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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ‘SUPRA-CONSTITUTIONAL’ LIMITS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2013

Yaniv Roznai
Yaniv Roznai*
Affiliation:
PhD Candidate, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE); Visiting Student Research Collaborator, Princeton University; LL M, LSE; LL B, BA, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC), [email protected].
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Abstract

This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

Keywords

constitutional amendmentsEuropean lawhierarchy of normsinternational lawjudicial reviewlimits on amendment powersnatural lawsupra-constitutionalsupranational lawunconstitutional constitutional amendments
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 62 , Issue 3 , July 2013 , pp. 557 - 597
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2013 

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106 Herdegen (n 35) 605.

107 One may wonder about the ICTY's choice of words, as a distinction exists between illegality and illegitimacy. See generally Roberts, AE, ‘Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force be Illegal but Justified?’ in Alston, P and Macdonald, E (eds), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (OUP 2008) 206–8Google Scholar.

108 Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras 155–157 (dictum) <www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf>.

109 Garlicki and Garlicka (n 69) 359–63.

110 See Schnably (n 99) 422.

111 Kelsen, H, Principles of International Law (3rd printing, Lawbook Exchange, Ltd 2003) 408–18Google Scholar. See also Socarras, MP, ‘International Law and the Constitution’ (2010) 4(2) FedCtsLRev 185, 54Google Scholar (the US Supreme Court ‘has long enforced the law of nations as the source and limit of the sovereign powers that the Constitution allocates to the federal government’).

112 Kunz, JL, ‘The “Vienna School” and International Law’ (1934) 11 NYULQRev 370, 402Google Scholar.

113 Fitzmaurice, G, ‘the General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil Des Cours 85Google Scholar.

114 Akehurst, MB and Malanczuk, P, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 1997) 63Google Scholar.

115 See VCLT (n 96).

116 See also art 27(2–3) to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 1986 and art 3 of the Draft on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. More specifically with regard to domestic constitutional law see United Nations Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States, Annex to UNGA Res No 375 (IV), UNGA Off Rec 4th Sess, Resolutions, (1949) 67, art 13: ‘Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty’; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, s. 155 cmt b (1987): ‘A State cannot adduce its constitution or its laws as a defense for failure to carry out its international obligations.’

117 A de Hoogh, ‘The Relationship between National Law and International Law in the Report of the Georgia Fact-Finding Mission’ (4 January 2010) EJIL: Talk! <www.ejiltalk.org/the-relationship-between-national-law-and-international-law-in-the-report-of-the-georgia-fact-finding-mission/>.

118 Case of the ‘Montijo’: Agreement between the United States and Colombia of 17.08.1874, award of 26.7.1875, cited in Peters, A, ‘Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2009) 3 ICL 170, 183–4Google Scholar.

119 Avis Consultatif du 4 février 1932, Série A/B No 44, 24. See Hudson, MO, ‘International Engagements and Their Interpretation by the Permanent Court of International Justice’ in Kidd, AM and Radin, M (eds), Legal Essays: In Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray (University of California Press 1935) 190Google Scholar.

120 The question of the relationship between international and regional law (especially EU law) seems even more complicated. See Posch, A, ‘The Kadi Case: Rethinking The Relationship between EU Law and International Law?’ (2009) 15 ColumJEurL 1Google Scholar; d'Aspremont, J and Dopagne, F, ‘Two Constitutionalism in Europe: Pursuing and Articulation of the European and International Legal Orders’ (2009) 69 HeidelbergJIntlL (ZaöRV) 939Google Scholar; De Sena, P and Vitucci, MC, ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Between Dedublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values’ (2009) 20(1) EJIL 193CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nollkaemper, A, ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Between Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values: Three Replies to Pasquale De Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci’ (2009) 20(3) EJIL L 862CrossRefGoogle Scholar; de Búrca, G, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2010) 51(1) HarvIntlLJ 1Google Scholar.

