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TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CASE OF THE ARAB SPRING

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2015

Catherine Turner
Catherine Turner*
Affiliation:
Durham Law School, [email protected].
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Abstract

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the framework of transition and the enactment of a new constitution for Egypt. It does so by using the relatively under explored concept of transitional constitutionalism, interrogating some of the key claims on which transitional constitutionalism is based, and questioning their application in the Egyptian context. By doing this the paper explores the broader paradox of the imposition of a framework of transition that is rooted in principles of liberalism in the context where liberalism is far from the agreed or prevailing political model.

Keywords

constitutional reformEgyptinternational lawtransitiontransitional constitutionalism
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 267 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2015 

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References

1 See eg the adoption of the label ‘Transitional Council’ by rebels in Libya prior to the death of Ghadaffi. See S Talmon, ‘Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council’ ASIL Insight, 16 June 2011; a similar model has now been adopted in Syria. See ‘Syrian Opposition Submits Plan for Transitional Government’ Al-Jazeera America, 12 February 2014.

2 See McConnachie, K and Morrison, J, ‘Constitution-making, Transition and the Reconstruction of Society’ in McEvoy, K and McGregor, L (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart 2008)Google Scholar.

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7 See Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616 on the use of normative principles to guide transition.

8 See Ludson (n 5); Hart, V, ‘Constitution Making and the Transformation of Conflict’ (2001) 26 Peace and Change 153Google Scholar.

9 The term was first used by Teitel in her 2000 work Transitional Justice but has lain dormant until relatively recently.

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11 For detailed discussion of the difference between these two models see ibid 191–4.

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13 Teitel (n 10).

14 Teitel (n 10) 191.

15 McConnachie and Morrisson suggest that the notion that the past must be addressed in a constitutional document has become increasingly mainstreamed since the South African Transition; see (n 2) 83.

16 See Derrida, J, ‘Declarations of Independence’ in Rottenbert, E (ed), Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–2001 (Stanford University Press 2002)Google Scholar 46.

17 Ludsin (n 5) 264.

18 Teitel (n 10).

19 Secretary General's report (n 7).

20 Teitel (n 10) 210.

21 Teitel (n 12) 2057.

22 Teitel (n 10) 21.

23 The Report of the Secretary General (n 7) articulates a common language for justice in these contexts, including a detailed definition of rule of law. It is now this definition that underpins international law and policy in these contexts.

24 Ludsin (n 5).

25 Teitel (n 10).

26 Internationally assisted constitutional processes date back to the process of decolonization. Sripati (n 3). The emphasis of these processes has always been on ensuring participation and local ownership of processes. See Guidance Note of the Secretary General, ‘United Nations Assistance in Constitution- making Processes' (April 2009).

27 See eg UN-sponsored constitutional processes in Cambodia, East Timor, and more recently Somalia, all of which were mandated by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. For a more detailed discussion see Turner, C and Houghton, R, ‘Constitution Making and Post-Conflict Reconstruction’ in Saul, M and Sweeney, J (eds), The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Routledge 2015)Google Scholar (forthcoming).

28 See Dan, P and Al-Ali, Z, ‘The Internationalised “Pouvoir Constituent” – Constitution Making under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 423CrossRefGoogle Scholar on the procedural nature of the process in East Timor. The procedural focus of UN assistance is also evidence in the Secretary General's Guidance Note of 2009 (n 26).

29 See Teitel (n 10); also Ludsin (n 5).

30 Teitel (n 12) 2062.

31 McConnachie and Morrison (n 2) 79.

32 Gross, AM, ‘The Constitution, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel’ (2004) 40 StanJIntlL 57Google Scholar; see also Buyse, A, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The ECHR Perspective (Intersentia 2008)Google Scholar.

33 See Teitel (n 10).

34 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000 reprinted in 39 ILM 1432 (2000) (Brahimi).

35 See Hay, E ‘International(ized) Constitutions and Peace Making’ (2014) 27 LJIL 141Google Scholar; see also Dan and Al-Ali (n 28).

36 Hay (n 35).

37 See Feldman, N, ‘Imposed Constitutionalism’ (2005) 27 ConnLRev 857Google Scholar.

38 See Security Council Resolution 1272 (2002) on East Timor, and Resolution 746 (1992) on Cambodia. For more detailed discussion see Turner and Houghton (n 27).

