. The EU Administration of Mostar was established by Council Dec. 94/308/CFSP (1994) O.J. L134/1 and 94/790/CFSP (1994) O.J. L326/2, repeatedly extended and terminated by Dec. 96/442/CFSP (1996) O.J. L185/1, 96/476/CFSP (1996) O.J. L195/1, 96/508/CFSP (1996) O.J. L212/1 and 96/744/CFSP (1996) O.J. L340/1. See Pagani, “L'administration de Mostar par l'Union européenne”, (1996) 42 A.F.D.I. 234–254 and Special Report No 2/96 concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) accompanied by the replies of the Commission and the Administrator of Mostar, (1996) O.J. C287/1. Mostar's status is determined in the Agreement Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, para. 1 juncto Annex on Mostar, Dayton, 10 Nov. 1995, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 170–183.Google Scholar

108. From July 1994 until Oct. 1996, see http://www.weu.int/eng/info/yugo.htm#police.

109. In late 1995 the Commission adopted a global strategy (see SEC(95) 1597 final; COM(95) 564 final; COM(95) 581 final and COM(95) 582 final), compatible with the Commission/World Bank reconstruction plan (infra, n.110). In Jan. 1996 the “Essential Aid Programme”, financed under the PHARE programme, was adopted. Additional funding was made available through the OBNOVA programme, established by Council Reg. (EC) No 1628/96 (1996) O.J. L204/1, later modified, e.g. by Council Regulations (EC) No 851/98 (1998) O.J. L122/1 and No 2454 (1999) O.J. L299/1. See Special Report No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (period 1996–1997) with the Commission's replies (1998) O.J. C241/1 (hereafter “Special Report”) for details on the implementation and an assessment.

110. See e.g. their joint “Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (1996–1999)”, approved in Dec. 1995 on a first donor conference.

111. Of the estimated cost of 3.388 billion Euro for the reconstruction plan (supra, n.110), the EU itself pays 1 billion Euro (Special Report, para. 1.1).

112. Sorel, , (1995) A.F.D.I. 86 Google Scholar and Goldston, “The role of the OSCE in Bosnia: Lessons from the first year”, (1997/3) Helsinki Monitor, 14–16.

113. The first arrest was made in the summer of 1997, Goldston, (1997/3) Helsinki Monitor, 7, n.7. Initially, IFOR hardly made an effort (Holbrooke, To End a War, 339). For a legal analysis of IFOR's / SFOR's authority to make such arrests, see Gaeta, , “Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia?”, (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 174–181 Google Scholar. On IPTF's mandate, see supra, nn.97–98.

114. Holbrooke, To End a War, 336–337.

115. Special Report, para. 2.6, and paras 2.6 and 5.7 of the Commission's replies; Sica, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 486 and Bloed, “OSCE Chronicle”, (1996/1) Helsinki Monitor 75.

116. See Art. 1 Council Dec. 96/406/CFSP (1996) O.J. L168/1; a Memorandum of Understanding (EU-OSCE) dated 21 Dec. 1995 and an Exchange of Letters on 7 April 1997.

117. See e.g. Council decisions 96/406/CFSP (supra, n.116) and 98/302/CFSP (1998) O.J. L138/3.

118. According to the NATO Handbook 1998, SFOR's mandate includes providing “selective support to civilian organisations” and “support to other agencies”, see http://www.nato.int/ducu/handbook/1998/v087.htm; ~/v085.htm and ~/v090.htm. See also ~/v259.htm and Killham, NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals, NATO research fellowship final report, 12 March 1997, 48.

119. But not until 15 Jan. 1997, see http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/html/legal framework.htm.

120. Killham, NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals, 48–49 and Goldston, (1997/3) Helsinki Monitor, 7, n.7.

121. Hedges, “Leaders in Bosnia are said to steal up to $1 billion”, The New York Times, 17 Aug. 1999. During a press conference on 17 Aug. 1999 a representative of the OHR stated that the overall picture given by this article was correct.

122. OSCE, “Seminar on co-operation among international organisations and institutions, Sofia, 17–19 May 1999, Consolidated Summary, 11 June 1999, SEC.GAL/64/99 (hereafter OSCE Seminar), 6.

123. At the end of 1998, 371,000 refugees and 860,000 internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) remained, Conclusions of the PIC, Madrid, 16 Dec. 1998, Annex, 1.2. During the first 10 months of 1999 about 44,000 refugees and 33,000 IDPs returned, S/1999/1260, para. 15. The PIC Declaration of 23/24 May 2000 (Brussels), states that, though significant progress had recently been made in rural areas, return to urban areas remained slow due to political obstruction.