121 On the national treatment of EU and ECHR law see Keller, H and Stone Sweet, A (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (OUP 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Martinico, G and Pollicino, O (eds), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (Europa Law Publishing 2010)Google Scholar; Martinico, G, ‘Is the European Convention Going to Be ‘Supreme’? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts’ (2012) 23(2) EJIL 401CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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123 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (1970) ECR 1125, 1134, para 3 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61970CJ0011:EN:PDF>.

124 See Rekvenyi v Hungary, App No 25390/94, ECtHR Judgment of 20 May 1999 and Victor-Emmanuel de Savoie v Italy, App No 53360/99, ECtHR Judgment of 24 April 2003, in which the ECtHR examined the compatibility of constitutional provisions with the ECHR but did not establish a breach. Cited in Garlicki and Garlicka (n 69) 362–3, n 42.

125 Alajos Kiss v Hungary, App No 38832/06, ECtHR Judgment of 20 May 2010.

126 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina, App No 27996/06, ECtHR Judgment of 22 December 2009. See Milanović, M, ‘Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECtHR), Introductory Note’ (2010) 49(2) International Legal Materials 281CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bardutzky, S, ‘The Strasbourg Court on the Dayton Constitution: Judgment in the Case of Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 December 2009 (October 19, 2010)’ (2010) 6(2) Eur Const L Rev 309Google Scholar; Tran, C, ‘Striking a Balance Between Human Rights and Peace and Stability: A Review of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2011) 18(2) Human Rights Brief 3Google Scholar.

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128 Rubenfeld, J, ‘Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’ (2004) 79 NYULRev 1971, 1973Google Scholar.

129 Torrijo, XF, ‘International Law and Domestic Law: Definitely an Odd Couple’ (2008) 77 Rev Jur UPR 483, 489–90Google Scholar.

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131 Nollkaemper, A, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (OUP 2011) 199–200CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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133 Garlicki and Garlicka (n 69) 363.

134 Rigaux (n 122) 301–6.

135 Bryde (n 87) 210.

136 [2009] UKHL2, para 98.

137 For a detailed review see Schnably (n 99) 461–73.

138 ibid 470.

139 ibid 473.

140 Butcher, GT, ‘Legal Consequences for States of the Illegality of Apartheid’ (1986) 8 HumRtsQ 404, 433Google Scholar; Jisheng, X, ‘Evolution of South Africa's Racist Constitutions and the 1983 Constitution’ (1987) 16(1) A Journal of Opinion 18Google Scholar.

141 SC Res 554, UN Doc S/RES/554 (17 August 1984) <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/487/84/IMG/NR048784.pdf?OpenElement>.

142 Preuss, UK, ‘Perspectives in Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change through External Constitutionalization’ (2006) 51 NYLSchLRev 467, 492Google Scholar.

143 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, art 25: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’

144 Devine, DJ, ‘International Law Tensions Arising from the South African Situation 1976–1986’ (1987) Acta Juridica 165, 194Google Scholar.

145 For such interpretation of the decision see Schaffer, RP, ‘The Inter-Relationship between Public International Law and the Law of South Africa: An Overview’ (1983) 32 ICLQ 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zimmermann, A, ‘Is It Really All about Commitment and Diffusion? A Comment on Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law’ (2008) UIllLRev 253, 257–8Google Scholar.

146 See Milanović, M, ‘Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2010) 104(4) AJIL 636, 640CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brljavac, B, ‘Institutional Discrimination against the Minority Groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Barrier to the EU Membership’ (2012) 7(2) Research and Practice in Social Sciences 1, 9Google Scholar.

147 See famously Henkin, L, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Columbia University Press 1979) 47Google Scholar: ‘It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.’ See also Koh, HH, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 YaleLJ 2599Google Scholar.

148 Hale, B, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’ (2012) 12(1) HRLRev 65, 77Google Scholar.

149 Francioni, F, ‘International Law as a Common Language for National Courts’ (2001) 36 TexIntlLJ 587Google Scholar; Nollkaemper (n 131). For an important debate on the role of domestic courts in the development and enforcement of international law see Roberts, A, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in International Law’ (2011) 60(1) ICLQ 57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

150 Nollkaemper (n 131) 7.

151 ibid 8.