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40 Hay (n 35) 145

41 Turner and Houghton (n 27).

42 See Sripati (n 3) 94.

43 Spripati (n 3).

44 Hay (n 35).

45 Morsina et al. (n 39) 279.

46 See eg Amnesty International. ‘Egypt's new constitution limits fundamental freedoms and ignores the rights of women’ 30 November 2012, criticizing the Egyptian constitution for failing to provide for the supremacy of international law over national law. Available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/egypt-s-new-constitution-limits-fundamental-freedoms-and-ignores-rights-wom>.

47 Hart (n 8) 157 suggests that this view of constitutionalism views the constitution as a completed map of conflict resolution rather than simply a landmark along the way.

48 Teitel (n12); Ludsin (n 5).

49 Teitel (n 12) 2079.

50 Gross (n 32) 50.

51 Teitel (n 12) 2063.

52 Teitel (n 12) 2070.

53 Hart (n 8) 159.

54 Ludsin (n 5) 264.

55 McConnachie and Morrison (n 2); McEvoy, K, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 411Google Scholar.

56 This brings the idea of transitional constitutionalism back into line with the procedural model of constitutional assistance that has existed until recently.

57 For a more detailed theoretical exploration of this dynamic in the context of Tunisia see Wall, I, ‘Tunisia and the Critical Legal Theory of Dissensus’ (2012) 23 Law and Critique 219CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Ludsin (n 5).

59 For an overview of these events see Bowen, J, The Arab Uprisings (Simon & Schuster 2012)Google Scholar.

60 See Brown, N, ‘Egypt's Failed Transition’ (2013) 24 Journal of Democracy 45Google Scholar.

61 M Penner Angrist, ‘Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over’ Foreign Affairs, 16 January 2011; R Haas, ‘Reflections on the Revolution in Egypt’ Project Syndicate, 13 February 2011.

62 Noueihed, L and Warren, A, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter Revolution and the Making of a New Era (Yale University Press 2012)Google Scholar 4; Lynch, M, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (Public Affairs 2012)Google Scholar 63.

63 S Zizek, ‘For Egypt, this is the miracle of Tahrir Square’ Guardian, 10 February 2011.

64 L Noueihed and A Warren (n 62) 6; see also Statement of President Barak Obama on Egypt, 10 February 2011 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/10/statement-president-barack-obama-egypt>.

65 Lynch (n 62) 72.

66 DE Sanger, ‘Obama Presses Egypt's Military on Democracy’ New York Times, 11 February 2011. Sanger demonstrates the way in which the protests in Tahrir Square were characterized to fit within an overarching narrative of non-violent protest and unequivocal moral force which set Egypt on a path of genuine democracy.

67 Brown (n 60).

68 J Shenker, ‘The Struggle to Document Egypt's Revolution’ Guardian, 15 July 2011.

69 Noueihed and Warren (n 62) 105.

70 Ibid 6.

71 One commentator suggests that ‘an intense struggle over narratives and legitimacy have defined postrevolutionary politics' Lynch (n 62) 72; Similarly Abou-El-Fadl writes that competing visions for the transition have emerged, some more conservative than others. R Abou El Fadl, ‘Beyond Conventional Transitional Justice: Egypt's 2011 Revolution and the Absence of Political Will (2012) International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, 6.

72 Abou-El-Fadl (n 71).

73 Brown (n 60).

74 See Carnegie Endowment (2012), ‘Court Decision on Presidential Election Law: Road Block or Minor Speed Bump for the Military?’ at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/19/court-decision-on-presidential-election-law-road-block-or-minor-speed-bump-for-military>.

75 The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party achieved 47.2 per cent of the vote <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16665748>.

76 See Brown (n 60) 47.

77 Noueihed (n 62) 118–19; I am indebted to Reem Abou-el-Fadl for her insights into the course of events during this period.

78 See Ludsin (n 5).

79 See Turner, C, ‘Deconstructing Transitional Justice’ (2013) 24 Law and Critique 193Google Scholar; also Shenker (n 68).

80 Carnegie Endowment (n 74).

81 See Z Al-Ali, ‘The New Egyptian Constitution: An initial assessment of its merits and flaws’ International IDEA, 25 January 2013.

82 A Mohyeldin, ‘Who's Afraid of the Egyptian Constitution?’ 5 December 2012 < http://ideas.time.com/2012/12/05/viewpoint-whos-afraid-of-the-egyptian-constitution/>.

83 Al Ali (n 81).

84 Human Rights Watch, ‘Egypt: New Constitution Mixed on Support of Rights' 30 November 2012 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/29/egypt-new-constitution-mixed-support-rights>.

