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BLANKET BANS, SUBSIDIARITY, AND THE PROCEDURAL TURN OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2019

Peter Cumper  and
Tom Lewis
Peter Cumper
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, Leicester Law School, University of Leicester, [email protected]
Tom Lewis
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, [email protected].
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Abstract

In recent years several commentators have identified a ‘procedural turn’ by the European Court of Human Rights whereby it places increased emphasis on the presence or absence and/or quality of legislative and judicial deliberations at domestic level when assessing the proportionality of allegedly rights-infringing measures. One area where the procedural turn has been particularly apparent is in relation to cases involving blanket bans on activities protected by the European Convention. On most accounts this move to ‘process-based review’ is causally linked to the principle of subsidiarity. In this article it is argued that whilst the shift to process-based review may generally have sound justifications in terms of the subsidiary role of the European Court as compared to States parties to the Convention, there are nevertheless several ironic downsides to this approach in the case of blanket bans, in terms of the certainty and predictability of the Court's case law. Furthermore, and more critically, there may be serious consequences in terms of the rights protection afforded to vulnerable minorities within States who may be at the receiving end of such legislative blanket bans.

Keywords

Human rightsEuropean Court of Human Rightsblanket banssubsidiarityprocess-based reviewprocedural turnmargin of appreciation
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 68 , Issue 3 , July 2019 , pp. 611 - 638
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2019 

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References

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2 In this article we use the term ‘procedural turn’ to describe the shift in the ECtHR's approach, and the term ‘process-based review’, following Robert Spano, to refer to the adjudicatory mechanism itself. See Spano (2018) ibid.

3 See Gerards and Brems, Spano, and Kleinlein (n 1).

4 Aristotle, Nichomachaean Ethics (trans WD Ross) (Batoche Books 1999) Book 5, 88–9; Hart, HLA, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1994) 130Google Scholar. See also Reid, Lord, ‘The Judge as Law-Maker’ (1972) 12 JSPTL 22Google Scholar, 26.

5 See eg ADT v UK, App No 35765/97, (2001) 31 EHRR 33, in which the ECtHR said: ‘It is not the Court's role to determine whether legislation complies with the Convention in abstract. The Court will therefore consider the compatibility of the legislation in the present case … in the light of the circumstances of the case …’, para 36 (emphasis added).

6 In the case of Convention arts 8 (private and family life), 9 (manifestation of religion or belief), 10 (expression) and 11 (peaceful assembly and association), this has been derived from the requirement that interferences must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. It has been implied into other articles such as the ‘right to vote’ under art 3 prot 1.

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9 See eg Campbell v UK, App No 13590/88, (1993) 15 EHRR 137, concerning the blanket rule that required the opening and reading of all prisoner's correspondence, whether or not legally privileged (art 8); Tinnelly and McElduff v UK, App Nos 20390/92; 21322/93 (1998) 27 EHRR 246, concerning the ‘conclusive’ and non-challengeable nature of certifications on security grounds that the applicants had not won contracts (art 6); and Papachelas v Greece, App No 31423/96, (2000) 30 EHRR 293, concerning the inflexible and irrebuttable presumption that land value be reduced by a fixed amount in cases of compulsory purchase (art 1 prot 1).

10 See eg James v UK, App No 8793/79, (1986) 8 EHRR 123, concerning the blanket statutory right to leasehold enfranchisement on the termination of a long lease, taking no account of the individual circumstances of the individual lessee (art 1 prot 1); Mellacher v Austria, App No 10522/83, (1990) 12 EHRR 392, concerning the inflexible reduction of rents without taking account of individual circumstances (art 1 prot 1); Stubbings v UK , App No 22083/93, (1996) 23 EHRR 213, concerning the inflexible operation of the Limitation Act (art 6); and Pretty v UK, App No 2346/0-2, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, concerning the statutory blanket prohibition on assisted suicide (art 8).

11 Sales and Hooper (n 8) 440.

12 ibid 454.

13 Arnardóttir (2017) (n 1).

14 Animal Defenders International v UK, App No 48876/08, (2013) 57 EHRR 21.

15 Earlier Strasbourg case law indicated that such wide bans would breach art 10: see VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland, App No 24699/94, (2002) 34 EHRR 4 and TV Vest AS & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway, App No 21132/05, (2009) 48 EHRR 51.

16 ibid.

17 Animal Defenders (n 14), paras 102–104.

18 ibid, para 108.

19 ibid.

20 ibid, paras 108–110.