152 ibid 200.

153 Kumm, M, ‘The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model’ (2003) 44 VaJIntlL 19, 22–3Google Scholar.

154 Nollkaemper (n 131) 166–77.

155 Grimm, D, ‘The Basic Law at 60: Identity and Change’ (2010) 11(1) GermanLJ 33, 45Google Scholar. But see the German Constitutional Court Cases BVerfGE 37, 327 (Solange I), BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II) and VerfGE 89, 255 (Maastricht) (the Constitution Court's authority to adjudicate individual complaints is restored if EU gives lack of attention to fundamental rights).

156 Compare Deener, DR, ‘Treaties, Constitutions and Judicial Review’ (1964) 4 VaJIntlL 7Google Scholar (examining ‘the extent to which powers of judicial review contribute to or shape the decisions of municipal courts in cases of conflict between a treaty and a constitution’).

157 The use of international law by domestic courts is likely to intensify institutional tensions between the judiciary and governmental branches. See Mohallem, MF, ‘Book Review: National Courts and the International Rule of Law, by André Nollkaemper’ (2012) 32(3) LS 516, 522Google Scholar.

158 Scelle, G, Precis du droit des gens, Principes et systematique (Vol I, Librarie du Recueil Sirey 1932) 43, 54–56Google Scholar. On Scelle's theory see in general Thierry, H, ‘The Thought of Georges Scelle’ (1990) 1 EJIL 193CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Casses, A, ‘Remarks on Scelle's Theory of “Role Splitting” (dedoublement fonctionnel) in International Law’ (1990) 2 EJIL 210, 212–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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160 cf LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, 9, para 28, and International Court of Justice, LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, 466 paras 111–115.

161 Shany, Y, ‘How Supreme is The Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Text by Domestic Courts’ (2006) 31(2) BrookJIntlL 341, 399Google Scholar.

162 Add to this the claim that national courts hesitate to apply international or regional law if they cannot be assured that other national court will act similarly. See Benvenisti, E, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts’ (1993) 4 EJIL 159, 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weiler, JHH, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocuters’ (1994) 26 ComPolStud 510, 521–2Google Scholar.

163 Dupuy, PM, ‘Unity in the Application of International law at the Global Level and the Responsibility of Judges at the National Level: Reviewing Georges Scelle's “Role Splitting” Theory’, in De Chazournes, LB and Kohen, M (eds), International Law and the Quest for Its Implementation (Brill 2010) 421Google Scholar.

164 See Ingham, JF, ‘Unconstitutional Amendments’ (1928–29) 33 DickLRev 161, 165–6Google Scholar: ‘If the Supreme Court, created by, and owing its authority and existence to the Constitution, should assume the power to consider the validity or invalidity of a constitutional amendment … it would be assuming the power to nullify and destroy itself, of its own force, a power which no artificial creation can conceivably possess.’

165 Kumm (n 153) 24.

166 Garlicki and Garlicka (n 69) 364.

167 de Búrca, G and Gerstenberg, O, ‘The Denationalization of Constitutional Law’ (2006) 47(1) HarvIntlLJ 243, 258Google Scholar.

168 Paulus, A, ‘National Courts and the International Rule of Law: Remarks on the Book by André Nollkaemper’ (2012) 4 JrslmRevLegalStud 9Google Scholar.

169 Albi, A, ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the new Member States: Bringing Parliament into the Equation of Co-operative Constitutionalism’ (2007) 3 EurConstLRev 25Google Scholar. See also Kwiecień, R, ‘The Primacy of European Union Law over National Law under the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 6(11) GermanLJ 1479, 1487–8Google Scholar : ‘Unlike the ECJ, the national courts comparatively seldom justified primacy by the autonomy of the Community legal order … The national courts thus reject the hierarchy of legal acts, within which the acts of national law, including the Constitutions, are subject to the supremacy of Community law.’