85 R Abou-el-Fadl, ‘Mohamed Morsi Mubarak: The Myth of Egypt's Democratic Transition’ Jadaliyya, 11 February 2013 <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10119/>; see also Rosenfeld, M, ‘Editorial: On constitutionalism and the paradoxes of tolerance: Reflections on Egypt, the US and beyond’ (2013) 11 ICON 835Google Scholar.

86 Mohyeldin (n 82); A Khalil, ‘Egypt's Constitutional Endgame: Where Confusion Is the Rule’ <http://world.time.com/2012/12/04/egypts-constitutional-end-game-where-confusion-is-the-rule> 4 December 2012; see also Brown (n 60).

87 See I Black and P Kinglsey, ‘Egypt clashes continue amid faltering efforts to forge new government’ Guardian, 8 July 2013.

88 See P Kingsley and M Chulov, ‘Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two years' Guardian, 4 July 2014.

89 There are differing interpretations within Egypt on the extent to which Islam is or should be enshrined into the constitution. See Al-Ali (n 81).

90 ZAl-Ali, ‘Egypt's draft constitution: an analysis' International IDEA, 09 November 2012

91 Abou-el- Fadl (n 85); Rosenfeld (n 85) 837; Brown (n 60).

92 Hart (n 8).

93 Ludsin (n 5) 264.

94 De Ville, J, ‘Sovereignty without Sovereignty: Derrida's Declarations of Independence’ (2008) 19 Law and Critique 87Google Scholar.

95 Teitel (n 12).

96 Brown (n 60).

97 See Samuels, K, ‘Post-Conflict Peace-building and Constitution-Making’ (2006) 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 663Google Scholar.

98 Ludsin (n 5) 264.

99 Brown (n 60).

100 Samuels (n 97) 668.

101 See eg Campbell, C and Turner, C, ‘Utopia and the Doubters: Truth, Transition and the Law’ (2008) 23 LS 374Google Scholar; McEvoy (n 55).

102 Powell, D, ‘The Role of Constitution Making and Institution Building in South Africa's Transition’ (2010) 4 International Journal of Transitional Justice 230Google Scholar, 233.

103 Leebaw, B, ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice’ (2008) 30 HRQ 95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 105.

104 The rule of law for these purposes being defined in the 2004 Secretary General's Report (n 7.)

105 In particular the model of transitional constitutionalism put forward by Teitel assumes a transition towards liberal democracy, thereby limiting the transformative potential of constitutionalism to the liberal framework. See Gross (n 32) 50.

106 See eg Turner, C, ‘Political Representations of Law in Northern Ireland’ (2010) PL 451Google Scholar; in the Egyptian context see Abou-el-Fadl (n 71).

107 Brown (n 60).

108 In Egypt it has been suggested that some groups reject the idea of revolutionary legitimacy altogether and insist instead that power should be decided through the ballot box. Lynch (n 62) 73.

109 Brown (n 60).

110 Abou-el-Fadl (n 71).

111 Ludsin (n 5) 276.

112 Brown (n 60).

113 Conor Gearty describes this as the campaigning jackpot of legal implementation. Gearty, C, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge University Press 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar 62.

114 See eg Barnett, RR, ‘Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan’ (2004) 15 Journal of Democracy 5Google Scholar; also Ludsin (n 5) 263 suggesting that both short- and long-term goals of peacemaking are now based on the finalization of a new constitution; Brown (n 60).

115 To paraphrase Michael Ignatieff's famous suggestion that the role of truth commissions was to ‘narrow the range of permissible lies'. See Ignatieff, M, ‘Articles of Faith’ (1996) 25 Index on Censorship 110Google Scholar.

116 See Kazziha, W, ‘The Fantasy of Arab Democracy without a Constituency’ in Brown, N and El-Din Shahin, E (eds), The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East: Regional Politics and External Policies (Routledge 2010)Google Scholar 42, 46.

117 See Turner (n 79) on the ways in which the language of transition perpetuates violence and exclusion.

118 Abou-El-Foudl (n 71) highlights the difference between reform and transformation in Egypt. The call for the fall of the regime should be read not as a call for reform of existing structures, but for a rethinking of the way in which the State has been shaped.

119 Lerner, H, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge University Press 2011)Google Scholar 30; see also Samuels (n 97) on the importance of participation.

120 Hay (n 35) 149 describes as the ‘less visible’ aspect of internationalized constitution making the assumption that self-determination in these contexts will be take the form of liberal democracy.

121 Dan and Al-Ali (n 28) 461.

122 See Sanger (n 66) on Obama's response to the uprising in Egypt.

123 Heydemann, S, ‘Embracing the Change, Accepting the Challenge? Western Response to the Arab Spring’ in Alcaro, R and Haubrich-Seco, M (eds), Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprising (Edizioni Nuova Cultura 2012)Google Scholar 22.