21 ibid, para 116. Described in detail at paras 106–111.

22 ibid, para 114. See also eg Shindler v UK, App No 19840/09, (2014) 58 EHRR 5, concerning the withdrawal of the right to vote from ex-pats after 15 years; Sukhovetskyy v Ukraine, App No 13716/02, (2007) 44 EHRR 57, concerning the deposit to be paid for standing in elections; and Murphy v Ireland, App No 44179/98, (2004) 38 EHRR 13, concerning the ban on religious advertisements on TV and radio in the Republic of Ireland.

23 NURMTW v UK, App No 31045/10, (2015) 60 EHRR 10.

24 ibid, para 89.

25 ibid, para 90.

26 ibid, para 99.

27 SAS v France, App No 43835/11, (2015) 60 EHRR 11, paras 15–27.

28 ibid, para 129.

29 ibid, paras 145–149.

30 ibid, para 153. See also Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium, App No 37798/13, ECHR (11 July 2017) para 53 and Dakir v Belgium, App No 4619/12, ECHR (11 July 2017) para 56.

31 J Gerards, ‘Procedural Review by the ECtHR: A Typology’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 145.

32 A Nussberger, ‘Procedural Review by the European Court of Human Rights: The View from the Court’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 163.

33 ibid, paras 163–164. See also Brems, E, ‘SAS v France: A Reality Check’ (2016) 25 NottLJ 58Google Scholar.

34 Belcacemi and Oussar and Dakir (n 30).

35 ibid Belcacemi and Oussar, para 54 and Dakir, para 57.

36 Hirst v UK (No 2), App No 74025/01, (2004) 38 EHRR 40. The text of art 3 prot 1 states: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’

37 The UK government pointed to at least 13 other Council of Europe States that had a ban on prisoner voting.

38 Hirst (n 36), para 47. Compare with the absence of such a section 19(1)(a) Human Rights Act statement in Animal Defenders (n 14).

39 ibid, para 48.

40 ibid, para 82.

41 ibid, para 79.

42 ibid, para 80. See also, eg, Alajos Kiss v Hungary, App No 38832/06, (2013) 56 EHRR 38.

43 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, App Nos 11157/04 and 15162/05, (4 July 2013).

44 ibid, para 109.

45 See (n 1) above.

46 Most commonly this has been in cases involving arts 8 and 10: see eg Von Hannover v Germany (No 2), App No 40660/08, (2012) 55 EHRR 15, paras 104–107 and Axel Springer AG v Germany, App No 39954/08, (2012) 55 EHRR 6, paras 85–88. See further Saul, M, ‘Structuring Evaluations of Parliamentary Processes by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 20(8) IJHR 1077Google Scholar; Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 1); and Gerards (n 31) who argues that the procedural turn is evident in so-called ‘dilemma cases’ (of which blanket ban cases form a significant proportion), and cases involving the balancing of competing Convention rights.

47 See generally the sources cited at (n 1).

48 Spano (2018) (n 1) 481.

49 Carozza, PG, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 AmJIL 38Google Scholar. See also Christoffersen, J, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (Brill 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mowbray, A, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 15(2) HRLR 313Google Scholar; Føllesdal, A, ‘Subsidiarity and International Human Rights Courts: Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights – or Neither? (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 147Google Scholar, 148; Besson, S, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law – What is Subsidiary about Human Rights’ (2016) 61(1) AmJJuris 69Google Scholar; Kleinlein (n 1); and European Court of Human Rights Background Paper, ‘Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?’, ECtHR Seminar to mark the official opening of the judicial year (30 January 2015) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2015_ENG.pdf>.

50 Von Staden, A, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative and Judicial Standards of Review’ (2012) 10 IJCL 1023Google Scholar, 1036.

51 The High Contracting Parties have the obligation to secure Convention rights to all those within their jurisdictions.

52 There is a right to an effective remedy before a national tribunal for those whose rights have been violated. See Kuijer, M, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial and the Council of Europe's Efforts to Ensure Effective Remedies on a Domestic Level for Excessively Lengthy Proceedings’ (2013) 13(4) HRLR 779Google Scholar, 785.

53 The Court is established to ensure the observance of the Convention by the States parties.

54 The Court may only deal with a matter after ‘all domestic remedies have been exhausted’.

55 See Background Paper (n 49), para 2; and Mowbray (n 49) 319. See also eg Austin v UK, App No 39629/09, (2012) 55 EHRR 14, in which the Court said: ‘Subsidiarity is at the very basis of the Convention, stemming as it does from a joint reading of Articles 1 and 19’, para 61; and Kudla v Poland, App No 30201/96, (2002) 35 EHRR 11, para 155.