124. Though “bigger fish” have now been arrested, including four (former) generals and the former president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. According to NATO, “the net is closing”: see NATO press release (2000)036, 3 April 2000.

125. PIC, Madrid, 10 Dec. 1998, Conclusions, paras 4, 12.2–3 and 15 and OSCE Seminar, 6.

126. Zandee, , “Column: Lessons learned from Kosovo”, (1999/4) Helsinki Monitor 5 and Caplan, “International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo”, (1998) 74 International Affairs 746–754.Google Scholar

127. See the OSCE Annual Report 1997, para. 3.7.

128. UNSC Resolutions 1160 (31 March 1998), 1199 (23 Sept. 1998), 1203 (24 Oct. 1998) and 1239 (14 May 1999).

129. Milosevic and Holbrooke concluded an agreement on 12 Oct. 1998, Yugoslavia and NATO on 15 Oct. 1998 (text in UN Doc. S/1998/991) and Yugoslavia and the OSCE on 16 Oct. 1998 (text in UN Doc. S/1998/978). Yugoslavia promised to respect the UNSC resolutions and accepted verification by NATO (in the air) and by the OSCE (on the ground).

130. See OSCE, Kosova, As Seen, As Told, Part I (Oct. 1998—June 1999), http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/partl/index.htm.

131. In 1998 the Russians even pleaded for a termination of Yugoslavia's suspension from the OSCE (Bloed, “OSCE Chronicle” (1999/1) Helsinki Monitor 49). Given the OSCE's consensual decision-making (supra, II.B), Russia has a veto right. It had made it clear it would not approve a tougher UN Security Council resolution, see Leurdijk, (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor 11.

132. See supra, n.61.

133. The OSCE has no enforcement powers and although it can mandate peacekeeping missions, it has not yet done so.

134. Established by Permanent Council Decision 263,25 Oct. 1998. See also the OSCE's Annual Report 1998, para. 2.2.4.

135. Leurdijk, (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor 14.

136. See http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/html/role.htm.

137. A WEU proposal (WEU Ministerial Council, Rhodes, 12 May 1998, para. 12) led to a formal EU request (Council Dec. 98/646/CFSP (1998) O.J. L308/1) and then to WEU action (WEU Ministerial Council, Rome, 17 Nov. 1998, para. 5).

138. See the discussion about NATO air strikes in Bosnia during UNPROFOR's deployment there (supra, III.A.2).

139. Leurdijk, (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor 14–15.

140. OSCE Annual Report 1999, 1.1.5.1. Permanent Council Decision 296, 8 June 1999 terminated the KVM and established an OSCE Task Force for Kosovo to prepare for a possible new OSCE mission to Kosovo.

141. In that sense Caplan, (1998) 74 International Affairs 753.

142. Leurdijk, (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor, 9–11. In NATO's new Strategic Concept (supra, n.23), this issue was not resolved.

143. This “OSCE Presence in Albania” was established by Permanent Council Decision 160 of 27 March 1997 and started its activities on 3 April 1997, see http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey13.htm.

144. Permanent Council Decision 218 of 11 March 1998.

145. See e.g. the joint EU/Council of Europe “Albania programmes” mentioned in EU press release 98/93, 1 April 1998.

146. MAPE's establishment was approved by the WEU Ministerial Council Declaration, Paris, 13 May 1997, para. 47. On MAPE, see http://www.weu.int/eng/mape/info.htm. At the EU's request (Council dec. 98/547/CFSP (1998) O.J.L263/1; 99/189/CFSP and 99/190/CFSP (1999) O.J.L63/1) WEU completed a study and adopted and started to implement a contingency plan (WEU Ministerial Council Declaration, Rome, 17 Nov. 1998, para. 4 and WEU Permanent Council decision, 2 Feb. 1999). EU Council dec. 2000/388/CFSP (2000) O.J. L145/1 provides additional funding.

147. In 1999 ECHO spent 378 million Euro on humanitarian aid for the Kosovo crisis (“Kosovo—One Year On—The European Contribution”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/see/kosovo/l_year_on.htm); in 1998 it was 21.6 million Euro (ECHO Rapport annuel 1998, 13 and 28).

148. “Historique des initiatives françaises”, http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/dossiers/kossovo/kossovo 14.html.

149. See Clark, “When force is necessary: NATO's military response to the Kosovo crisis”, (1999/2) NATO Review 17–18; Balanzino, “NATO's humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisis”, Ibid., 9–13.