124 For a detailed breakdown of the diversity of issues that drove the protests in Egypt see Gunning, J and Baron, IZ, Why Occupy a Square? People, Protests and Movements in the Egyptian Revolution (Hurst 2013)Google Scholar. This analysis demonstrates that the reporting of the uprisings in the West may have overplayed the significance of democracy and largely ignored the significance of demands of social justice, for example.

125 Heydemann (n 123) 23 suggests that the emerging narratives that define the challenges of the Arab Spring for Western governments may well increase the likelihood that Western responses will reinforce, rather than overcome, long-standing tensions and sources of conflict.

126 This emphasis on liberal democracy includes facets of internationalization and free trade that had been controversial in Egypt under Mubarak but which looked set to be replicated in Egypt. See Abou-el-Fadl (n 85).

127 Kazziha (n 116) 48.

128 This tension was identified in UN reports evaluating the lessons of previous post conflict constitutional assistance processes. See J Benomar, ‘Constitution-Making and Peace Building: Lessons Learned from the Constitution-Making Processes of Post-Conflict Countries' (UNDP 2003).

129 (n 71) 2.

130 Ibid.

131 See Arthur, P, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’ (2009) 31 HRQ 321, 339–40Google Scholar.

132 Ibid 341; This model of contextualizing international frameworks to fit local priorities was seen in Iraq where the Constitutional Committee's draft contained a well-developed section on socio-economic rights, in accordance with Islamic and Arab custom. Dan and Al-Ali (n 28) 440.

133 Ghai (n 3) 110.

134 Lin Noueihed and Warren (n 62) 123.

135 Samuels (n 97) 670, suggesting that elite–population division will exacerbate division.

136 H el-Hamalaway, ‘Egypt's Revolution has been 10 Years in the Making’ The Guardian, 2 March 2011; This can be contrasted with the assertion that there was no evidence of effective grass-roots mobilization in Egypt prior to the revolution, Kazziha (n 116).

137 Lynch (n 62) 88.

138 For evidence of this one need only consult Brown and El-Din Shahin (n 116) which explores the reasons for the failure of democratization in the Middle East.

139 Brown (n 60).

140 Ludsin (n 5) 264.

141 Ghai (n 3) 123.

142 An Na'im, A, ‘Towards a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights’ in Goodale, M (ed), Human Rights: An Anthropological Reader (Wiley-Blackwell 2009)Google Scholar 19, 38.

143 Ibid 28; Ludsin (n 5) 272.

144 Ghai (n 3) 122.

145 See eg the Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1-7 (1977), regarded as providing an authoritative definition of who could claim to be protected as a minority. See Gilbert, J, ‘Constitutionalism, Ethnicity and Minority Rights in Africa: A Legal Appraisal from the Great Lakes Region’ (2013) 11 ICON 414Google Scholar, 416.

146 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons of National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities UN Doc A/Res/47/135 (1992).

147 See Gilbert (n 145) on how these provisions have been incorporated differently in the post-conflict constitutions of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

148 Philpott, D, Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation (Oxford 2012)Google Scholar 8.

149 See Baderin, M, ‘Human Rights and Islamic Law: the myth of discord’ (2005) EHRLR 165Google Scholar.

150 An Na'im, A, ‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 95Google Scholar.

151 See Rosenfeld (n 85) 837.

152 See generally An Na'im, AIslam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia (Harvard 2009)Google Scholar.

153 Rosenfeld (n 85) 837.

154 An Na'im (n 142) 100.

155 Philpott (n 148) 9.

156 Ludsin (n 5); Samuels (n 97); UN Guidance Note (n 26).

157 See Lollini, A, Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice in South Africa (Berghan 2011)Google Scholar 34 on the success of this project in South Africa; See also Deng, F, ‘Human Rights, Universality and Democracy’ in Twining, W (ed) Human Rights: Southern Voices (Cambridge University Press 2009)Google Scholar on the need to recognize the existence of disparate groups and provide mechanisms for accommodation within the law.

158 Lollini (n 157) 28; Samuels (n 97).

159 See Dann and Al-Ali (n 28) on the extent to which international involvement in constitutional processes should remain procedural and avoid the temptation to import prescriptive lessons.

160 In this way it would address what Rosenfeld (n 85) identifies of the paradox of tolerance, whereby responses to intolerance becomes themselves intolerant in their desire to entrench their own interests.

161 Brown (n 60).

162 Ibid.