170 Paulus (n 168) 16. cf Görgülü Case 2 BvR 1481/04 (14 October 2004) BVerfGE 111, 307 at para 34 <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html>: ‘The Basic Law is clearly based on the classic idea that the relationship of public international law and domestic law is a relationship between two different legal spheres and that the nature of this relationship can only be determined from the viewpoint of domestic law only by domestic law itself.’

171 Nollkaemper himself recognizes that in order for international claims to be adjudicated in domestic courts ‘international law has to be valid in national law’. Nollkaemper (n 131) 68–74.

172 Kelsen (n 111) 420.

173 See Deener, DR, ‘Comment: International Law Provisions in Post-World War II Constitutions’ (1951) 36 CornellLRev 505, 522–8Google Scholar; Wilson, RR, ‘International Law in New National Constitutions’ (1964) 58 AJIL 432CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an earlier account see Pergler, C ‘Constitutional Recognition of International Law’ (1944) 30(2) VaLRev 30(2) 318Google Scholar.

174 See Stein, E, ‘International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions?’ (1994) 88 AJIL 427CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ginsburg, T, Chernykh, S and Elkins, Z, ‘Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law’ (2008) UIlLRev 201, 207–10Google Scholar; Chang, WC and Yeh, JR, ‘Internationalization of Constitutional Law’ in Rosenfeld, M and Sajó, A (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 1168Google Scholar.

175 Cassese, A, ‘Modern Constitutions and International Law’ (1985-III) 192 Recueil des Cours 331Google Scholar; Vereshchetin, VS, ‘New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between International Law and National Law’ (1996) 7 EJIL 1, 4–8Google Scholar; Buergenthal, T, ‘Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties’ (1998) 36 ColumJTransnatlL 211Google Scholar; Hathaway, OA, ‘Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States’ (2008) 117 YaleLJ 1236, 1362–72Google Scholar; Peters (n 118) 171; Nollkaemper (n 131) 151.

176 See Schwartz, H, ‘The Internationalization of Constitutional Law’ (2003) 10(2) Hum Rts Brief 10Google Scholar. Note that by these terms I do not refer to the ‘structural changes of the international legal systems’ or to ‘the transfer of constitutional functions from the national to the international level’. On such understanding see Cottier, T and Hertig, M, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’ (2003) 7 Max Planck UNYB 261, 269–75Google Scholar. On constitutionalism beyond the state see also Trachtman, JP and Dunoff, JL (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009)Google Scholar; Schwöbel, CEJ, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dobner and Loughlin (n 127).

177 See Ginsburg, T, ‘Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law’ (2006) 38 NYUJIntlL 707Google Scholar; Ginsburg, Chernykh and Elkins (n 174).

178 Henkin (n 80) 72–4; Peters (n 118) 172; Neuman (n 103) 1891.

179 Vereshchetin (n 175) 13.

180 See Peters (n 118) 187–93; Peters, A, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in Nijman, J, and Nollkaemper, A (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (OUP 2007) 259–66Google Scholar.

181 Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Case No 17/02-24/02-06/03–22/04 on the limitation of the rights of ownership in areas of particular value and in forest land, ruling of 14 March 2006, para 9.4 <www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/2006/r060314.htm>.

182 Corte costitutizionale Judgment Nos 348/2007; 349/2007; 311/2009; 317/2009 <http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ActionPagina_328.do>. See Biondi Dal Monte, F, Fontanelli, F, ‘Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian Legal System’ (2008) 9 GermanLJ 889Google Scholar; Mirate, S, ‘The Role of the ECHR in the Italian Administrative Case Law: An Analysis after the Two Judgments of the Constitutional Court No. 348 and No. 349 of 2007’ (2009) 1 ItalianJPubL 260Google Scholar; Gentili, G, ‘A Comparison of European Systems of Direct Access to Constitutional Judges: Exploring Advantages for the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2012) 4(1) ItalianJPubL 159, 205–6Google Scholar.

