To estimate the clinical and economic burden of Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD) in Massachusetts over 2 years.

A retrospective analysis of Massachusetts hospital discharge data from 1999-2003 was conducted. Cases of CDAD in 2000 were identified using code 008.45 from the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification; patients were excluded if they had a hospitalization in the prior year during which a diagnosis of CDAD was recorded. Hospitalizations for CDAD during 2001 and 2002 were examined. For primary case patients (ie, those for which CDAD was the principal diagnosis), all inpatient costs were deemed to be related, whereas for secondary case patients, all-patient refined diagnosis-related group assignment, case severity level, and length of stay (LOS) were used to calculate incremental costs attributable to CDAD. Costs were adjusted to the national level and reported in 2005 US dollars.

The CDAD cohort consisted of 3,692 patients; 59% were women, and the mean age was 70 years. This group represented 1% of all patients hospitalized in Massachusetts in 2000 (96% of hospitals treated at least 1 case; range, 1-257 cases). Of patients who received a first hospital diagnosis of CDAD in 2000, a total of 28% were primary case patients; their mean LOS was 6.4 days, and the mean cost per stay was $10,212. For secondary case patients, the mean CDAD-related incremental LOS was 2.95 days, and the mean incremental cost per stay was $13,675 per patient. Of patients with CDAD who survived their index stay in 2000, a total of 455 (14%) had at least 1 readmission for CDAD within the subsequent 2 years (mean number of readmissions, 1.4 per patient; range, 1-7 readmissions), with a mean time to first readmission of 3 months. Over 2 years, a total of 55,380 inpatient-days and $51.2 million were consumed by CDAD management.

CDAD is widespread in Massachusetts hospitals. Rehospitalization with CDAD, if it occurs, generally happens within a few months and happens multiple times for some patients. Based on this study's findings, a conservative estimate of the annual US cost for CDAD management is $3.2 billion dollars.

To describe methods to assess the practical impact of risk adjustment for central line-days on the interpretation of central line–associated bloodstream infection (BSI) rates, because collecting these data is often burdensome.

We analyzed data from 247 hospitals that reported to the adult and pediatric intensive care unit component of the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System from 1995 through 2003. For each unit each year, we calculated the percentile error as the absolute value of the difference between the percentile based on a risk-adjusted or more-sophisticated measure (eg, the central line–day rate) and the percentile based on a crude or less-sophisticated measure (eg, the patient-day rate). Using rate per central line–day as the “gold standard,” we calculated performance characteristics (eg, sensitivity and predictive values) of rate per patient-day for finding central line–associated BSI rates higher or lower than the mean. Greater impact of risk adjustment is indicated by higher values for percentile error and lower values for performance characteristics.

The median percentile error was ± 7 (ie, the percentile based on central line-days could be 7% higher or lower than the percentile based on patient-days). This error was less than 10 percentile points for 62% of the unit-years, was between 10 and 19 percentile points for 22% of the unit-years, and was 20 percentile points or more for 15% of the unit-years. Use of the rate based on patient-days had a sensitivity of 76% and a positive predictive value of 61% for detecting a significantly high or low central line–associated BSI rate.

We found that risk adjustment for central line–days has an important impact on the calculated central line–associated BSI percentile for some units. Similar methods can be used to evaluate the impact of other risk adjustment methods. Our results support current recommendations to use central line–days for surveillance of central line–associated BSI when comparisons are made among facilities.

In 2002, federal regulations authorized the use of standing orders programs (SOPs) for promoting influenza and pneumococcal vaccination. In 2003, the New Jersey Hospital Association conducted a demonstration project illustrating the efficacy of SOPs, and the state health department informed healthcare facilities of their benefits. We describe the prevalence of reported use of SOPs in New Jersey hospitals in 2003 and 2005 and identify hospital characteristics associated with the use of SOPs.

A survey was mailed to the directors of infection control at 117 New Jersey hospitals during the period from January to May 2005 (response rate, 90.6%). Data on hospital characteristics were obtained from hospital directories and online resources.

