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Second-Personal Respect, the Experiential Aspect of Respect, and Feminist Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Amanda Roth
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Abstract

I argue that Stephen Darwall's account of second-personal respect should be of special interest to feminists because it opens up space for the development of certain feminist resources. Specifically, Darwall's account leaves room for an experiential aspect of respect, and I suggest that abilities related to this aspect may vary along with social position. I then point out a potential parallel between the feminist critique of epistemology and a budding feminist critique of moral philosophy (specifically relating to respect).

Type
Original Articles
Information
Hypatia , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , Spring 2010 , pp. 316 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by Amanda Roth

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