56 In the very early Belgian Linguistics Case, 23 July 1968, Series A No 6 35, para 10 the Court referred to the ‘subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention’.

57 M Saul (n 1) 28; L Lazarus and N Simonsen, ‘Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debate: Enriching the Doctrine of Due Deference’ in Hunt et al. (n 1) 388, 390.

58 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights ‘Interlaken Declaration’ (19 February 2010) especially at 1 and 3 available at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf>.

59 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights ‘Izmir Declaration’ (27 April 2011) especially at 1 and 3-5 <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf>.

60 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights ‘Brighton Declaration’ (20 April 2012) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf>.

61 High Level Conference on the ‘Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared responsibility’ ‘Brussels Declaration’ (27 March 2015) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Brussels_Declaration_ENG.pdf>.

62 High Level Conference on the European Human Rights System in the Future of Europe ‘Copenhagen Declaration’ (13 April 2018) <https://rm.coe.int/copenhagen-declaration/16807b915c>.

63 In one of the earliest applications of the margin of appreciation, the Court expressly linked subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. See Handyside v UK, App No 5493/72, (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 48. On the margin of appreciation see eg Hutchinson, MR, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 48(3) ICLQ 638CrossRefGoogle Scholar and McGoldrick, D, ‘A Deference of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 65(1) ICLQ 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 Brighton Declaration (n 60), para 11; Copenhagen Declaration (n 62), para 7; Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 1) 9; Spano, R, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and National Courts: A Constructive Conversation or a Dialogue of Disrespect (2015) 33(1) NordicJHumRts 1Google Scholar, 4; and Background Paper (n 49), para 16.

65 E Brems, ‘The “Logics” of Procedural Type Review by the European Court of Human Rights’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 22–4; Interlaken Declaration (n 58) 1; Izmir Declaration (n 59) 1; and Brighton Declaration (n 60), paras 3, 11 and 12.

66 Brighton Declaration (n 60), paras 5–8.

67 See eg Lazarus and Simonsen (n 57) 320.

68 See eg D Cameron PM, ‘Speech on the European Court of Human Rights’ (25 January 2012) available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-on-the-european-court-of-human-rights>. See also, eg, Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ 27th Sultan Azlan Law Lecture 2013 available at: <http://www.sultanazlanshah.com/pdf/2014%20Book/SAS_Lecture_27.pdf>; Lord Hoffmann, The ‘Universality of Human Rights’ (19 March 2009) available at: <https://www.judiciary.uk/announcements/speech-by-lord-hoffmann-the-universality-of-human-rights/>; Elliott, M, ‘After Brighton: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ (2012) PL 619Google Scholar; O'Boyle, M ‘The Future of the ECtHR’ (2011) 12 GermanLJ 1862Google Scholar; A Buyse, The Draft Copenahagen Declaration – What About Civil Society?’ (1 March 2018) available at: <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/03/01/the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-what-about-civil-society/>; and L Huijbers, ‘The Draft Copenhagen Declaration – Process-based Review and Subsidiarity’ (27 February 2018) available at: <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/02/27/the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-process-based-review-and-subsidiarity/>.

69 Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 1); Lazarus and Simonsen, ‘Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debates: enriching the doctrine of due deference’ in Hunt et al. (n 1) 390; Gerards, J and Terlouw, A, ‘Solutions for the European Court of Human Rights: The Amicus Curiae Project’ in Spyridon, F, Zwart, T and Fraser, J (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar 2013) 165Google Scholar; and Føllesdal (n 49) 152.

70 Spielmann, D, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation’ (2014) 67(1) CLP 49Google Scholar, 65.

71 Lazarus and Simonsen (n 69) 392.

72 Brems (n 65) 26.

73 Spano (2014) (n 1) 499.

74 A Sathanapally, ‘The Modest Promise of “Procedural Review” in Fundamental Rights Cases’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1).

75 Background Paper (n 49), para 27 (emphasis added).

76 Arnardottir (2015) (n 1); See also, more generally, Dothan, S, ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 ChicagoJIL 115Google Scholar.

77 Kleinlein, T, ‘Consensus and Contestability: The ECtHR and the Combined Potential of European Consensus and Procedural Rationality Control’ (2017) (28) 3 EJIL 871Google Scholar.

78 Background Paper (n 49), para 22.

79 Arnadottir (2015) (n 1).

80 Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 1).