150. See http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/html/background.htm, last para.

151. Leurdijk, (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor 17 and Caplan, (1998) 74 International Affairs 746 and 754 (with reservations on Russia).

152. Rambouillet, 6–23 Feb. 1999 and Paris, 15–19 March 1999.

153. For details, see Weller, “The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo”, (1999) 75 International Affairs 211–251 and “Les accords de Rambouillet”, http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/dossiers/Kossovo/rambouill.html.

154. Weller, (1999) 75 International Affairs 221–227, but see Ibid., 228–233 and 251.

155. Ibid., 228–233. But see de la Gorce, “Histoire secrète des négotiations de Rambouillet”, (1999) Le Monde Diplomatique, May, 4–5.

156. The Contact Group imposed sanctions on 9 March 1998, followed by the EU and the UN (the latter with an arms embargo, UNSC Res. 1160, 31 March 1998). The EU and the Contact Group adopted additional sanctions, see “Historique des initiatives françaises”, supra n.148. The initial EU sanctions were adopted by Council Dec. 98/240/CFSP (1998) O.J. L95/1, 98/326/CFSP (1998) O.J. L143/1, 98/374/CFSP (1998) O.J.L165/1 and 1999/273/CFSP (1999) O.J. L108/1.

157. Zandee, (1999/4) Helsinki Monitor 5.

158. On 6 May 1999 an agreement was reached within the G7/8 (text in Annex 1 to UNSC Res. 1244,10 June 1999).

159. Norman, , “EU heartened by Ahtisaari's success”, The Financial Times, 7 06 1999.Google Scholar

160. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 5 juncto Annex 2, para. 3.

161. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 7; para. 5 juncto Annex 2, para. 3 and para. 7 juncto Annex 2, para. 4.

162. Determined by an agreement concluded on 18 June 1999 in Helsinki: see http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618a.htm. The Russian troops are under command of their representatives at NATO and, in theatre, under tactical control of the sector commanders. It is roughly the same construction as in IFOR/SFOR (supra, n.104). For details on KFOR's structure and the Russian participation, see http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618c.htm.

163. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 9. NATO and the UCK concluded a separate agreement on the UCK's disarmament (text at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm). The disarmament and demilitarisation have been completed: see the UN Secretary-General's report of 23 Dec. 1999 (S/1999/1250).

164. UNMIK Regulation 8 (1999), http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regs.html (where all UNMIK regulations are listed). See also http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/kpc.html.

165. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 12 July 1999, paras 43–44 (hereafter S/1999/779). The most recent report at the time of writing is S/2000/538,6 June 2000. For an overview of UNMIK's first year, see http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12.html. See also Garcia, “La Mission d”Administration Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo (MINUK)”, (2000) R.G.D.I.P., 61–71.

166. S/1999/779, paras 54–78.

167. Ibid., paras 60–65. On 1 March 2000, 2361 regular UN police personnel were deployed in Kosovo, well short of the requested 3618 (S/2000/177, para. 37). Several classes of KPS cadets have graduated so far, among them a significant number of women and cadets from minorities, see http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/police_school/police_english.pdf.

168. UNMIK Regulation 1 (2000). See also http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/jias.html. In April 2000 the Serbs decided to participate as observers. They then withdrew due to the security situation, but rejoined in July 2000 after UNMIK agreed to additional security measures (UN press releases of 2 April, 25 and 29 July 2000).

169. S/1999/779, paras 79–90.

170. Permanent Council Decision 305, 1 July 1999, which also terminates the Task Force for Kosovo (supra, n.140).

171. UNHCHR was already mentioned in S/1999/779, paras 87–88.

172. Tasks also included in Recommendation 1414(1999) of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, 23 June 1999, para. 16.b.i. Further, the Council of Europe reviews legislation and works on an ombudsman (S/1999/1250, paras 80–83).

173. S/1999/779, paras 91–100.

174. An EU press release of 20 July 1999 shows that ECHO makes substantial financial contributions to UNHCR.

175. The text of which is at http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosret2.htm.

176. World bank press release, 28 July 1999.

177. See http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/kosapp/main.htm.

178. S/1999/779, para. 101–109. See Joint Action of 29 July 1999 concerning the installation of the structures of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (Unmik): Council Dec. 1999/522/CFSP (1999) O.J. L201/1 and Council regulation (EC) No 1080/2000 (2000) O.J. L122/27.

179. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/see/intro/index.htm.

180. Established by Council Reg. (EC) No 2454/1999 (1999) O.J. L299/1. New changes to this regulation have been proposed by COM(2000) 281 final (10 May 2000).