The prevalence of use of SOPs for influenza vaccination was 50% (95% confidence interval [CI], 40.1%-59.9%) in 2003, and it increased to 78.3% (95% CI, 69.2%-85.7%) in 2005. The prevalence of SOP use for pneumococcal vaccination was similar. In 2005, the reported rate of use of SOPs for inpatients (influenza vaccination, 76.4%; pneumococcal vaccination, 75.5%) was significantly higher than that for outpatients (influenza vaccination, 9.4%; pneumococcal vaccination, 8.5%). Prevalence ratios for SOP use comparing acute care and non-acute care hospitals were 1.71 (95% CI, 1.2-2.5) for influenza vaccination SOPs and 1.8 for (95% CI, 1.2-2.7) pneumococcal vaccination SOPs. Acute care hospitals with a ratio of admissions to total beds greater than 36.7 reported greater use of SOPs for pneumococcal vaccination, compared with those that had a ratio of less than 36.7.

The increase in the prevalence of reported use of SOPs among New Jersey hospitals in 2005, compared with 2003, was contemporaneous with SOP-related actions taken by the federal government, the state government, and the New Jersey Hospital Association. Opportunities persist for increased use of SOPs among non-acute care hospitals and for outpatients.

Rabies virus was inadvertently transmitted to a lung transplant recipient through donor lungs. The patient was given ventilatory assistance and cared for postoperatively for 6 weeks before a diagnosis of rabies virus infection was made. Postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) was offered to potentially exposed healthcare workers (HCWs).

Only HCWs classified as belonging to possible and/or proven contact groups (according to a standardized interview) received PEP. The risk of individual HCWs being exposed to rabies virus was reassessed on the basis of viral concentrations measured in the patient's excretions and body fluids. HCWs who were vaccinated as part of PEP were followed up prospectively according to a standardized procedure.

Of 179 HCWs and other patient contacts, 132 met the eligibility criteria for PEP (118 [89.4%] with possible contact and 14 [10.6%] with proven contact with the patient's excretions and/or body fluids). One hundred thirty-one individuals started PEP, and 126 met the inclusion criteria for analysis. Of these, 48 (38%) developed at least 1 adverse effect (8 [6.3%] had fever, 37 [29.4%] had headache, 3 [2.4%] had lymphadenopathy, 17 [13.5%] had dizziness, and 6 [4.8%] had paresthesia). No HCW or other patient contact developed rabies or serious PEP-related adverse effects. Reassessment of the individual's risk of infection as a function of the viral concentration in the patient's excretions and/or body fluids (up to 5.12 × 107 copies/mL) revealed that 103 HCWs (78.0%) had contact with high-risk substances (89 [67.40%] had possible contact and 14 [10.7%] had proven contact).

HCWs can be exposed to significant viral concentrations in excretions and/or body fluids from rabies virus-infected lung transplant recipients. Because widespread use of PEP entails the possibility of significant health problems for HCWs considered to be at risk of contracting rabies, applying a rational indication for PEP is crucial.

To evaluate (1) the framework of the 12 Steps to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance Among Hospitalized Adults that is part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Campaign to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings, with regard to steps addressing antimicrobial use; and (2) methods of feedback to clinicians regarding antimicrobial use after postprescription review.

Prospective intervention to identify and modify inappropriate antimicrobial therapy.

A 1,000-bed, tertiary care teaching hospital.

Inpatients in selected medicine and surgery units receiving broad-spectrum antimicrobials for 48-72 hours.

We created a computer-based clinical-event detection system that automatically identified inpatients taking broad-spectrum and “reserve” antimicrobials for 48-72 hours. Although prior approval was required for initial administration of broad-spectrum and reserve antimicrobials, once approval was obtained, therapy with the antimicrobials could be continued indefinitely at the discretion of the treating clinician. Therapy that was ongoing at 48-72 hours was reviewed by an infectious diseases pharmacist or physician, and when indicated feedback was provided to clinicians to modify or discontinue therapy. Feedback was provided via a direct telephone call, a note on the front of the medical record, or text message sent to the clinician's pager. The acceptance rate of feedback was recorded and recommendations were categorized according to the 12 steps recommended by the CDC.

Interventions were recommended for 334 (30%) of 1,104 courses of antimicrobial therapy reviewed. A total of 87% of interventions fit into one of the CDC's 12 steps of prevention: 39% into step 3 (“target the pathogen”), 1% into step 4 (“access experts”), 3% into steps 7 and 8 (“treat infection, not colonization or contamination”), 18% into step 9 (“say ‘no’ to vancomycin”), and 26% into step 10 (“stop treatment when no infection”). The rate of compliance with recommendations to improve antimicrobial use was 72%. No differences in compliance were seen with the different methods of feedback.