183 US Const art VI, cl 2; Sloss, D, ‘The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 24 YaleJIntlL 129, 131Google Scholar.

184 See Geofroy v Riggs, 133 US 258, 267 (1890) (dictum): ‘It would not be contended that (the treaty power) extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’ See also Vazquez, CM, ‘Treaties as Law of The Land: The Supremacy Clause and The Judicial Enforcement of Treaties’ (2008) 122 HarvLRev 599, 611Google Scholar. But see Socarras (n 111) 190 (the roots of American law acknowledged the supraconstitutional statues of international law) and Levin, RZ and Chen, P, ‘Rethinking the Constitution–Treaty Relationship’ (2012) 10(1) IntlJConsL 242, 243Google Scholar (the relationship between the Constitution and treaties is better characterized by ‘mutual adjustment’).

185 On the relationship between EU law, ECHR law and national law in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania see M Bobek, D Kosai, ‘Report on the Czech Republic and Slovakia’ in Martinico and Pollicino (n 121) 117; I Raducu, ‘Report on Romania’, in Martinico and Pollicino (n 121) 369.

186 P Cede, ‘Report on Austria and Germany’ in Martinico and Pollicino (n 121) 61.

187 H Keller, A Stone Sweet, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems’ in Keller and Stone Sweet (n 121) 684.

188 Constitución de la Nación Argentina (1994), art 75, para 22. See Fierrot, HF and Ayllón, SL, ‘The Impact of Globalization on the Reform of the State and the Law in Latin America’ (1997) 19 HousJIntlL 785, 799Google Scholar. On the relationship between domestic constitutional law and international human rights law in Latin America see generally Mera, MEG, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism: On the Constitutional Rank of Human Rights Treaties in Latin America through National and Inter-American Adjudication (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights 2011)Google Scholar.

189 The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art 2(2) (n 7).

190 Peters (n 118) 184. The Constitution expressly authorizes the government to enter into treaties inconsistent with the Constitution, subject to approval by two-thirds vote in both chambers of the parliament. Grondwet [Gw.] [Constitution] art 91(3) (Neth). See Alkema, EA, ‘Constitutional Law’ in Chorus, J, Gerver, PH and Hondius, E (eds), Introduction to Dutch Law (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2006) 327–30Google Scholar; E Mak, ‘Report on the Netherlands and Luxembourg’ in Martinico and Pollicino (n 121) 301.

191 See Brems, E, ‘Belgium: The Vlaams Block Political Party Convicted Indirectly of Racism’ (2006) 4 IntlJConstL 702, 710Google Scholar (‘the priority of international treaties over the Belgian Constitution is not a matter of complete consensus among Belgian constitutional lawyers, and the Court of Cassation has never before so explicitly taken a position in this debate’); P Popelier, ‘Report on Belgium’ in Martinico and Pollicino (n 121) 90 (‘the Constitutional Court has never openly expressed the primacy of the constitution over international law’).

192 Belgian Cour de cassation, Dutch Section, 2nd Chamber, Vlaamse Concentratie, Decision of 9 November 2004, para 14.1, cited in Peters (n 118) 184 and Peters (n 180) 260.

193 49 SCRA 105, 126 (1973), cited in Bernas, JG, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government: Notes and Cases: Part I (Rex Bookstore 2005) 1224Google Scholar. On the events leading to this case see Tan, SBJ, ‘The Philippines after the Lifting of Martial Law: A Lingering Authoritarianism’ (1980) 55 PhilippineLJ 418, 419Google Scholar; Roque, H, ‘The Philippines: Quezon's Wish Granted’ in Hill, C, Menzel, J (eds), Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia: Vol. 2 Reports on National Constitutions (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2008) 217–19Google Scholar.

194 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, Part 6, art 125. See generally Y Tikhomirov, ‘Russia’ in Shelton (n 98) 518, 523–4; Marochkin, SY ‘International Law in the Courts of the Russian Federation: Practice of Application’ (2007) 6(2) ChineseJIL 329Google Scholar.