81 P Popelier, ‘Evidence Based Law Making: Influences, Obstacles and the Role of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 79; Gerards (n 31); and Popelier and Van De Heyning (n 1).

82 R Masterman, ‘Process and Substance in Judicial Review in the United Kingdom and at Strasbourg: Proportionality, Subsidiarity, Complementarity?’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 247.

83 Popelier, P, ‘The Court as Regulatory Watchdog: The Procedural Approach in the Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Popelier, P, Mazmanyan, A and Vandenbruwaene, W (eds), The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 265Google Scholar.

84 T Kleinlein (n 77); Lazarus and Simonsen (n 69).

85 See eg Griffith, JAG, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waldron, J, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waldron, J, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lazarus and Simonsen (n 69); Bellamy, R, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (2007 Cambridge University Press)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bellamy, R, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Conventions: Political Constitutionalism and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 25(4) EJIL 1019Google Scholar; and M Tushnet, ‘Taking the Constitution away from the Courts’ (Princeton University Press 1999).

86 S Fredman, ‘From Dialogue to Deliberation: Human Rights Adjudication and Prisoners’ Rights to Vote’ in Hunt et al. (n 1) 447.

87 See Hogg, P and Bushell, A, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)’ (1997) 35 OsgoodHallLJ 75Google Scholar; Gardbaum, S, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice’ (Cambridge University Press 2013)Google Scholar; and Young, A, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Arguably an exemplar of this dialogic approach can be seen in the UK's HRA—see eg Nicol, D, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’ [2006] PL 722Google Scholar; and Hickman, T, ‘Constitutional Dialogue Theories and the HRA 1998’ [2005] PL 306Google Scholar.

88 Lazarus and Simonsen (n 69).

89 The Brighton Declaration (n 60) states that ‘the conference welcomes open dialogues between the Court and States Parties as a means of developing an enhanced understanding of their respective roles in carrying out their shared responsibility for applying the Convention’, para 12(c).

90 Copenhagen Declaration (n 62), para 33.

91 Lazarus and Simonsen (n 69).

92 Sathanapally (n 74) 40.

93 Kleinlein (n 77) 889.

94 T Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011).

95 Copenhagen Declaration (n 62), para 27 (emphasis added). See also Brighton Declaration (n 60), para 23.

96 Christine Goodwin v UK, App No 28957/95, (2002) 35 EHRR 18, para 74; Bayatyan v Armenia, App No 23459/03, (2012) 54 EHRR 15, para 98; and Brems, E and Lavrysen, L ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 35(1) HumRtsQ 176Google Scholar, 186.

97 The same could be said if Yland passed its measure without debate more recently, or indeed, after the judgment in Xland's case is handed down.

98 VgT (n 15), para 75. In the domestic incarnation of Animal Defenders, R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] 1 AC 1312, Lord Bingham commented that the ‘facts in VgT were very similar to those in the present case’, para 9. See Lewis, T, ‘Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of Strasbourg Jitters?’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 460CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

99 Animal Defenders (n 14), paras 42–55 the Court summarized the domestic debate and the impact that VgT had on the legislative deliberations.

100 ibid, in particular at paras 53–55.

101 TV Vest (n 15), para 55.

102 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 67, citing the 2006 report of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities.

103 Joint dissent of Judges Ziemele, Sajó, Kalaydjieva, Vučinič and De Gaetano. Judge Spano (2018) (n 1) 20 denies that this will be the case. See Lewis (n 98) 472.

104 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 108. See also Shindler (n 22), para 117; and NURMTW (n 23), para 101.

105 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 122. See also Shindler (n 22), para 116; and NURMTW (n 23), paras 102–103.

106 Animal Defenders (n 14) dissent of Judge Ziemele et al., paras 9–10, emphasis in original. See also NURMTW (n 23) concurring opinion of Judges Ziemele, Hirvelä and Bianku, para 2.

107 J-M Sauvé, ‘The Role of the National Authorities’ speech at seminar organized by the ECtHR ‘Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?’ (30 January 2015) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_Seminar_JMSauv%C3%A9_ENG.pdf> 9.

108 Gerards in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 159; Saul (n 1) 15 and Saul (n 46) 1082.

109 Scoppola v Italy (no 3), App No 126/05, (2013) 56 EHRR 19.

110 ibid, para 106.

111 ibid Judge Björgvinsson dissent.

112 ibid. See Fredman (n 86) 462.

113 Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 1). See also Gerards (n 31) 143 and 148, who makes the same point in relation to Lindheim v Norway, and X and Others v Austria, in which process-based review was not used.

