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BALANCING SOFT AND HARD LAW FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2018

Barnali Choudhury
Barnali Choudhury*
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Laws, University College London, [email protected].
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Abstract

In the wake of increasing corporate disasters, there has been an urgent need to address the impact of business on human rights. Yet business responsibilities for human rights are mainly voluntary and best understood as ‘soft law’. Recently, however, States have begun negotiations for an internationally binding treaty in this area, suggesting that there is a need to turn to ‘hard law’ to increase the efficacy of business and human rights (BHR) initiatives. This article argues that because soft and hard law concepts are not dichotomous, BHR governance need not become ‘hard law’ to be effective. Rather ‘hardened’ soft law instruments can be equally effective.

Keywords

Public International Lawhuman rightsbusiness and human rightsglobalizationsoft lawsupply chains
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 67 , Issue 4 , October 2018 , pp. 961 - 986
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2018 

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162 ibid, art 19A.

163 Act Amending the Danish Financial Statements Act (2012).

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168 ibid.

169 Modern Slavery Act (2015).

170 ibid section 54.

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173 ibid section 54(11).

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