195 Supreme Court of Russian Federation (plenum), decision No 5 of 10 October 2003, ‘on application of the universally recognized principles and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation by courts of general jurisdiction’, para 1. An English translation is available at Burkov, A, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russia Law (ibidem-Verlag 2007) 124–34Google Scholar.

196 Bundesbeschluss über die Volksinitiative ‘für eine vernünftige Asylpolitik und gegen die illegale. Einwanderung.’ 14 March 1996, BBI 1996 I 1355, cited and elaborated in de Wet, E, ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15(1) EJIL 97, 101–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Zimmermann (n 145) 258. On the peremptory status of the non–refoulement principle see Allain, J, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement’ (2001) 13(4) IJRL 533CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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198 Botschaft über die Volksinitiatieven ‘für eine vernünftige Asylpolitik und gegen die illegale Einwanderung’. In BBI 1994 III 1489, 1495–1500, cited in de Wet (n 196).

199 This opinion of the Swiss Federal Council was somewhat contrary to a prior decision of 1953, in which it held that no external limitations exist upon the constitutional process that can be deemed superior to the people's will (BBI 1954 I 72). In its later opinion, the Federal Council distinguished between treaty obligations, which state parties can legally terminate and were at issue in the 1953 initiative, and jus cogens norms, which were at issue in the 1994 initiative. See de Wet (n 196) 102–3.

200 See Biaggini (n 5) 316–17; Diggelmann, O, ‘Switzerland and the European Convention on Human Rights: Particularities in a Nutshell’ (2007) Jura 171, 173Google Scholar.

201 See Moeckli, D, ‘Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals: Swiss Direct Democracy and Human rights’ (2011) 11(4) HRLRev 774, 781Google Scholar.

202 Bericht des Bundesrates uber das Verhaltnis von Volkerrecht und Landesrecht, 5 March 2010, Bundesblatt 2010, 2263 at 2310, 2323, 2328–2331, cited in Moeckli ibid 785.

203 Neuman (n 103) 1875–6.

204 On ‘unamendable provisions’ as valid and binding see Roznai (n 11). See also Kelsen, H, ‘Derogation’ in Newman, RA (ed), Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound (Bobbs-Merrill 1962) 343–4Google Scholar; Kelsen, H, General Theory of Norms (Clarendon Press 1991) 109–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kelsen, HGeneral Theory of Law and State (The Lawbook Exchange 2007) 259Google Scholar; Gözler (n 40) 52; Roznai and Yolcu (n 1) 190–5.

205 Oppenheim, L, ‘Introduction’, in Picciotto, CM, Relational Law to the Law of England and the United States (McBride, Nast & Co 1915) 10Google Scholar : ‘Neither can International Law per se create or invalidate Municipal Law, nor can Municipal Law per se create or invalidate International Law. International Law and Municipal Law are in fact two totally and essentially different bodies of law … Of course, it is possible for the Municipal Law of an individual State by custom or by statute to adopt rules of International Law as part of the law of the land, and then the respective rules of International Law become ipso facto rules of Municipal Law.’

206 Garlicki and Garlicka (n 69) 364.

207 Peters, A, ‘The Bananas Decision (2000) of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Towards Reconciliation with the European Court of Justice as Regards Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’, in (2000) 43 GerYBIL 276, 282Google Scholar.

208 Compare McCormick, JP, ‘Book Review: Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves’ (1999) 25 NYURevL&SocChange 109, 118Google Scholar: ‘As legal fora increasingly lose direct state-related implementation power as a result of globalization and regionalization, judges will need to consider methods that pursue civil and social justice when actual implementation is likely to be imperfect or ineffectual.’

209 Recall David Dyzenhaus's criticism of the South African judiciary who, according to him, should have confronted the government and resisted apartheid. While those judges saw themselves bound by domestic law, they could have invoked common law rights and freedoms to protect members of the society. Dyzenhaus, D, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order (Hart Publishing 1998) 14–15Google Scholar.