Nearly one-third of antimicrobial courses did not follow the CDC's recommended 12 steps for prevention of antimicrobial resistance. Clinicians demonstrated high compliance with following suggestions made after postprescription review, suggesting that it is a useful approach to decreasing and improving antimicrobial use among inpatients.

To estimate the cost of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) in a network of 28 community hospitals and to compare this sum to the amount budgeted for infection control programs at each institution and for the entire network.

We reviewed literature published since 1985 to estimate costs for specific HAIs. Using these estimates, we determined the costs attributable to specific HAIs in a network of 28 hospitals during a 1-year period (January 1 through December 31, 2004). Cost-saving models based on reductions in HAIs were calculated.

Twenty-eight community hospitals in the southeastern region of the United States.

The weight-adjusted mean cost estimates for HAIs were $25,072 per episode of ventilator-associated pneumonia, $23,242 per nosocomial blood stream infection, $10,443 per surgical site infection, and $758 per catheter-associated urinary tract infection. The median annual cost of HAIs per hospital was $594,683 (interquartile range [IQR], $299,057-$l,287,499). The total annual cost of HAIs for the 28 hospitals was greater than $26 million. Hospitals budgeted a median of $129,000 (IQR, $92,500-$200,000) for infection control; the median annual cost of HAIs was 4.6 (IQR, 3.4-8.0) times the amount budgeted for infection control. An annual reduction in HAIs of 25% could save each hospital a median of $148,667 (IQR, $74,763-$296,861) and could save the group of hospitals more than $6.5 million.

The economic cost of HAIs in our group of 28 study hospitals was enormous. In the modern age of infection control and patient safety, the cost-control ratio will become the key component of successful infection control programs.

The incidence of Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD) appears to be increasing. Population-based estimates of disease have been limited, and analyses of hospital-level risk factors for CDAD are lacking. We sought to determine the incidence and trends of CDAD in Oregon and to identify hospital-level factors associated with increases in disease.

We analyzed hospital discharge data to calculate the incidence and to describe trends of CDAD in Oregon from 1995 through 2002. We administered questionnaires to hospital laboratory directors, infection control practitioners, and pharmacists to determine the status of laboratory, infection control, and pharmacy policies over time.

The overall incidence of CDAD in Oregon was 3.5 case patients per 10,000 residents in 2002. Incidence increased from 1.4 to 3.3 cases per 1,000 hospital discharges from 1995 to 2002. Rates of disease increased most in hospitals with licensed bed capacity of more than 250 beds and more than 5 intensive care unit beds. Few laboratories, infection control practitioners, and pharmacists were able to identify changes in specific policies over the study period.

This is the first study to determine a statewide population-based incidence of CDAD. Incidence of CDAD in Oregon has more than doubled over the past decade; larger hospitals experienced the greatest increase in disease rates. We did not identify hospital-level policies that could explain the increase. A study of patients with CDAD at the hospitals with the largest increases is underway to further identify risk factors.

Shift work has been found to be associated with an increased rate of errors and accidents among healthcare workers (HCWs), but the effect of shift work on accidental blood and body fluid exposure sustained by HCWs has not been well characterized.

To determine the duration of time on shift before accidental blood and body fluid exposure in housestaff, nurses, and technicians and the proportion of housestaff who sustain a blood and body fluid exposure after 12 hours on duty.

This retrospective, descriptive study was conducted during a 24-month period at a large urban teaching hospital. Participants were HCWs who sustained an accidental blood and body fluid exposure.

Housestaff were on duty significantly longer than both nursing staff (P = .02) and technicians (P < .0001) before accidental blood and body fluid exposure. Half of the blood and body fluid exposures sustained by housestaff occurred after being on duty 8 hours or more, and 24% were sustained after being on duty 12 hours or more. Of all HCWs, 3% reported an accidental blood and body fluid exposure, with specific rates of 7.9% among nurses, 9.4% among housestaff, and 3% among phlebotomists.

Housestaff were significantly more likely to have longer duration of time on shift before blood and body fluid exposure than were the other groups. Almost one-quarter of accidental blood and body fluid exposures to housestaff were incurred after they had been on duty for 12 hours or more. Housestaff sustained a higher rate of accidental blood and body fluid exposures than did nursing staff and technicians.

Surveillance of nosocomial bloodstream infection (BSI) is recommended, but time-consuming. We explored strategies for automated surveillance.