181. World Bank & European Commission, “Toward Stability and Prosperity: A Program For Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo”, 3 Nov. 1999 (costing 2.3 billion USD over 4–5 years). One billion USD has been pledged on a second donor conference (Commission/World Bank joint press release, 17 Nov. 1999). On the reconstruction in Kosovo see also http://www.seerecon.org.

182. On the first and second donor conference for Kosovo about half the pledges were made by the EU and its Member States, see http://www.seerecon.org/Calendar/Cal-28–7–99-Pledges.htm and the UN press release of 18 Nov. 1999.

183. UNMIK Regulations Nos 16, 17, 20 and 27 of 1999.

184. S/1999/779, paras 47–48.

185. Ibid., especially paras 24–30.

186. UN press releases of 29 July 1999 and 11 Aug. 1999 and S/1999/1250, paras 63–64. The daily KFOR press releases indicate that KFOR is still doing much of the patrolling and UNMIK is concentrating on investigating.

187. “Unearthing the facts”, TIME (International), 28 June 1999,30 and Cohen, “K-FOR troops arrest war crimes suspects”, The Guardian, 21 Aug. 1999. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 14 demands that the security presence co-operate with the Tribunal.

188. OSCE, Kosova, As Seen, As Told, Part II, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part2/index.htm (14 June 1999–31 Oct. 1999). See http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/ethnic_minorities/index.htm for more recent reports.

189. Fortunately, the Task Force (supra, n.179) bridged the gap. The Council and Parliament still disagree on funding for Kosovo: see Taylor, “MEPs set for new battle with governments over Kosovo aid”, The European Voice, 10 Jan. 2000.

190. UN press release, 29 June 2000.

191. See supra, n.167.

192. See e.g. Königs in the UN press release of 8 Nov. 1999, mentioning weekly meetings between all organisations.

193. Supra, n.6. On 27 May 1999 a Conference on South-Eastern Europe took place in Bonn to prepare the ground.

194. Set out in the EU Council Conclusions of 26–27 Feb. 1996 and Annex III thereto. At the heart was the “Process of stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-Eastern Europe” (the “Royaumont Process”), which has been terminated because its objectives are now part of the Stability Pact (Council Dec. 2000/387/CFSP (2000) O.J. L 144/35).

195. Stability Pact, paras 1–11. For a brief commentary, see Hombach, “The Stability Pact: Breaking new ground in the Balkans”, (1999/4) NATO Review 20–23.

196. Stability Pact, paras 12–14 and EU Council Dec. 1999/523/CFSP (1999) O.J. L201/2.

197. Brussels, 19 Sept. 1999, hereafter “Work Plan”. See http://www.stabilitypact.org for the text and for more details.

198. OSCE Permanent Council Decision 306, 1 July 1999 (conform para. 22 Stability Pact).

199. Stability Pact, para. 23 juncto Annex, para. C.i and OSCE press release 62/99. For more details on this Working Table, see the Work Plan (supra, n.197).

200. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, “Stability Programme for Southeast Europe. A Council of Europe contribution” (CM(99)79), 6–7 May 1999, para. III.l.b-III.4 (complementing the Stability Pact) and Recommendation 1414 (1999) of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, paras 11 and 16.b.iv (supra, n.172). The Council of Europe and the OSCE consult on their co-operation, e.g. regarding the Stability Pact: OSCE press release, 4 Oct. 1999.

201. Stability Pact, para. 25 juncto Annex, para. C.ii and Council of Europe, CM(99)79 (supra, n.200), para. III.1.a.

202. The Stabilisation and Association Process will, in time, lead to EU membership for these countries if all conditions are met: see COM (99)235 and http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/index.htm. The conditions are based upon the conditions set out in the Annex to Annex III to the EU Council Conclusions of 29–30 April 1997, which were part of the EU's existing regional approach (supra, n.194).

203. Stability Pact, para. 41. For more details on this Working Table, see the Work Plan (supra, n.197).

204. Consisting of a Joint Declaration, dated 12 May 1999.

205. The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe. A Regional Strategy Paper, 13 March 2000.

206. Stability Pact, Annex, para. C, i-iii. For more details on this Working Table, see the Work Plan (supra, n.197).

207. See Recommendation 1414 (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (supra, n.172), para. 16.b.iv.

208. See the reference in OSCE press release no. 62/99 to the Working Table on security issues.

209. Stability Pact, para. 26. In April 1999 NATO launched its South East Europe Initiative to complement and support the Stability Pact. It promotes regional co-operation through PfP tools, an open ended working group in the EAPC, security co-operation programmes and a Consultative Forum on Security Issues on Southeast Europe (consisting of the 19 allies and seven countries from the region), NATO press release M-NAC-D(99) 156,2 Dec. 1999 and the speech of NATO's Secretary-General on 10 March 2000 in Antalya.