210 Peters, A and Preuss, U, ‘International Relations and International Law’ in Tushnet, M, Fleiner, T and Saunders, C (eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge 2012) 36–9Google Scholar; Nollkaemper (n 131) 199–200; Peters (n 118).

211 See for example with regard to East Asia: Lee, KG, ‘From Monadic Sovereignty to Civitas Maxima: A Critical Perspective on the (Lack of) Interfaces between International Human Rights Law and National Constitutions in East Asia’ (2010) 5(1) NationalTaiwanUniLRev 155Google Scholar.

212 See Rosenfeld, M, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts’ (2004) 2 IntlJConstL 633, 655Google Scholar; Bork, R, The Tempting of America (Free Press 1990) 66Google Scholar (arguing that recognizing supra-constitutional norms invites judicial activism).

213 Vereshchetin (n 175) 14.

214 But see Martinico (n 121) 424: ‘today, the issue of the ECHR's primacy and direct effect does not depend just on what is written in the constitutions, it is something that seems to go beyond the full control of national constitutions’.

215 de Wet (n 196) 103.

216 Slaughter, AM and White, WB, ‘The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law)’ (2006) 47(2) HarvIntlLJ 327, 350Google Scholar (for them, this slogan ‘refers not simply to domestic law but to domestic politics. More precisely, the future of international law lies in its ability to affect, influence, bolster, backstop, and even mandate specific actors in domestic politics’).

217 Wright, Q, ‘International Law in Its Relation to Constitutional Law’ (1923) 17 AJIL 234, 239CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

218 ibid 244.

219 Compare Claes, M, ‘The Europeanisation of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalisation of Europe: Some Observations against the Background of the Constitutional Experience of the EU-15’ (2007) 3 CYELP 1, 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

220 Torrijo (n 129) 491.

221 Grimm (n 127) 16.

222 Simpson, G, Law, War & Crime (Polity Press 2007) 46Google Scholar.

223 This may not be the case when one argues that the original constituent power is limited. Here, resorting to supra-constitutional theories might be unavoidable. See Keshavamurthy, CV, Amending Power Under The Indian Constitution: Basic Structure Limitations (Deep & Deep Publications 1982) 87Google Scholar, n 29: ‘Taken to logical limits it can even be argued that the human values protected by the International Covenants operate as limitations even on the ultimate Sovereignty in any community which would prefer to remain as a member of the community of civilized nations.’ See also Franck, TM and Thiruvengadam, AK, ‘Norms of International Law Relating to the Constitution-Making Process’ in Miller, LE (ed), Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making (United States Institute of Peace Press 2010) 3Google Scholar.

224 cf The German Constitutional Court Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, para 218 <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>: ‘Through what is known as the eternity guarantee, the Basic Law … makes clear … that the Constitution of the Germans, in accordance with the international development which has taken place in particular since the existence of the United Nations, has a universal foundation which cannot be amended by positive law.’

225 de Wet (n 196) 104.

226 For example, with regard to the initiative to ban the construction of minarets, the Federal authorities did not find any violation of peremptory norms, claiming that the freedom to exercise one's religion and the prohibition on discrimination do not form part of jus cogens. Similarly, with regard to the initiative requiring the automatic expulsion of foreign nationals convicted of certain criminal offences specified by law, it was argued that it could be implemented in a way that respects the prohibition on refoulement. zur Volksinitiative, Botschaft ‘Gegen den Bau von Minaretten’ Bundesblatt 2008, 7603, 7609–12Google Scholar; zur Volksinitiative, Botschaft ‘fur die Ausschaffung krimineller Auslander (Ausschaffungsinitiative)’, Bundesblatt 2009, 5097, 5106–13Google Scholar, cited in Moeckli (n 201) 781–82.

227 Herdegen (n 35) 605.

228 Carter, WM, ‘Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation’ (2010) 69 MdLRev 344, 389Google Scholar.