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Management of Potential Laboratory Exposure to Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus Implications for Pandemic Planning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2015

Catherine Susan Marshall ,
Kaylene Styles ,
Gordon Abraham  and
Eugene Athan
Catherine Susan Marshall
Affiliation:
Department of Infectious Diseases, Barwon Health, Geelong, Victoria, Australia
Kaylene Styles
Affiliation:
Department of Infectious Diseases, Barwon Health, Geelong, Victoria, Australia
Gordon Abraham
Affiliation:
Australian Animal Health Laboratory, East Geelong, Victoria, Australia
Eugene Athan*
Affiliation:
Department of Infectious Diseases, Barwon Health, Geelong, Victoria, Australia
*
Department of Infectious Diseases, Barwon Health, Ryrie St., Geelong, VIC 3220, Australia ([email protected])
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Abstract

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Type
Letters to the Editor
Information
Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology , Volume 30 , Issue 5 , May 2009 , pp. 504 - 506
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 2009

References

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