The occurrence of a foodborne outbreak of Salmonella drypool, an uncommon serotype, led to the recognition of hospital-acquired cases occurring over a 5-year period. In late 1981, a catered luncheon resulted in an epidemic of S. drypool, and in retrospect, cases were found to have been occurring in hospital patients from 1977 until 1981. Over the next 4 months, patients, employees, and 50% of the kitchen workers became infected, despite repeated culture surveys of the staff and removal of all infected workers. Food and environmental cultures failed to reveal the source of infection, but infected workers were observed to have multiple negative cultures over several months and then to become positive again. Closing of the kitchen for 2 weeks failed to stop the epidemic. Finally, all kitchen employees, both infected and uninfected, were treated with trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole for 2 weeks. After treatment, no new kitchen workers became infected, although two workers who had had positive cultures earlier in the epidemic began to excrete S. drypool again, and the epidemic ended.

Forty percent to 60% of antimicrobial agents administered in hospitals without effective antimicrobial review and control programs are not needed. Excessive use of antimicrobial agents in the hospital promotes colonization of patients with resistant organisms, needlessly exposes them to the risk of an adverse drug reaction, and increases the cost of care. A gradated antimicrobial utilization review program is presented that determines hospital usage, develops guidelines for appropriate cost-effective drug administration, provides several options for implementation, and monitors outcome so that measures can be modified for specific situations. The techniques used are basic epidemiologic measures currently used to assess hospital infections.

Resuscitation bags at the bedside of 12 intubated ICU patients with known culture positive sputum were evaluated as possible reservoirs of pathogenic bacteria. As oxygen was constantly flowing into the bags, sampling of gas continuously emitted from the exhalation valve assembly was sampled to detect if a bacteria-laden aerosol was being created. Positive cultures were obtained from 75% of the valves and 25% of the aerosol samples. In those patients with gram-negative bacteria in their sputum, 71% of the valves and 29% of the gas samples were positive for the same organisms. Various methods to control this possible contributing factor to nosocomial infection in the ICU are discussed.

A statistical algorithm was used to identify potentially important clusters among nosocomial infections reported each month by 7 community hospitals. Epidemiologic review and on-site investigations distinguished outbreaks of clinical disease from factitious clusters. In 1 year, 8 outbreaks were confirmed. They involved 82 patients—approximately 2% of patients with nosocomial infections and 0.09% of all discharges. One true outbreak occurred for every 12,000 discharges—at least 1 outbreak per year for the average community hospital. Five (63%) outbreaks were recognized independently by the hospitals' infection control personnel. Four (50%) resolved spontaneously; the hospitals' own control measures were necessary in 2; and 2 resolved only after an outside investigation. Organized surveillance appears necessary to detect some outbreaks, and control measures are needed to stop many. Since, however, outbreaks account for such a small proportion of nosocomial infections, infection control programs should be sufficiently staffed and managed so that most of the effort is directed toward the surveillance and control of endemic infection problems, but with adequate resources remaining to respond to outbreaks when they occur.

We investigated the feasibility of transducer head disinfection with 70% alcohol wipes. In the initial trial, nine gas-sterilized transducers were inoculated with an estimated 5 × 106 organisms of a clinical isolate of Enterobacter cloacae, mimicking a contaminated fluid couple. A sterile disposable transducer dome was attached to each transducer. The units were allowed to sit for 24 hours at room temperature; the domes were then removed. Three transducer heads were cultured prior to disinfection to ensure that viable organisms remained. Each transducer head was wiped clean with a single alcohol wipe, allowed to dry, and then cultured. All nine cultures showed growth of E. cloacae. A second series of trials with 54 transducers employed an identical protocol, except that each transducer head received not one, but two, applications of alcohol. In addition to E. cloacae (26 runs), Staphylococcus aureus, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Candida albicans were employed in nine, nine and ten runs, respectively. Cultures of 53 of 54 transducer heads showed no growth; the single positive culture was attributed to an error in technique. These preliminary results suggest that the double-alcohol-wipe technique may be an easy, cost-effective, alternative or supplemental method of transducer head disinfection. However, we do not advocate routine implementation of this technique in patient care settings until clinical trials confirm its safety and efficacy.

Over a period of 35 days beginning July 23, 1984, the Infection Control Section of the Nassau Hospital, a 535-bed community teaching institution received reports of an unusually high number of PPD tuberculin skin test conversions among employees from Employee Health Service personnel.

The first case involved a registered nurse who, upon receiving a routine annual Mantoux skin test on July 23, converted from the previous year's negative reaction to a significant reaction (20 mm induration) with a greater than normal area of erythema. When she reported this to her private medical doctor prior to beginning INH prophylaxis, she was retested by the physician. This test was read as nonreactive.

Many employee health programs perform skin-tests on employees after exposure to pulmonary tuberculosis. This activity has become standard in employee health programs. The scenario in most health care facilities involves employees who are exposed to patients with active pulmonary tuberculosis. Many of these patients have active disease that is not detected during their hospitalization, and personnel are exposed unknowingly. The diagnosis of tuberculosis is often made after the patient is discharged which may result in contact tracing of exposed employees. This activity seems straightforward at first glance but is usually time-consuming and cumbersome. The first questions often asked are: what constitutes a dangerous patient and what is the definition of an exposure?