Cohort study. We prospectively processed microbiological and administrative patient data with computerized algorithms to identify contaminated blood cultures, community-acquired BSI, and hospital-acquired BSI and used algorithms to classify the latter on the basis of whether it was a catheter-associated infection. We compared the automatic classification with an assessment (71% prospective) of clinical data.

An 850-bed university hospital.

All adult patients admitted to general surgery, internal medicine, a medical intensive care unit, or a surgical intensive care unit over 3 years.

The results of the automated surveillance were 95% concordant with those of classical surveillance based on the assessment of clinical data in distinguishing contamination, community-acquired BSI, and hospital-acquired BSI in a random sample of 100 cases of bacteremia. The two methods were 74% concordant in classifying 351 consecutive episodes of nosocomial BSI with respect to whether the BSI was catheter-associated. Prolonged episodes of BSI, mostly fungemia, that were counted multiple times and incorrect classification of BSI clinically imputable to catheter infection accounted for 81% of the misclassifications in automated surveillance. By counting episodes of fungemia only once per hospital stay and by considering all cases of coagulase-negative staphylococcal BSI to be catheter-related, we improved concordance with clinical assessment to 82%. With these adjustments, automated surveillance for detection of catheter-related BSI had a sensitivity of 78% and a specificity of 93%; for detection of other types of nosocomial BSI, the sensitivity was 98% and the specificity was 69%.

Automated strategies are convenient alternatives to manual surveillance of nosocomial BSI.

To assess the impact of real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) detection of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) on nosocomial transmission and costs.

Monthly MRSA detection rates were measured from April 1, 2000, through December 31, 2005. Time series analysis was used to identify changes in MRSA detection rates, and decision analysis was used to compare the costs of detection by PCR and by culture.

A 1,200-bed, tertiary care hospital in Canada.

Admitted patients at high risk for MRSA colonization. MRSA detection using culture-based screening was compared with a commercial PCR assay.

The mean monthly incidence of nosocomial MRSA colonization or infection was 0.37 cases per 1,000 patient-days. The time-series model indicated an insignificant decrease of 0.14 cases per 1,000 patient-days per month (95% confidence interval, —0.18 to 0.46) after the introduction of PCR detection (P = .39). The mean interval from a reported positive result until contact precautions were initiated decreased from 3.8 to 1.6 days (P<.001). However, the cost of MRSA control increased from Can$605,034 to Can$771,609. Of 290 PCR-positive patients, 120 (41.4%) were placed under contact precautions unnecessarily because of low specificity of the PCR assay used in the study; these patients contributed 37% of the increased cost. The modeling study predicted that the cost per patient would be higher with detection by PCR (Can$96) than by culture (Can$67).

Detection of MRSA by the PCR assay evaluated in this study was more costly than detection by culture for reducing MRSA transmission in our hospital. The cost benefit of screening by PCR varies according to incidences of MRSA colonization and infection, the predictive values of the assay used, and rates of compliance with infection control measures.

To identify infection control policies and practices used by Iowa long-term care facilities (LTCFs) for residents with Clostridium difficile infection or C. difficile-associated diarrhea and to assess use of antimicrobial agents.

Survey.

LTCFs in Iowa that responded between March 25, 2005 (ie, when surveys were mailed), and July 2005.

Of the 418 LTCFs in Iowa, 263 (62.9%) responded. Most facilities (94.3%) reported that they accept persons known to have C. difficile infection. Few LTCFs reported that clusters of C. difficile infection had been identified. However, only 111 facilities (42.2%) had a protocol to identify residents with C. difficile infection, and most (77.5%) did not test for C. difficile unless a resident had severe diarrhea. Only 58.5% of the facilities placed residents with C. difficile infection in private rooms, and 60.9% cohorted residents infected with C. difficile with other residents with C. difficile colonization or infection. Only 66 facilities (25.1%) have a program to control the use of antimicrobial agents. Staff could use alcohol-based hand gel products after contact with residents known to have C. difficile infection (in 188 facilities [71.5%]) or diarrhea (in 173 [65.8%]). However, the survey did not ask whether the staff used alcohol-based products instead of soap and water.

C. difficile is present in Iowa LTCFs, but many C. difficile infections probably remain undiagnosed. Staff in LTCFs should be educated about this organism so that they can implement appropriate testing and preventive strategies.