210. Brussels, 29–30 March 2000. 2.4 billion Euros were pledged, UN Press release, 30 March 2000.

211. Stability Pact, para. 11.

212. The statement of the President of the UN Security Council on behalf of the Security Council on the Role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflicts (30 Nov. 1999, hereafter “S/PRST/1999/34”) speaks of a “co-ordinated international response”, “effective long-term strategies” and a “comprehensive conflict prevention strategy”.

213. Kooijmans, (1995) 49 Internationale Spectator 367, equates preventive peace-building with structural help. Priorities in the Feira European Council Conclusions (supra, n.35) include strengthening the rule of law and civil administration.

214. Kooijmans, (1995) 49 Internationale Spectator 366–367, writes the following on the UN: “preventive action failed because the possibility of enforcement was not credible” (our translation).

215. An Agenda for Peace, paras 28–32 and S/PRST/1999/34 (supra, n.212).

216. “An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice”, speech held in Skopje on 16–19 Oct. 1996.

217. S/PRST/1999/34 (supra, n.212) and OSCE Seminar, 9, 15 and 18.

218. The European Security Charter clearly illustrates this, see paras 1, 36–43 and 46. See also Cohen, , Conflict prevention in the OSCE. An assessment of capacities (Clingendael Institute, 1999).Google Scholar

219. Zandee, (1999/4) Helsinki Monitor 6.

220. For a few opinions on this issue, see Simma, , “NATO, the UN and the use of force: legal aspects”, (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 1–22 Google Scholar; Cassese, , “Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?” (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 23–30 Google Scholar and the editorial comments by Henkin, e.a. in (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 824–862.Google Scholar

221. Leurdijk, (1999/2) Helsinki Monitor 18 (“like preventive diplomacy, coercive diplomacy should be executed in a credible way”) and Holbrooke, To End a War, 152 (“they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it.”).

222. OSCE Seminar, 6 and 13.

223. See Zandee, (1999/4) Helsinki Monitor 6 and Caplan, (1998) 74 International Affairs 751.

224. E.g., In the U.S. the Pentagon receives about 15 times more than the State Department in 2000.

225. Holbrooke (To End a War, 146 and 88) regarded the threat with air strikes and the sanctions as his key bargaining chips.

226. According to Rosas and Lahelma, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 188, this is equally valid for OSCE Long Term Missions, which are also based on the parties” consent.

227. We do not wish to blame the (mostly dedicated) staff for a limited mandate and/or insufficient means.

228. See e.g. E. Derycke (then Belgian Minister of foreign affairs) during the parliamentary debate on NATO's expansion in the Chamber of Representatives, see summary report of the plenary meeting of 16 July 1998.

229. Ibid.; Burci, “Division of Labour between the UN and the OSCE”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 303 and 307. Van Mierlo, “The significance of the OSCE in the European security architecture”, (1995/4) Helsinki Monitor 8, also identifies the OSCE's focus on the phases before and after an actual conflict.

230. See the scope of the measures mentioned in the statement of the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Security Council, on An Agenda for Peace, 30 April 1993 (S/25696).

231. See the Statement of the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Security Council on the maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building, 8 July 1999, which also attaches importance to reintegration of former combatants.

232. OSCE Seminar, 6 and 15. See also the European Security Charter, para. 43.

233. Sorel, , (1995) A.F.D.I. 94.Google Scholar

234. OSCE Seminar, 10, 18 and 20.

235. OSCE Handbook, 1999, 152–153.Google Scholar

236. OSCE Handbook, 1999, 1 54 and Killham, E. L., NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals, 49–51.Google Scholar

237. It is part of the European Security Charter and builds on the (OSCE) Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions (Copenhagen, 18/19 Dec. 1997).

238. European Security Charter, para. 46 and Platform for Co-operative Security, para. 7.

239. See supra, nn.167 and 191.

240. See respectively the Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 Nov. 1999, para. 35 juncto the European Security Charter, paras 1 and 42 and The Panel's Report (supra, n.17), paras 86–101 and 118–145.

241. Eurocorps may become one of the headquarters of the future EU rapid reaction force, WEU press release of 9 Dec. 1999.

242. Para. 7: compliance with all OSCE commitments is of “immediate and legitimate concern to all participating states”.