114 Saul (n 1) 1082.

115 Animal Defenders (n 14), dissent of Judges Tulkens et al., para 17.

116 Hansard HC Deb 10 February 2011, Vol 523, col 493-586. The House voted by 234 to 22 against loosening the restrictions on prisoner voting. See Fredman (n 86) 463ff. For differing views on the question of whether the debate was a genuine substantive consideration of the human rights issues, or whether the ECtHR had exceeded its authority see (respectively) D Nicol, ‘Legitimacy of the Commons Vote on Prisoner Voting’ [2011] PL 681; and J King, ‘Should Prisoners Have the Right to Vote?’ UK Constitutional Law Group Blog (8 May 2011), available at: <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/05/18/jeff-king-should-prisoners-have-the-right-to-vote/>.

117 Scoppola (109), para 79.

118 ibid, paras 75–80.

119 SAS (n 27) 153–4; Belcacemi and Oussar (n 30), para 53; Dakir (n 30), para 56.

120 NURMTW (n 23), para 89.

121 ibid, para 99.

122 ibid.

123 See the dissent of Judge Wildhaber et al. in Hirst, para 7: ‘It must be assumed that section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 2000 reflects political, social and cultural values in the United Kingdom.’

124 Anchugov and Gladkov (n 43).

125 ibid, para 109.

126 ibid.

127 See the questions posed in the Third Party Intervention, ‘European Court of Human Rights Fouzia Dakir v Belgium, App No 4619/12. Written Submission by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University’ at <http://www.hrc.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Dakir_hrc.pdf> 6.

128 Nussberger (n 32) 168.

129 Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party And Others v Russia, App No 18860/07 (8 November 2016) para 67; Zdanoka v Latvia, App No 34932/00 (2007) 45 EHRR 17, para 103; Anchugov and Gladkov (n 43), para 95; and A Donald and P Leach, ‘The Role of Parliaments Following Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Hunt et al. (n 1) 59.

130 Sathanapally (n 74) 75.

131 ibid.

132 Saul (n 46) 1082.

133 Kavanagh, A, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2009) 15Google Scholar.

134 Hirst (n 36) dissent of Wildhaber et al., para 7.

135 Hirst (n 36) Concurring opinion of Tulkens et al.

136 Sathanapally (n 74) 60. See also A Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2012) 49.

137 Donald and Leach (n 129) 84; Sathanapally (n 74) 76; and Saul (n 1) 28.

138 Nussberger (n 32) 167; and Fredman (n 86) 447.

139 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 109; and NURMTW (n 23), para 101.

140 Nussberger (n 32) 166. Admittedly there is an argument, following Tom Tyler, that from the viewpoint of social psychology, procedural fairness is important because in people's contact with the law they care not only about the outcome of their case, but also about the way in which it has been handled. See T Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’ (2007-8) 44 (1/2) Court Review 26–32; E Brems and L Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in the Human Rights Adjudication of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) HumRtsQ 176 200; SO Chaib, ‘Procedural Fairness as a Vehicle for Inclusion in the Freedom of Religion Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court (2016) 16(3) HRLR 48; and Brems (n 65) 31. However, where we are concerned with legislative blanket bans introduced by majorities to the detriment of minority groups, and where domestic courts have no ability to find in favour of applicants because of the blanket nature of domestic law (unless they find a breach of their human rights), the efficacy of such arguments is rather devalued.

141 Art 19 ECHR.

142 Sathanapally (n 74) 46.

143 Dakir (n 30) Judge Spano joined by Judge Karakaş, Concurring Opinion, para 9. They made the point that SAS should not be followed blindly, and that any loss of liberty on account of wearing a face veil would carry a ‘strong presumption of disproportionality’, para 10.

144 Spano (2018) (n 1) 473.

145 ibid 492. This approach aligns with a ‘constitutionalizing’ view of the ECtHR. See A Stone Sweet, ‘On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The ECtHR as a Constitutional Court’ (2009) Yale Law Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 71: <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/71>; W Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the ECtHR, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’ (2009) 9 HRLR 379; S Greer and L Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about ‘Constitutionalising’ the ECtHR (2012) HRLR 655; and F De Londras, ‘Dual Functionality and the Persistent Frailty of the ECtHR’ (2013) EHRLR 38.

146 Spielmann (n 70).

147 Spano (2018) (n 1) 484; and Bar-Siman-Tov, I, ‘Semiprocedural Judicial Review’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 271CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 297.